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Near East/South Asia Report

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28 January 1986

NEAR EAST/SOUTH ASIA REPORT

CONTENTS

ARAB AFRICA

TUNISIA

- Exploitation of Natural Resources for Development Projects
(Wajdi Saihi; DIALOGUE, 11 Nov 85)..... 1

ARAB EAST/ISRAEL

ISRAEL

- Tehiya Leader Comments on Kahane's KAKH Movement
(Yuval Ne'man; YEDI'OT AHARONOT, 13 Aug 85)..... 4
- Peace Now Activism Urged
(Avraham Frank; 'AL HAMISHMAR, 2 Sep 85)..... 7
- One-Time Peres Aide Profiled
(Hagit Slotky; BAMAHANE, 2 Oct 85)..... 12
- Outgoing Chief Military Police Officer Interviewed
(BAMAHANE, 9 Oct 85)..... 15
- Interview With NAHAL Commander
(Yoram Gilbo'a Interview; BAMAHANE, 27 Nov 85)..... 18
- 'Atlit Prison After Lebanon War Examined
(Barukh Ron; BAMAHANE, 9 Oct 85)..... 21
- Size of Black Market Estimated
(YEDI'OT AHARONOT, 30 Jul 85)..... 23

Sectors To Be Hurt by Unemployment Forecast (YEDI'OT AHARONOT, 12 Aug 85).....	26
Employment Situation in Arab Sector Reviewed (Muhammad Khalilah; DAVAR, 18 Oct 85).....	29
New Right g Weekly Planned (Y Sheleg; BAMAHANE, 6 Nov 85).....	31
Drop in Interest Rates Urged (David Lifkin; MA'ARIV, 22 Oct 85).....	33
West Bank Intellectual Favors Annexation (Mikhal Sela; KOTERET RASHIT, 13 Nov 85).....	37
Knesset Member Opposes Defense Budget Cuts (Shevah Weis; 'AL HAMISHMAR, 3 Sep 85).....	42
Elta Increases Defense Exports to Asia (Hayim Bi'or; DAVAR, 6 Sep 85).....	45
New Gun Laws Enacted (David Golan; HADASHOT, 10 Oct 85).....	46
Viability of High Tech Industry Discussed (HA'ARETZ, 15 Sep 85).....	47
Kinneret Water Quality Improves (Eli El'ad; HA'ARETZ, 23 Sep 85).....	55
Profiles of Israeli Arab Community (Roman Frister; HA'ARETZ, various dates).....	59

JORDAN

Al-Rifa'i Attempts To Deal With Economic Downturn (LE MONDE, 14 Nov 85).....	84
---	----

SAUDI ARABIA

Arab Security Studies Center Inaugurated in Riyadh (AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT, 6 Nov 85).....	87
Overall Cost of Living Continues To Drop (AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT, 26 Nov 85).....	91
Major Phosphate Deposit Discovered in North (Mansur al-Badr; AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT, 18 Nov 85).....	92
State Buying Farmers Wheat at Favorable Prices (AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT, 26 Nov 85).....	94

Various Riyadh Urban Development Projects (Ibrahim al-Kulayb; AL-RIYAD, 3 Sep 85).....	97
Various Eastern Province Agricultural Achievements Noted (Hani al-Hadif; AL-RIYAD, 8 Sep 85).....	100
Various Wadi al-Dawasir Projects Reviewed (Nasir al-Hamdan; AL-RIYAD, 3 Sep 85).....	102

SYRIA

Khaddam Rejects 'Hegemony' Over Lebanon ('Abd al-Halim Khaddam Interview; LA REVUE DU LIBAN, 16-23 Nov 85).....	106
--	-----

SOUTH ASIA

IRAN

Rafsanjani on Cooperation With Gulf States (Hojjat ol-Eslam Hashemi Rafsanjani Interview; ETTELA'AT, 18 Nov 85).....	121
Opposition Paper Comments on Soviet-Gulf Relations (London KEYHAN, 12 Dec 85).....	129
Exercises Organized To Cope With 'Coups, Public Riots' (London KEYHAN, 12 Dec 85).....	130
Relations With France Said To Be Deteriorating (London KEYHAN, 12 Dec 85).....	133
Dubayy Blasted for Extradition of Pilots Seeking Asylum (London KEYHAN, 12 Dec 85).....	136
Briefs Resident Iraqis Called to Fronts	139

PAKISTAN

U.S. Aid Prospects, Security Concerns Viewed (Jamal Rasheed; THE MUSLIM, 10, 11 Dec 85).....	140
Commentary Views Seminar on Security (Abbas Rashid; THE MUSLIM, 14 Dec 85).....	144
State Bank Annual Report Reviews Economy (Jawaid Bokhari; THE MUSLIM, 8 Dec 85).....	147

Caution Urged on 'Tightening Debt Trap'	
(Aslam Sheikh; THE MUSLIM, 14 Dec 85).....	151
Amnesty International's Charges Discussed	
(Zubeida Mustafa; VIEWPOINT, 28 Nov 85).....	153
Senate Recommends Early Repatriation of Biharis	
(THE MUSLIM, 13 Dec 85).....	157
SBPF Convention Reiterates Confederation Demand	
(Maleeha Lodhi; THE MUSLIM, 10 Dec 85).....	160

TUNISIA

EXPLOITATION OF NATURAL RESOURCES FOR DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS

Tunis DIALOGUE in French 11 Nov 85 pp 30-31

[Article by Wajdi Saihi: "Development of Central Tunisia: A Strategy Suited to the Realities and Potentials of the Region "]

[Text] In the same way that investment derives its entire significance from the size of its allocations, its results depend on procedures adopted and choices made. For the development of Central Tunisia, the procedures arise from a realistic vision oriented toward the future and strategy based on a model adapted to the realities and potentials of the entire region.

Just a few days after his visit to the south, Mohamed Mzali, prime minister and minister of the interior, paid a visit to Kairouan, thus expressing the intention and determination of the government to assure that all regions of the country will have the necessary conditions for harmonious and appropriate development.

This concern hardly comes from an option aimed solely at approving the necessary financial effort but takes its meaning from a choice made on the national level, the magnitude of which is proved, in fact, by this effort at regional promotion which so clearly recognizes the realities and the potentials to be developed. As a matter of fact, that is what Mohamed Mzali emphasized when he stated that "the economic and social development policy followed in Tunisia is staying away from stereotyped ways of thinking and imported ideas and comes from original ideas drawn from the country's realities and from our conception of the civilization of the Tunisia of the future."

It is therefore a genuinely national program based on regional realities with all that that can entail in terms of natural and human resources.

In the case of Central Tunisia, geochemical conditions, socioeconomic traditions, and the choice made at the national level, itself the product of consultation made on the regional level, result in the agricultural sector being the priority sector; and this is the direction taken by governmental action and reflected by the goals defined by the Sixth Developmental Plan as well as by the promotional effort undertaken during the last several years.

This choice also proceeds from a concern for profitability as Mohamed Mzall stated in Kairouan. In fact, the agricultural sector, supported by a series of measures (including flexible agricultural credit, availability and distribution of supplies, especially for plant health, selected seed as well as other measures for encouragement and training along with favorable climatic conditions), made it possible for the agricultural GNP to register, in just the one year of 1985, growth on the order of 15 percent, which, among other things, permitted a GNP growth exceeding expectations for that year.

A Well Defined Strategy

Starting from these elements, the strategy adopted is expressed in financial terms by an allocation, for the agricultural sector alone in the four provinces, of 150 million dinars.

This total investment is divided, as the prime minister indicated, into several large projects which reflect the ambitions of their promoters.

They are [as published: total would agree if Sidi Mansour were 5.5]

- the Central Tunisia irrigation project: 24 million dinars;
- the Central Tunisia rural development project: 19 million dinars;
- the dry cultivation development project at Sidi Bouzid: 11 million dinars;
- the irrigation project at Sidi Bouzid: 10 million dinars;
- the El Houraeb Dam on the Oued Marguellil: 30 million dinars;
- the protection of the Bourguiba Dam: 13.5 million dinars;
- the supply of potable water to rural areas: 8.2 million dinars;
- the project of the development company at Sidi Saad: 6.7 million dinars;
- the project of the development company at Sidi Mansour: 55 million dinars;
- the Oued Eddarb project: 7.5 million dinars;
- other agricultural projects: 14.7 million dinars.

The common denominator in all the projects mentioned, obviously, is the concern for guaranteeing the maximum reserve of water for rational exploitation. In fact, the region, characterized by a semidesert climate, has always seen attempts at agricultural development limited by the inadequacy of rain water. As a result, promoters of the projects insisted first, to assure the success of the endeavor, on providing it with the maximum securities; that is, on increasing irrigation sources.

The Common Denominator

This design, viable on the large project level, also is applicable to small operations; for a total of 1,200 wells are anticipated in the region, counting new drillings and wells already underway, which, at the rate of 2 surrounding hectares each, can permit the settling of 2,400 families in an area of approximately 2,500 hectares.

As for surface well drilling, 600 will be dug in the Kairouan province with credits of 1.8 million dinars, 200 at Sidi Bouzid thanks to funds amounting to 600 thousand dinars as well as about 100 in the Kasserine province plus maintenance of approximately 300 for a cost of 800 thousand dinars.

Thus, credits allocated for drilling and upkeep of wells will amount to 3.2 million dinars in addition to 3.6 million dinars from FOSDA loans, from youth employment programs, and from agricultural development which will be mobilized for equipping the wells...

It should be noted in this regard that the mobilization of underground water has increased very substantially since 1981, the developments achieved up to now reflect that. Thus, if you consider the four provinces as a whole, you find that from independence until 1980, the number of wells drilled was 7,400, while between 1980 and 1985, progress was quite remarkable since the number went to 18,600, thus logging significant increases, especially in the province of Kasserine where the number more than tripled, rising from 800 to 2,700.

In the Sidi Bouzid province, for the same period, this number went from 1,200 to 6,000, or 5 times as many; and in the Kairouan province, it was increased from 3,500 to 6,000 wells; while for the Sfax province, it went from 1,900 to 4,000 wells.

This mobilization effort is expressed in the numbers, of course, but is also confirmed by the efforts agreed upon for water and soil conservation to maintain the phreatic table. Investments dedicated to this are in the neighborhood of 2.8 million dinars for just the first stage of this work.

In conclusion, within this same perspective, the decision has been made, as Mohamed Mzali announced in his speech at Kasserine, to create an improvement and development company within the Meknassi and Menzel Bouzaiane delegations. Affecting 4,000 hectares, this decision follows upon the heels of the discovery of very significant phreatic reserves in that region which will be exploited by means of wells with an output of 100 liters per second.

Thus, this rational exploitation of groundwater and surface water will permit the creation of real centers of development which will set the standard for other projects undertaken on the industrial and trade levels.

12666

CSO: 4519/34

ISRAEL

TEHIYA LEADER COMMENTS ON KAHANE'S KAKH MOVEMENT

Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT in Hebrew 13 Aug 85 p 19

[Article by Yuval Ne'man]

[Text] Recently KAKH has increased its public support, in an almost automatic reaction to the murder of Jews by Arab terrorists. The crueller the murder, the more intense the feelings of hate toward Arabs, and the greater the desire for revenge. Rabbi Kahane's statements are a verbal release to the gathering anger. The identification with KAKH expresses the disappointment and the sense of frustration of the public that feels that tolerance and the liberal approach toward the Arab minority are getting in the way of using more drastic defense measures.

In this context, the style makes a lot of difference. It is unfortunate that it was a Likud administration that instituted the easier approach in Judaea, Samaria, and the Gaza Strip, that did away with expulsions and that enabled the establishment of Arab universities which became headquarters for terrorists. These facts were nevertheless covered up by Begin's hawkish tone. He was astute enough to provide some release for the anger in the Jewish sector. Just recall what he said after the murder of the baby in Nahariya: "The revenge of the blood of an innocent baby has not yet been invented by the devil." Begin was the one who raised the issue of capital punishment. Today the only ones to be heard are RATS representatives, and other leftists who come out for the protection of the Arab citizens. They further enrage the public and help Rabbi Kahane, to whom the angry crowd is attracted. Television reports, too, which stress opposition positions by the left, and statements made by Arab MKs, only add oil to the fire and increase identification with KAKH.

Critics from the left do not distinguish between support of Likud, Tehiya or KAKH. The prime minister expressed this opinion in recent days when he described the escalation in extremism. Anyone who considered Herut to be fascist cannot really see the difference any more. Tehiya was organized around the struggle on the whole of Israel. Likud, or at least Herut, claims sentiments for the cause, although it was the first (in the Camp David accords) to recognize, in writing, the "Palestinian nation" and its "legitimate rights..." The insistence on the Jews' right to Israel mandates unwillingness to compromise with the national demands of Palestinian Arabs.

This is the reason for the impression of some continuity in anti-Arab sentiments from Herut to Tehiya to KAKH.

Tehiya proposed to the Knesset that some kind of national service for Arab citizens be instituted. This service will be a prerequisite for obtaining the right to vote. The same will apply to Jews. Tehiya's platform addresses the relocation of Arab refugees (about 500,000 in Judaea, Samaria, and the Gaza Strip) outside of Israel as a pre-condition for peace. In contrast, the government has agreed to absorb 5,000 refugees who now live in the Canada neighborhood of western Rafah, as part of the agreement with Egypt. Tehiya mentions other options for population exchanges as part of these agreements, similar to the transfer of 10 million Germans in 1946. Tehiya's demand to annex Judaea, Samaria, and the Gaza Strip forthwith does not imply giving the Arabs there Israeli citizenship. One should recall the resistance of Golan Heights Druze to receiving Israeli identity cards. The point is also that Arabs in east Jerusalem are holding on to their Jordanian citizenship to date. Israeli citizenship should only be granted under special circumstances and following appropriate loyalty tests. These are legitimate and civilized ways to hold back the size of the Arab population in Israel, or at least its political influence. Theoretically, if the practical goal is achieved, there is some similarity here to the processes proposed by Rabbi Kahane. But his way is inciting to hate and to mass expulsions, similar to the ways Jews were expelled from European countries in the Middle Ages. This "minor difference" is the only way the public can note the vast ideological differences between all the Zionist movements, from Labor to Tehiya to KAKH. The style of inciting against the Arab population is but one expression of something that is different, deeper, disgusting, and appalling, that the public as a whole is not aware of. Anyone who hears Rabbi Kahane in the Knesset can feel it directly. For example, considering Arabs--and non-Jews as a whole--as sub-humans.

Rabbi Kahane is not thrilled with Zionism and he does not derive his inspiration from Herzl. He finds everything in the scriptures, and the state toward which he strives is conducted according to the strictest sections of the scriptures, intentionally so.

KAKH is a one leader movement. The intermediate leaders are lovers of Israel that the author thinks are not too happy with the theological content dictated by Rabbi Kahane. But their opinions carry no weight in a one leader movement. If KAKH does indeed receive several seats in the next Knesset, the national camp will thereby suffer a great and dangerous loss. The nature of Kahane's movement is such that it will not become part of any coalition. It will not be possible to establish a national unity government, since it cannot be assumed that such a government could have a majority without KAKH's votes.

If Rabbi Kahane were willing to give up the social-ethnic message of his platform, and if he could only concentrate on the struggle on the Whole of Israel, he would respond to expectations of most of his supporters, and he would also remove the partition between himself and the Zionist camp. But if he cannot overcome emotions and methods derived from the worst of the Jew-haters, and if he can only differentiate between people in a way that is totally contradictory to any Jewish tradition, the rest of the Zionist camp

will have to fight this phenomenon and divert efforts to it that could otherwise be devoted to the real struggle, that against those who would lead the nation to a division of the Land of Israel. What a shame.

8646

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ISRAEL

PEACE NOW ACTIVISM URGED

Tel Aviv 'AL HAMISHMAR in Hebrew 2 Sep 85 pp 6, 11

[Article by Avraham Frank: "New Direction for Peace Now"]

[Text] It is no secret that recently the level of activity of the Peace Now movement has been quite low. Recently voices have been heard calling the movement to organize to act against Kahanism. At any rate it is unclear what the future path of the movement is to be, and this increases the necessity for public debate on the matter and formulating of lines of action. I am not sure that we--in view of the processes which Israeli society is undergoing--have any matter more important upon which to express an opinion. The Peace Now movement was the chief instrument in the struggle against nationalistic madness and we still have no better instrument. There is no guarantee that any radical change is expected in matters of foreign affairs and defense at the government level, in the unity government, or even if there is any chance for this. There is supreme necessity for a broad-based public power, which will lay the ground for possible new processes.

The problem of discrimination, Kahanism, nationalism, is a central problem of existence in the Israeli national experience. It is impossible to exaggerate its seriousness. There is no doubt that for the past few years we have been at the hour of truth that is the most serious that Zionism has ever known and the process is becoming more severe. Zionism is being destroyed from within. And it appears that it is much easier to deal with external enemies, with challenges which are placed on us by a foreign factor, than with internal destroyers. At any rate in these confrontations--we succeeded.

Many bodies have formed around the struggle against Kahanism, they act in various sectors, generally a fairly sporadic struggle. No doubt there is urgent need for a national framework for coordination, organization, and vitalization of the activity. In general, a struggle against Fascist forces requires creation of a massive public anti-force. Then it will be possible to function with efficiency. Thus the need for a national body, which has many active supporters, amongst public figures, members of the Knesset and ministers. This body can, then, carry out local propaganda activities (educational and otherwise) on wide scale, and can appear and be seen, frequently, via the national communications media.

The question which is interesting for the purposes of this article is, if the Peace Now movement should serve as the national body to struggle against Kahanism, and if it should dedicate itself principally to this activity. It seems to me that the answer to this should be a definite NO!

We must make serious inquiry into the significance of this matter. Until now, the Peace Now movement has acted against annexation, settlement, perversion of justice in the territories, and for advancement of the peace process. Turning its resources to action principally against racism and Kahana--with all the importance these matters deserve--is placing the movement in a line of retreat. Therefore there are definitely two "lines" on this front: the first and principal line--is the line of the struggle against the conquest and settlement, and the back line--is the line of the struggle against the results of conquest and settlement. Kahana is the result and product--one of the results born of--conquest, as it was defined by Ze'ev Schiff (HA'ARETZ, 25.8.85)--"Kahana Against Likud".

The struggle against Kahana, with all the strangeness in the matter, can today be carried out along with many people from the Likud, whatever their reasons for this are. They do not see the matter the way it is presented here. In their view there is not necessarily a connection between conquest and the springing up of racism, and in their view Kahana is in no way a descendant of the Likud. These are, supposedly, two totally different interpretations.

The Peace Now movement must not abandon the front line of the struggle--the struggle for peace. There is no other national factor which can take this upon itself, and the definition of lining up at the second line is none other than a de facto admission of defeat in the struggle for peace. That is to say, there is need, and it has already been stated that it is urgent, to establish a national framework for the struggle against racism; but the Peace Now movement must continue the struggle for peace, while occasionally contributing, as a movement, in addition, to the positive struggle against racism.

To Act Against Conquest

All signs point to it being the hour to renew activity. A feeling that there is something to lean on points to the fact that Gush Emunim is losing power. It has already lost much of its glowing halo which crowned it in the past, and the many corrupt acts which-- it has become clear--are connected with its activity, with the public's unwillingness today to invest resources in the West Bank, pull out from under it the basis for its activity. the relative ease with which the settlers at the Kasbah in Hebron were removed proves the correctness of this claim.

On the other hand, for the same reasons and for additional reasons, there is a wide public which is unable to stand the crime of what is going on in the "streets of Israel," and which seeks ways to act to change; this public feels the shame which the problem of conquest is no longer just a political problem but is becoming significantly our image as the state and as the people. Today there are new dimensions to the need which many people feel--to act against conquest.

If in the past, Peace Now's activity was directed toward working for peace between Israel and her neighbors, today several additional reasons are

Kahanism has proved to all of us that there is no existing possibility, for any length of time, of being both conquerors and also mentally balanced and democratic.

The conquest gave legitimization to every detestable immoral act to be a measure of behavior. Violence born of our relation to the West Bank and its citizens, is now turned internally against us.

The conquest aids the growth of political forces who believe in its continuance.

Conquest with all its side effects, dragged us into a detestable war, a war which had an alternative, and there is no certainty that it will be the only one of its kind.

Opposition to the peace process--and to the idea of peace at all-- has become a legitimized way of thinking. The yearning for peace is no longer a norm of thought and behavior which is the only one or the dominant one.

The young generation growing up in the midst of the conquest--for whom conquest is an existing known reality and the only one--is becoming the principal victim of these foreign ways of thinking.

We are endangering the Jews of the diaspora and the system of relations between ourselves and them. The growth of Kahanism in Israel, and its becoming a factor of force, is liable to bring about development of revelations of anti-semitism against Jews throughout the world.

It appears that we are all witness today--to what only a minority were aware of in the past (it will be fair to recall here the name of Prof Leibowitz) to the full serious significance of the situation of conquest. This is a new situation which did not exist 3-4 years ago. On this background the activity of the movement must be renewed, and it must take new directions.

What to do and how to do it

A. Peace Now must continue acting as a wide public extra-parliamentary movement. It must renew activity on a national scope as well as it was in the past, but focus more on presence in the area (all the time and everywhere) and less demonstrations. Those must be saved for truly "festive" occasions. The public is very hesitant about demonstrations when it is not sure of their necessity and their chances for influence.

B. It appears that a central and important thing is the slogans with which the movement goes out to its renewed activities. I would like in this direction to suggest the following ten versions:

--Better a Jewish Country than Greater Israel

--Better a "Sane" Country than Greater Israel

--Conquest Corrupts!

--Conquest--hurts the Conqueror, hurts us

--Kahanism--"product" of Conquest. Let's Get Rid of Them Both

--Invest in Development Towns and Not in the West Bank

--Peace is Not a Tragedy--It is a Chance.

--Arab Terror and Jewish Terror, Both are Enemies of Peace

--And of course: Peace is Better than Greater Israel

Of course it is possible to find better versions, but as a general direction--this points the way. As was stated, the repertoire must be enlarged, and should no longer be just one slogan, which today no longer "covers" all the aspects of the struggle.

C. Practical Steps. Several stages are required for the renewal of activity:

1. A steering committee of the movement should be ready for the process. A flourish of activity such as suggested here, will require much effort on our part--and perseverance.
2. The chapters which the movement had in the past must be revitalized, and the active members redrafted--veterans and new.
3. To a great extent activity should be carried out on a regional basis. At the same time, the scope must be national. That is, it should be carried out simultaneously in many areas.
4. The essence of the activity will be-- massive intensive presence in the area with the positions of the movement: continuous distribution of material, Sabbath activities; presence at and against various political activities (again--the regional responsibility is crucial); holding regional explanatory meetings; frequent press conferences; regular and rapid reaction of the speaker to every relevant event, including protestation of acts of terror by Arabs; and of course, when required--demonstrations.

D. Wide Platform. At this stage the movement must turn--and expect support and participation from--all those who believe in territorial compromise, without dealing with what exactly their nature and scope is. With all the unhappiness in the matter, this is not the stage we are in. There is common public interest in cooperating with the camp of the "sane" and I believe that this camp is still the large camp.

E. The General Goal. The goal of the renewed struggle is to prove to the public that the citizens of Israel do not see our current ruling of the West Bank as a final situation and final fact; that they prefer peace; and that any other alternative will destroy the Zionist operation and the state. The goal of the struggle is also to show that "the caravan will not pass" in contrast with what the people of the right think--no annexation and no annexators.

In conclusion: a suggestion for action has been presented here. The necessary things will not be done, I fear, without the active intervention of the body of aspirers to peace in Israel--the Peace Now movement.

9182/12781
CSO: 4423/45

ISRAEL

ONE-TIME PERES AIDE PROFILED

Tel Aviv BAMAHAHE in Hebrew 2 Oct 85 p 18

[Article by Hagit Slotky: "The Last of the Mohicans"]

[Text] One of the Labor Party MK's once said that there are three people who enjoy Peres' confidence: Yosi Beylin, Elhanan Yishai and Afi Shtentzler.

The first two are among the most prominent of "Peres' boys." Beylin serves as secretary of the government. Yishai is the prime minister's advisor on development affairs and is in charge of public appeals. The third is a potential "Peres boy". Peres offered him the post of deputy director of his office, in charge of coordination between the advisors. Relying upon the description by Beylin and associates in the last issue of MONITIN, Shtentzler would have fit into this crowded corridor without much difficulty: "average height, clean-shaven, short hair, sporting a tie and a styled haircut, non-smoking, academic. The image of the college graduate that has recently swept America." Champions of individualism will point out that Shtentzler does not wear a tie. It is reasonable to suppose that had he accepted Peres' offer, they would have found him with a tie, too.

In any case, Shtentzler refused. According to MONITIN: "He got out of there as fast as he could once he realized that all of those whom he was supposed to coordinate were going to gang up to get rid of him". According to Shtentzler himself, he preferred a chosen task to an appointed one: "Until now all the jobs that I have had were selected for me to match my talents. But I was not elected by the public. The explanation in MONITIN is ridiculous since, when I was offered the job of deputy director, 'Peres' boys' were not yet under foot. Anyhow, as I said, I wanted to gain public trust."

This preference brought him to the Giv'atayim council. Secretary of the Giv'atayim workers council. Recent events in the city have brought him into the headlines. Afi Shtentzler is proof that the man makes the job. He is the man who brought together throngs to demonstrate against Kahane. On Yom Kippur eve, his wife contacted him at the council staff, a little frightened. They had begun to receive telephone threats. They warned her not let her husband come out against a holy man. Shtentzler does not get excited. The idea to come out against Kahane was his, and he has no regrets. In the first stage of the discussion he encountered opposition. Even town mayor Yaron was not

enthusiastic. But the fresh secretary swept up the others, and the outcome is well known: Kahane came, there were eggs and blows. They even planned to cut his speaker wires, but the police jumped the man with the penknife. Even without that, there was enough noise. One of the consequences: fewer people today ask who Afi Shtentzler is.

Afi Shtentzler, 32, is the youngest workers council secretary in Israel. The darling of Qeysar in particular and the Histadrut in general, he regularly has people 50 years and older coming into his room for instructions. In a picture in the local newspaper, another of his innovations, he is seen embracing the secretary of NA'AMAT in Giv'atayim. But for the caption, one might think this was his proud grandmother. The director of the religious department in the city quoted Qeysar, who quoted himself: "Would that we had a few more like Shtentzler and the Histadrut would seem different." He is the favorite son.

His age, energy and enthusiasm all work to his advantage. In the desolate workers council landscape, he really is a refreshing change. He is a sabra, young, and the veteran of a battle unit. He has been in Giv'atayim 5 months and has already increased activity in the council by 300 percent without expanding the manpower at his disposal. A gallery was opened, there was a May Day march with the participation of the Working Youth, he set up a dance troupe like those in the army, a community college for agriculture and economics, a trade union platform, and soon, he promises, the city will have a cinema.

One can look for the roots of his public activity in the army. He was a company commander in the paratroopers. He says that he loved the army very much. The brigade commander and deputy brigade commander--today Brigadier General Itziq Mordekhay, infantry commander--called him a week before his discharge and pressured him to sign up with the regular army. "I said that I was willing to go to company commander's school for only one reason. After I fought at the "Chinese farm" and saw how many officers fell around me, I knew that every additional company commander was vital for the unit. I took the course, completed it with distinction, finished my service, and was discharged. They asked me then, too, to sign up, but I did not want to. I saw that despite the war, not much had changed in the army. Things had to change--and I as an individual could have no influence."

In 1975, after discharge from the army, after the Ma'alot tragedy, Shtentzler went to work in the municipality of Tel Aviv as the official in charge of security in educational institutions. "The whole thing was then in its infancy. In the wake of Ma'alot, I had to organize parent watches in the schools in 600 institutions." In 1979 he opened the paper and saw an announcement for town secretary. He applied, together with 30 other candidates, and won the job. In the context of Labor in the towns, he got to meet Mikah Harish and several other young Laborites, who called him in 1977 to help with Peres' organizational staff. You remember the results.

"In 1981 I was again called upon by Peres. Beylin, Gid'on Levi and I were really the ones who set up the entire organizational system. I then directed for the first time the tours of the markets and the pictures of Peres embracing people. Afterwards Reagan's people used this approach in his race

for the presidency." On the staff they saw that he was good and called on him again in 1984. He arrived 3 weeks after the work had begun and saw that the general direction was not to his liking. The other activists recommended that Peres appear in closed halls. As a former paratroop commander, he spoke of Peres' appearance as a leader, in the open squares and standing tall. Peres accepted his approach, and, again, the results are well known.

"After the elections, I got a call from the prime minister's office to come to Jerusalem. I was invited as the prime minister's personal guest to the government swearing in ceremony. A few days passed and I landed the offer to serve as deputy director. But then Mikah Harish came with the workers council. This was my most difficult dilemma. In the end I decided as I did, and I am completely happy with my choice."

He works 24 hours a day and does not have time to goof off or do the things he used to do. Now he wants to make a revolution, to change the image of the Histadrut, to get close to young people. "I am working on close ties with the Working Youth in Giv'atayim."

He does not talk about plans for the future. Not yet. Ten years of public activity have taught him what he cannot say and what not to talk about. Mayoralty of the city, for example. What is certain is that he will not remain for long as secretary of the Giv'atayim workers council. And he has a good excuse: "I think one should not sit too long on one chair."

9794

CSO: 4423/31

ISRAEL

OUTGOING CHIEF MILITARY POLICE OFFICER INTERVIEWED

Tel Aviv BAMAHANE in Hebrew 9 Oct 85 p 49

[Text] Colonel Abraham Saror is already packing. He is packing piles of reports and protocols and documents in brown cardboard files. He is packing 36 years in the investigative military police, 5 of them as chief. It is not easy to suddenly empty a large office, to leave the safes, the drawers, the shelves naked. It is as if you are emptying something in yourself. Fini.

The investigative military police is the story of Colonel Saror's life. He spent exactly 2/3 of his 52 years in that service. He grew with it. He was witness and partner to its successes and failures. He contributed, invested, left his stamp. He lived the investigative military police every day, all the time.

Grey-black hair, a small face, a wide solid body. For us he is a hard nut to crack. Even after 2 hours with him, you do not know what is concealed behind that tranquil, made up expression. He enjoys it. The questions never confuse him. He has a recipe ready-made of sly, evasive answers. He knows how to give you the feeling that this is as far as it goes; do not press further because you will not get any more. It also does not bother him that he answers most of our questions with difficulty. Even the partial answers are a bit much for him. That is how it is in the investigative military police.

When we speak with him about the successes last year, he points to the capture of stolen weapons and those who stole them. Among them were 2 soldiers who stole 20 pistols a year ago (they were sentenced to 8 years in prison, each), and the soldiers whos stole 6 M-16's. A total of 18 weapons. It is true, he says, that it is harder to trace stolen weapons, especially if they already have gotten into the hands of criminals or Arabs or other hostile elements. But the investigative military police did very good work on this. The last work year was marked by weapons crimes. The situation, in his estimation, is rather static, as in the past year. Weapons crimes are in general connected with drugs, he says. Sometimes the drug is in exchange for the stolen weapon; sometimes the thieves are addicts acting under the influence of the drug. No, there are no drug addicts, and if one should get into the IDF, he is located and immediately tossed out. But even so the problem is acute, especially in the service units. The investigative military police does not give up. They go to the units, taking urine specimens and explaining. This year almost

10,000 specimens were taken, as compared to less than 8,000 a year ago. There was actually a drop in the number of suspects. Perhaps, he speculates, they are beginning to be afraid of being caught.

The chief of staff told him recently that Lebanon is to the north of us, not behind us. For the investigative military police it is certainly behind us. The investigative military police had four bases in Lebanon: in Tyre, in Sidon, in Beirut, and in the Biqa'; and they did excellent work, says Saror. We came in with the IDF rescue forces and were the last to leave. Through local intelligence sources we managed to catch a lot of equipment that soldiers and civilians tried to smuggle. Drugs, too. Hundreds, perhaps thousands, of packages of hashish and heroin hidden in tires, in seats, in almost every part of a car. Drug sniffing dogs helped a lot.

But Lebanon also wore them down. Five top investigators were killed in the second Tyre disaster. The investment in resources and manpower was large. Today, says the outgoing investigative military police commander, we can focus on the real problems of the IDF and devote all our strength and energy to them.

The problem of suicides, for example. That is one that he is not exactly happy to talk about. He does not believe that the army is the reason. The people come with baggage from their civilian life, baggage of pressure and problems. Suddenly they do not have the warmth of home, and there are additional problems and difficulties. They also have the tools to take their own lives.

Judaea and Samaria are also on the agenda. The investigative military police is there, looking into abuse of the inhabitants by IDF soldiers. The so-called abuse, according to Saror. We found the donkey--he is smiling--but not the one who kissed him. [An allusion to a purported incident in which an Arab was forced to kiss a donkey.] The Arab who claims that he saw the incident or heard about it has not been able to point out the one who did the kissing. In any case, every criminal act apparently involving an IDF soldier is investigated and will be investigated thoroughly.

His forecast for the coming year tries to be optimistic. It is a bit hard. When there is economic recession, he says, there are more crimes. Especially property crimes. He hopes that the economic situation will improve, that the investigative military police will not suffer from the budget cuts, but instead will add manpower. In the meantime, touch wood, they have not been hurt, but they still lack money. For computerizing the files, for example, there is no money. The foundation is in place, everything is ready apart from the computers. In a year or two, he says.

The work has taken its toll of him. In this line of work, you hardly finish one investigation when there is already another. You have to be more and more sophisticated in order to succeed. Every criminal today knows the score, how the investigators work and what his rights are. The investigation that Saror remembers above all others and also the one that was the hardest during his tenure, was the episode involving arson on a military base some years back. The investigative military police was called in to investigate as early as the

first fire, but only after the fifth incident was a suspect detained, a fireman who worked on the base and appeared at every fire. He was the coordinating officer between the base and the investigators. The polygraph found that he was telling the truth, and he was therefore released. The fires continued. The investigative military police set up a special base that operated 24 hours a day. At a certain point in the fire field, the investigators discovered "gooseneck" fuses, and that was what led them back to the firemen. In a concealed search of the officer's car, the detectives found a number of fuses. That was the first hint.

Colonel Abraham Saror is going home. Even after his severance vacation he plans to stay in the area. Saror is, and will remain, an investigator. It is in his blood.

9794

CSO: 4423/31

ISRAEL

INTERVIEW WITH NAHAL COMMANDER

Tel Aviv BAMAHAHE in Hebrew 27 Nov 85 p 15

[Interview with NAHAL Commander Lieutenant General Yoram Gilbo'a by Nili Lahav: "I Am Not Planning on Dealing with Our Image"; date and place not given]

[Text] [Question] What characterizes NAHAL under your command, and how would you summarize its major achievements this year?

[Answer] I would think that we are not dealing with a question of characteristics, but of changes and emphasis. Each commander promotes his unit according to his personal priorities or to requirements from above, which also dictate changes. The main changes and priorities to which we accorded special attention were:

- A. Changes in the structure of order of battle and stress on boot camp training.
- B. Changes in the structure of settlement policy, which involved treatment of smaller details with a view to more fully exhausting the area of training, operational preparedness, and the subjects of the settlement groups and NAHAL in this respect.
- C. Planning of order of battle for the entire NAHAL within a half-yearly program finalized and coordinated in advance.
- D. Rotation of commanding officers among NAHAL units.
- E. Standardized uniforms and appearance for all NAHAL troops.

[Question] NAHAL often has an unflattering image among infantry soldiers, who denigrate its military value. What is the NAHAL doing to improve its image?

[Answer] I do not intend to deal with our image in the eyes of others. I have long since come to the conclusion that people are by nature more inclined to dissect, criticize, and advise others more than to deal with themselves.

Consequently, we have been endeavoring to pass mature criticism, as objectively as possible, on the NAHAL as NAHAL members, and on this basis to

implement a program designed to strengthen our self confidence and satisfaction in and with ourselves and the NAHAL.

One thing has become clear to me from discussions with company and battalion commanders, and I mean incisive discussions and examinations of the results obtained: We are on the right track, despite the fact that there is never a "halt" sign on this track.

[Question] Training has been intensified and greater stress has been put on the fullest possible military activities in NAHAL units, particularly settlements. Do not these additional duties interfere with social activities?

[Answer] Your question implies as a fact that the division of time between training and operational activities on the one hand, and NAHAL activities on the other, is weighted in favor of training. The truth is quite the contrary. In the new settlement structure, less time is put into training, but by employing different methods and techniques we have been achieving a greater efficiency. It is difficult to explain this to people who are not familiar with the way things were and with the changes made.

Some of the incorrect perceptions prevailing among the public stem from the very framework within which settlement groups are steered. The framework is military in all its aspects: that includes appearance and dress code, fulfillment of planned missions, observance of permanent and compulsory schedules, and so forth. This is the army, for all intents and purposes, only the framework is different.

[Question] In the past year you have been intensively dealing with kibbutz members joining the NAHAL, stressing that you view them as future officers. Are you certain that there is a place in the NAHAL for kibbutz members?

[Answer] I have a long account with the kibbutz members, which came to a head in the past year. I cannot see the NAHAL without the kibbutzniks serving in it. It is not conceivable that boys who grew up in kibbutzim like 'En Gedi, Gerofit, Yotvata, Nahal Oz, and many others, which started out as NAHAL settlements, would not serve in the NAHAL with a view to further establishing new kibbutzim. This also applies to kibbutzim established by the NAHAL, which to this very day continue to receive members through NAHAL settlement groups. The NAHAL is not a private IDF body. It was established for the purpose of preserving NAHAL settlement groups for the kibbutz movement during their military service, and that explains the great contribution and importance of kibbutz members in the NAHAL.

[Question] The implementation of that idea among the NAHAL, i.e., the number of NAHAL men who stay in the kibbutz at the end of their military service, is low. Many of them join the NAHAL without being certain of their desire to chose this way of life. Is that a failure on the part of NAHAL?

[Answer] A young man currently joining NAHAL has legitimate doubts about the way of life he will opt for. In view of all the temptations that cannot be immediately satisfied in a young kibbutz, such as travel abroad or studies, the young man naturally has doubts and is not certain that he would want to

stay in the kibbutz. I personally prefer the doubters to those who make solemn promises they do not know they can keep. The present reality in the State of Israel is not encouraging for those who opt for the land settlement way of life; we have been invaded by materialism and cynicism. Miraculously, however, the settlement percentages of 40 years ago correspond to those of today. Considering how much reality has changed, I view this as a success, and not a failure, for NAHAL.

12782

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ISRAEL

'ATLIT PRISON AFTER LEBANON WAR EXAMINED

Tel Aviv BAMAHAANE in Hebrew 9 Oct 85 p 49

[Article by Barukh Ron: "End of the Shiite Season"]

[Text] In 'Atlit prison they are resting up from the terrorists. The Ansar detainees were here 'only' 5 and 1/2 months, but what 5 and 1/2 months they were. What tension, what guard duty, what care. In the jail they say, whether seriously or in jest, the prisoners here had a 2 to 3 star hotel. Even if there is some exaggeration in that, relative to other prison camps of any sort--even relative to Ansar--it is certainly true. The former chief of military police, Brigadier General Me'ir Geva', always used to say that the military police and the entire IDF could be proud of that.

The blond hair of prison commander Lieutenant Colonel S. is not yet turning white. Believe me, he smiles, there is gray hair already, and more than one. He also says, in the same breath, that it is hard to give a short summary. Nevertheless 'Atlit today is on the threshold of a new era. From enemy terrorists to our own deserters. A sharp transition.

Some 240 terrorists passed through the prison in the last 3 years, from 22 organizations. Among them the Shi'ite Amal, the Muslim (Orthodox) Amal, Hizballah, both factions of Fatah, the organizations of Nayif Hawatimah, George Habash and Ahmad Jabril, the Muslim Jihad, the Ba'th, etc. Most of them arrived from Ansar and were released in groups after the IDF withdrawal from Lebanon. A few of them were in prison longer, among them the 121 Jabril people who were released in the prisoner exchange deal.

In surveying the "terrorist era," Ansar is undoubtedly the point of departure. "The lessons that we learned there will be fully exploited back home," says Lt Colonel S. "We constructed a new form of handling, we organized and prepared the manpower, we studied the enemy, trying to understand the terrorist qualities and mentality. And it succeeded. We proved that it can be done differently from Ansar."

Here we did not hear about attempts at escape or incidents of violence, and, according to Lt Colonel S., there was almost no physical or verbal abuse. "I requested soldiers in compulsory service and not reservists to handle the terrorists. I wanted a young crew that had not been worn down in the past and

that would not feel bitterness or anger. The prison corps passed a 10-day training course in Arab mentality and the necessary essentials in handling such a problematic population. All in all, the relations between the staff and the prisoners were good, in some cases even closer ties of friendship were forged."

The terrorists were assigned to their cells in "integrated" fashion and not by organization. "Such separation could have been seriously explosive for us," says Lt Colonel S. "Differences in ideology and in leaders were certainly felt among the various organizations, but in most cases these did not lead to physical confrontation."

'Atlit prison a month after. They are resting up, considering the lessons learned, thinking about today and tomorrow. From terrorists to deserters. A sharp transition.

9794

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ISRAEL

SIZE OF BLACK MARKET ESTIMATED

Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT in Hebrew 30 Jul 85 Business Supplement p 1

[Text] Those declarations about the war on "black capital" remind one of the saying that everyone talks about the weather but nobody does anything about it...Ever since the establishment of the state, its leaders have repeatedly declared a war on the underground economy. The more they declared, the larger that economy became.

Today, economists estimate, "black capital" amounts to around \$25 billion! The tax burden on salaried employees, firms and independents, which has grown steadily, has caused a parallel development of ways and sophisticated methods to conceal income. Israel today is a poor country with wealthy citizens.

It seems that this time there is an end in sight. The government decided on an all out war against the underground economy, which prevents all economic planning. It is very doubtful, though, whether even today all those decisions which have been adopted and approved will ever be implemented--for one reason or another.

The struggle against the black economy unites everyone--but declarations and deeds are two separate things. Concealment of income is seen and known to everyone. But no one is willing to help the tax authorities.

One of the problems which prevents reducing the phenomenon is inadequate manpower in the tax offices.

The person responsible for government revenues, Isra'el Baron, promises that starting in August (85) the tax authorities will hire about 500 inspectors to increase control over income. "Only permanent presence will prove itself, as was proven in the last taxation projects which were held throughout the country," say those at the revenue service.

No Sector Is Clean

As was mentioned above, the black economy has spread in all sectors of the economy and it seems that there is no "clean" sector. Some of the black capital was moved overseas and returns to Israel, as the years go by, all "laundered." Some simply remains abroad and is being invested there. The remainder is left in Israel and can be found in all sectors of the economy. It should be stressed that a considerable portion of income concealment is done perfectly legally: the stiff tax laws, which are cumbersome and complex enable legitimate tax evasion.

Where is the "black capital?"

Salaried employees. Anyone who thinks that this sector pays its true tax burden is mistaken. Some salaried employees do their own contracting after hours, or even during normal working hours--without reporting. Some conduct other lucrative businesses, which are not fully organized, such as bazaars of all sorts. There are those salaried employees who find other work after their normal jobs. They do not report their moonlighting jobs.

Agriculture. This sector, especially the vegetable growers, is totally open. There is no true reporting there. It is estimated that about 30-40 percent of all vegetables are brought to market outside the organized frameworks. From 10 to 20 percent of all fruits, especially citrus fruits, which are sold do not go through the organized channels. A similar percentage holds for poultry and eggs.

Who Conceals and How?

Commerce. This sector is also wide open, especially in the many open markets: Street vendors and bazaar holders are not among the ranks of taxpayers. Owners of legitimate shops do not necessarily report all their income, either. There are many and strange ways to evade taxes.

Imports. The method of tax evasion in this sector is quite sophisticated and requires a lot of expertise in all that is related to import procedures and the various duty laws. The principle is really quite simple: The importer reports to the customs officials that certain goods are being brought in, with a stated price which is higher than what he actually pays his supplier overseas. The difference is deposited in his account abroad.

Services. It is doubtful whether there is any one service branch which reports all income. The tax offices are helpless. They claim that "if citizens would only require receipts, it would be possible to catch the different suppliers of those services." Today the chance of doing that is rather nil.

Industry. The larger industrial plants do pay their true share of taxes. True, their tax rate is low, but this is the existing law. Smaller plants and workshops are like service providers.

It turned out recently that some large plants did not have all their export funds returned. Some funds were invested overseas. It was also found out that some companies, which established branches overseas with the approval of Israel Bank, used some of the legitimately exported funds for other purposes. This loophole has now been plugged and the Bank of Israel is very careful when examining applications to establish firms overseas.

"Black capital cannot be totally done away with," claim officials of the tax authorities. "This happens in other countries, too. But in Israel the phenomenon has surpassed all proportions and something has to be done in order to reduce it."

8646

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ISRAEL

SECTORS TO BE HURT BY UNEMPLOYMENT FORECAST

Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT in Hebrew 12 Aug 85 Business Supplement p 1

[Text] Three population centers will be particularly hurt by layoffs in government and local government offices. This was reported by the committee which deals with unemployment pockets. The committee is headed by the general manager of the Welfare and Labor Ministry, Tzvi Tzilker. The report was handed to Prime Minister Peres on 11 August.

The report points out that among the large cities, the one to be hurt most is Jerusalem, where most government offices are located. Jerusalem does not have alternate job opportunities for those laid off.

The Haifa region can also expect to be hurt hard. Even without the expected layoffs in the public sector, the Haifa region is the largest unemployment center in the country. Unemployment there grew with the layoffs of 900 workers at ATA.

The third sensitive center is the development towns, which even before the cutbacks had an unemployment rate of between 10 and 15 percent. According to these data, there are 11,000 unemployed in development towns, half of them having been idle for 6 days or more.

Another fact which should receive special attention: Cutbacks in the public sector will hurt mostly women, who constitute half of the work force there.

The report also addresses the question of how the economic plan, enacted in July, will effect employment in the coming months. Something rather shocking turns up: Close to 70 percent of the 23,000 workers expected to be laid off in the public and business sector alike will lose their jobs as a result of cutbacks in the defense budget.

The implications of cutbacks in the defense budget can be felt most acutely in the business sector. Reduced expenses can be expected to cause the laying off of 12,500 workers in the industry and construction sectors.

The report includes an enumeration of the impact of cutbacks in the defense budget on the various sectors: about 8,000 layoffs in industry, of which 4,500 will be from the metal, electronics, and transportation sectors, 1,500 textile and food industry workers, and another 2,000 in other industries. Likewise, because of cutbacks in construction projects of the defense system, and other problems of the construction industry, this sector will lose 4,500 of its workers.

It is doubtful whether the business sector, itself being reduced by 12,500, can absorb the 8,000 laid off from government offices, local governments and other public institutions financed by the government. This does not even take into account the laying off of another 9,500 from the public sector, because of "prior commitments."

The general manager of the Labor Ministry, Tzvi Tzilker, points out in his report that because of these "prior commitments" layoff letters were mailed to 6,000 teachers and the defense system has also committed to laying off 3,500 workers in the course of the current fiscal year.

At the same time, the report voices the hope that implications of cutbacks in orders by the defense system will not necessarily mean layoffs. The size of the layoffs will depend on the ability of the various plants to manufacture other products, for exports, for example. But these hopes are really not very realistic, at least for the next few months. The report, which was handed to the prime minister, also contains an assessment of the ability of various sectors to absorb workers laid off by the public sectors or as a result of cutbacks in orders from the defense system. According to this assessment: "No increase in the number of employees can be expected in industry. In fact, the number may even decline." The worst cutbacks can be expected in the metal, textile, and food industries. The report also expects stability in employment in the electronics industry because of higher exports. By the way, stability is also expected in the finance industry and in business services.

What is the bottom line of this analysis?

By the end of the year 17,000 workers will be laid off by the public sector, and another 5,000 from the business sector. In addition, in the next 6 months, the economy has to absorb 17,000 young people joining the work force for the first time. The report concludes: "The implementation of the new economic plan by the end of the year will bring about high unemployment by the end of 1985. The number will reach 125,000, compared with 85,000 today. The number of those unemployed for 6 or more days, and who register with the unemployment office, will reach 35,000, compared with 25,000 today. In other words, by the end of the year, and in the beginning of next year, unemployment will be 50 percent higher than today.

Prime Minister Peres received the report and met with Labor Minister Moshe Katzav in order to hear his emergency plans for the expected high

unemployment. After studying the issue the prime minister said that unemployment has not yet reached serious dimensions, but he agrees that things may very well get worse in the near future. According to his estimate, there are still jobs that have not been filled. The prime minister repeated that the government does not intend to use unemployment as a vehicle for economic recovery.

8646

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ISRAEL

EMPLOYMENT SITUATION IN ARAB SECTOR REVIEWED

Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 18 Oct 85 p 18

[Article by Muhammad Khalilah: ["Unorganized Labor in the Arab Sector"]

[Text] The locksmith and carpentry workshops, and the block and metal enterprises currently functioning in Arab villages hardly provide enough work for their owners. And if a locksmith or carpenter employs one or two workers, they are organized workers. The Histadrut has not managed to organize the workers for various reasons, and there are no workers councils in most Arab localities.

Be that as it may, more than 80 percent of all Arab workers are employed outside their area of residence. And when there are layoffs, the Arab workers employed in various cities in the country are the first to lose their jobs. According to Histadrut officials and to the Professional Association dealing with the Arab sector, the number of unemployed is growing from one month to the next. They estimate that the percentage of unemployed is similar to that in development settlements and makes up more than 20 percent of the labor force. According to the Professional Association, the numbers provided by the Employment Agency do not reflect the reality in the area because the hundreds of unorganized workers are not registered at employment agencies.

Another few hundred workers are trying to find jobs by themselves, having given up on the employment agencies which failed to find work for them, and that still does not include the hundreds, if not thousands, of high school and university graduates who are not registered because they do not qualify for unemployment and secured income insurance. Another reason for nonregistration is that many villages do not have employment agencies, and if there already is such an agency, it is located tens of kilometers away from the village, and the registration involves travel and accomodation expenses in the respective town or village.

The Nazerat agency serves the town and the neighboring villages. In September, some 3,000 employment seekers were registered, as compared to 2,000 in August. The employment agency received 90 demands for workers from area enterprises. But, against the insignificant number of demands for workers, says the secretary of the Professional Association of the Workers Council, Muhammad

Abu-Ahmad, in the same month we received some 100 workers with pink slips in their hands.

A similar situation prevails in the other Arab localities. Similar unemployment figures apply to Shefar'am and its surroundings, western and upper Galilee, the valleys and the triangle, and mixed towns.

Abu-Ahmad bitterly stresses that the building sector in the north is almost completely out, no new buildings are being started, and that construction workers were the first to be hit. What is left in the building sector is finishing and repair jobs. Currently, he says, most of the laid-off workers are metal workshop and industry workers. According to him, there are no signs that the wave of unemployment and layoffs is about to end. Abu-Ahmad also points out that the spreading unemployment among the Arab workers perpetuates unorganized labor, and that under the very nose of an Alignment-ruled government.

The Nazerat Workers Council and the other worker councils in the Arab sector, aware of the seriousness of the problem and of its dangerous consequences, last week sent cables to all the relevant bodies, in which they pointed out the dire employment situation in the Arab sector, and asked the government and the Histadrut to take urgent steps to devise a suitable solution to this painful problem.

12782
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ISRAEL

NEW RIGHT WING WEEKLY PLANNED

Tel Aviv BAMAHAHE in Hebrew 6 Nov 85 p 18

[Article by Ya'ir Sheleg: "The New HAYARDEN"]

[Text] A new weekly is scheduled to join the crowded market of the Israeli press. HAYARDEN [The Jordan], a national weekly, or, as editor Aharon Ben-Ami described it: "The magazine will represent the Greater Israel line of thought in its broad spectrum." The last two words are meant to emphasize that the weekly will "allow" internal differences on various subjects and may even bring forward completely opposed views. The first issue is scheduled for the 6th of November ("if no changes occur"), and its price will most probably be 500 shekels.

Dr Ben-Ami, 60 years old, a resident of Ari'el in Samaria, is not a journalist by profession. He is a sociologist, and until recently a lecturer at the Bar Ilan University's Faculty of Sociology on Middle Eastern studies. He admits that his journalistic experience has been limited to publicist articles he has written for several newspapers. Consequently, it is to be assumed that most of the professional duties will fall on his deputy: Me'ir Ben-Gur, a veteran journalist (former secretary general of the Association of Journalists), who, together with this wife, writer Ne'omi Frenkel, moved to Qiryat Arba'a a few years ago.

In a discussion with Dr Ben-Ami, he tells us about the birth of the weekly: "For a few years a few friends and I have been toying with the idea. In fact, ever since the Six-Day war. At the time, the Greater Israel Movement brought out the publication ZOT HA'ARETZ, and another one, NEQUDA, appeared a few years ago. However, those publications concentrate on publicist articles. Our aim was to bring out something less intellectual, more directly intended for the wide public, more newsy and more popular.

"A few months ago we encountered a unique opportunity to implement our idea, in the shape of a serious financier who was prepared to devote some of his private fortune to the enterprise. That is how the firm "Jordan--Publishers" was founded. For the time being the firm will only bring out the weekly, but it may also expand to other areas." By the way, Dr Ben-Ami was not prepared to divulge the identity of the financial backer, "in order to leave the door open for others to join." All that he was ready to reveal at this stage was that the financier lives in the country.

Dr Ben-Ami proudly introduces the "editorial board" (a sort of council of managers, some of whom will also write articles). Its stars are prominent in the right-wing gallery in the country: Professor Har'el Fish, Dr Efrayim Eldad, Elyakim Ha'etzioni, Professor Ezra Zohar, Knesset Member Uzi Landau, Professor Yosef Nedava, and Gabriel Zifroni, "formerly editor of the revisionist newspaper HABOQER." An honorable place has also been found on the board for the veteran activists of Gush Emunim, Menahem Flicks and Avraham Mintz, two of the founders of Alon More.

Publicistic articles, the plague from which HAYARDEN wanted to escape, will not be lacking. The team of writers, admits Ben-Ami, is a more serious problem. "the team is still in the process of taking shape. To my regret, I cannot note the joining of veteran journalists, whose name alone is important for a paper. The paper will rely, at least in the beginning, on new and young writers."

And speaking of culture, I asked Ben-Ami whether reviews will be a priori dictated by the political flavor of the newspaper. "It can be assumed that a play such as 'The Palestinian' by Sobol will be panned in your paper?" Ben-Ami: "I think it would be very suitable for us to review such a play, if we see it as a retreat from the values of Zionism. At the same time," he stressed, "we have agreed with the critic Or Zion Bartene that he should write purely professional literary reviews."

Among circles familiar with the birth process of HAYARDEN one hears the view that the motivation for its establishment was at least partly as a criticism of NEQUDA, which has become "too doubting and too open" (particularly in its critical attitude toward the "underground"). Dr Ben-Ami vigorously denies this: "we view NEQUDA as the publication closest to us. I even suggested to its editor, Yisra'el Har'el, that he write for us. We see no competition between the two papers. We only wanted a publication different from NEQUDA in two respects: firstly, a more popular paper, able to speak to broader strata of the population, and secondly, of a less purely religious character than NEQUDA, although not anti-religious by any means. As for openings, we intend to coopt writers who hold different views from ours, and also to give expression to internal differences within the public rallied around Greater Israel."

Another claim we heard was that the publication of the newspaper is connected to an internal dispute among the Judaea and Samaria settlements concerning leadership and ideology. The dispute is taking place between the more moderate Ofra people, and the more extremist Alon More and Qiryat Arba' people. In this connection we should note that all the Gush Emunim activists on the HAYARDOAN board live in Alon More, except for Elyakim Ha'etzioni, who lives in Qiryat Arba', while the editor of NEQUDA and most of its writers live in Ofra and neighboring settlements in Eretz Binyamin. Ben-Ami strongly refutes this claim, too: "It is true that I have naturally included in the board, as a first stage, people who live close to me. But the board is by no means closed, and we definitely want to receive other elements, too."

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ISRAEL

DROP IN INTEREST RATES URGED

Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 22 Oct 85 Business Supplement p 9

[Article by David Lifkin: "The Prime Minister Will Be Asked To Decide About Lowering Interest Rates"]

[Text] Despite the fact that bank interest rates have dropped this week, various economic figures plan to bring pressure to bear once again on Prime Minister Shim'on Peres and on Finance Minister Yitzhaq Moda'i to lower the interest rates even further. These figures claim that in the present conditions there is no justification for high real interest rates, and that the promise given them at the introduction of the emergency economic plan, that interest rates will be only 1 percent higher than the rate of inflation, must be kept. They oppose the policy of the Bank of Israel, which wants to maintain a high real interest rate.

Heavy pressure was already applied 2 weeks ago on the Bank of Israel to lower interest rates. The heads of the Industrialists Association and the Workers Association insistently appealed to the prime minister and protested that the high rates of interest have not been adjusted with the drop in inflation. The spokesmen warned the prime minister that firms and enterprises will not be able to continue working and that bankruptcies are expected, something which will cause thousands of workers to lose their jobs. The prime minister waited for the return home of the director general of the Finance Ministry, Dr. Immanu'el Sharon, and assigned him to take care of the problem of lowering the interest rates.

Dr Sharon went to the Bank of Israel and requested that interest rates once again be examined. At the central bank, Victor Medina, manager of the Monetary Department and the man in charge of this matter, rejected the claims that the Bank of Israel is not doing anything to lower the interest rates. Medina pointed out data proving that the Central Bank has lowered the bank rate by 50 percent in the past 3 months. However, he stressed, the Bank of Israel must proceed cautiously concerning both the pace and size of each cut in interest rates. He added that the pace of lowering interest rates in the economy is a function of the process of growth of demand for credit, and that one must prevent the danger of exploding credit in the economy.

Liquidity Deficits at the Banks

The banking system has shown no enthusiasm for lowering bank rates. Bank officials point out the fact that in the past weeks large liquidity deficits have been created because of considerable reduction in governmental flow, and thus the demand for credit has risen as a result of reduced foreign currency credit, and there is an excessive exploitation of credit lines in the economy. At one point, the liquidity deficits of the banks totaled some 300 billion shekels, and the banks took advantage of the monetary loans of the first and second degree that the Bank of Israel puts at their disposal. Thus, some bank managers believed at the time that there is no reason to lower interest rates, and consequently, some were of the opinion that if the demand for credit continues, there will be no choice but to raise the debt interest.

In the meantime, the banks competed for the jumbo deposits deposited on negotiable certificates of deposit, and were prepared to pay higher rates than normal. Bank officials claim that this situation allowed customers to take advantage of credit lines to take out loans in order to deposit the money in negotiable certificates of deposit and receive a higher interest than they were paying for the loans.

Bank of Israel officials inquired of members of the banking system what their position would be on a decision to lower the rates of interest. At the time of the inquiry no bank was opposed to such a decision, and consequently the Bank of Israel announced the cut in interest rates, but it postponed the implementation of the decision until Thursday this week. In this manner, the Bank of Israel thought it would dispel the public pressure brought to bear on it.

Government Offices Surprised by the Enactment Postponement

Economic quarters were surprised to hear that the central bank had decided to enact the interest cuts only 2 weeks after the adoption of the decision. Professor Michael Bruno, one of the architects of the economic program, expressed amazement about the delay decreed by the central bank in lowering interest rates. According to him, interest rates could have been lowered at once, without any additional delay.

The Bank of Israel rejects the criticism. Bank officials point out that under the economic program, they had been asked to lower the volume of credit in the economy by one third. The bank is carrying out these cuts gradually, but is steadily implementing the mission assigned to it.

Counterattacking, they recall that those responsible for the economic program had assigned the task of reducing credit to the Bank of Israel, while they themselves are incapable of carrying out cuts in the government budget. If the budget cuts are implemented as planned, then there will be less pressure to reduce credit in the economy. This shows that there is a direct connection between the degree of success attained in reducing the state budget and the volume of credit in the economy.

Consequently, the Bank of Israel will continue the policy according to which real interest rates in the economy will remain as high as it is necessary in order to curb demand in the economy by restricting credit, with a view to precluding a considerable explosion of the credit framework. The position of the Bank of Israel is that it will be possible to accelerate the pace of lowering interest rates in the economy only if demand from the public sector is further curbed through cuts in the national budget, instead of the heavy restraints required in the area of credit. The central bank is pressing for considerable cuts in the national budget for the coming year, too.

In the controversy about interest rates in the economy, Bank of Israel points to data proving that a large number of economic enterprises benefit from the adjusted credit granted at cheaper rates of interest than the free shekel credit. In addition, the enterprises also enjoy cheap supply credit from abroad as compared to the usual cost of bank credit. Consequently, the volume of free shekel credit is lower than the volume of adjusted credit.

However, various economic figures warn against high economic rates of interest. This is a destructive rate of interest, they stress, and the economy will pay dearly in terms of business complications. Therefore, it is better for the interest rates to be lowered now, than to have to pay a high price in the future, through an outflow of considerable amounts from the state funds in order to bail out enterprises and prevent layoffs of thousands of workers. In their view, the burden of restraints should not fall on bank credits, but should be achieved through other means, less painful to the producing economy.

Waiting for Peres' Return

Additional clarifications are now expected from the prime minister on the subject of interest rates. These will occur upon his return from abroad, within the framework of discussions on ways to restore economic growth, in the light of the data on the results of the economic policy.

In point of fact, the prime minister serves as chairman of the advisory board of the Bank of Israel, the body steering the policies of the central bank, in keeping with the government decision. As is known, there are differences of views about the composition of the advisory board of the Bank of Israel, and that is why the government has assumed the prerogatives of the board. This means that the economic figures look upon Peres as the authority that is to deal with urgent monetary matters.

When will the next cuts in bank interest rates occur?

Economic figures demand that the next interest rate lowering should come already at the beginning of November. The Bank of Israel, however, believes that the data and the results of the economic policy should first be considered, and that a decision on lowering interest rates should be taken on the basis of those findings. The decision will once again be up to the prime minister.

Interest Rate Cuts

	Free credit in shekels	Free credit in foreign currency (in shekel terms)	Total free credit	Adjusted credit	"Target" credit
June	20.4	22.3	20.9	21	20
Sep	12	1.6	9.8	9.1	6.8
Oct	11	2.5	8.4	4	5.5

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ISRAEL

WEST BANK INTELLECTUAL FAVORS ANNEXATION

Tel Aviv KOTERET RASHIT in Hebrew 13 Nov 85 pp 15, 17

[Article by Mikhal Sela: "Nusaybah: 'Yes, to Annexation'"]

[Text] Sari Nusaybah, 36, is a lecturer of Muslim philosophy at Bir Zayt University, who for 2 years studied at the Hebrew University. He is one of the four board members (the others are Hanna Sinyurah, Ziyad Abu-Ziyad, and al-Rayyis) who founded the weekly AL-MAWQIF. His idea, to annex the territories and their inhabitants to Israel, is not an ironical reaction to the situation there. "I do not have a sense of humor," he says, According to him, this would be the best solution in the present conditions. "Socrates, too, differentiated between the ideal model of a state and the actual reality." He believes that if the Palestinians become Israeli citizens, they will be in a position to win 12-16 seats in the Knesset and to have an impact on the realization of their interests through the state.

[Question] What is the final objective?

[Answer] The final objective is to be free of you and to establish a state of my own, with a parliament and government of my own, a state in which I can participate in building my own future and that of my children.

[Question] Would annexation not reduce your chances of achieving a state of your own?

[Answer] Yes, it will make it difficult. But it seems to me that if things continue to evolve along the present direction, the chances of this ideal coming true will disappear altogether. We must find something else, the best possible for us.

Today I still hope to win independence. But let us suppose that tomorrow the Palestinians, the Arabs, and the Israelis do not manage to settle the disputes between them, that Shamir replaces Peres, that the PLO hardens its position even further, and that additional settlements are built--then the West Bank would become so intertwined with Israel that there will be no point in talking of a partition.

[Question] Why not become annexed to Jordan?

[Answer] Enjoying sovereign rights in Jordan means stifling our Palestinian identity and replacing it by a Jordanian one.

[Question] Jordan is Palestinian in its majority.

[Answer] From your point of view.

[Question] You are seeking a parliament. There are two: one in Jerusalem, and one in Amman.

[Answer] There is one in Palestine and one in Jordan. For me it is more natural to realize my sovereign rights through the parliament in Jerusalem, where I was born. Here, at least, I can vote. There, there are only appointments.

[Question] Your father served in the political apparatus there.

[Answer] When Jordan was linked to the West Bank, that occurred as a provisional arrangement. If something is to happen now, I would prefer a final settlement.

[Question] What is wrong with autonomy?

[Answer] There it is a question of civil and religious rights, and right now what Peres is talking about is a quantitative change. I want a qualitative change.

[Question] The talk is of an interim stage.

[Answer] If Israel knows that the objective is to establish a Palestinian state, then why not take a short cut and speak directly and immediately with the Palestinians, face to face, and settle the problem of their aspiration for independence? Why bring them under the Jordanian blanket? It is truly absurd to expect me to vote for a Jordanian parliament and live under an Israeli government.

A Law of Return for Palestinians, Too

[Question] How do you picture life within the State of Israel?

[Answer] We would be the Arabs of '67 instead of the Arabs of '48.

[Question] You agree that you are not a part of the Israeli Arabs?

[Answer] If we live within one state, then there will be no difference between the Tulqarm Arab who votes for the Knesset, and an Arab from Umm el-Fahm.

[Question] The Israeli Arabs think of themselves as part of Israeli society. They read Didi Menossi more than Najib Mahfuz.

[Answer] In the society I am talking about Ziyad Abu-Ziyad would have his permanent column next to Didi Menossi.

[Question] You are talking about assimilation?

[Answer] As a nation, we have strong traits and national aspirations. Those we will always have. Nevertheless, we will be able to assimilate and become a part of Israeli society.

[Question] You want to be an Israeli, or a Palestinian in a democratic state?

[Answer] My ideal is a democratic and secular Palestinian state. If your question implies the loss of national identity, then the answer is no. Quite the contrary: I would continue my struggle as part of a lengthy historical process leading up to the democratic Palestinian state, but the struggle must be waged with democratic means.

[Question] What would you do within the framework of this struggle?

[Answer] I would suggest amending the law of return, so that it would apply to both Jews and Arabs.

[Question] For which party would you vote?

[Answer] I would establish a party of my own.

[Question] The Israeli Arabs have not managed to found a party.

[Answer] The entire political map would change.

[Question] What would be the platform of your party?

[answer] First, the return of all Palestinians from the diaspora. Secondly, equal civil rights, including military service.

[Question] Why not join the Citizens' Rights Movement?

[Answer] Are they willing to let the Arabs return?

[Question] The Progressive List for Peace does not meet your needs either?

[Answer] At the moment their platform calls for a Palestinian state under PLO rule. At the moment--perhaps I would vote for such a platform. But in terms of the future--if in 10 years time we see that there is no room and chance for a state--I would want what I said.

[Question] What would be the name of the state?

[Anser] If we have the majority, I would change the name and the flag. If not, then I would wait. In 20 years time we would have the majority.

The Gap Between Behavior and Consciousness

[Question] Is Palestinian society ripe for such an idea?

[Answer] If things continue as they now are, within 5 to 10 years the practical implications of life would penetrate people's consciousness, too. People would then understand that they are behaving as if they belonged to the State of Israel, and would accept this as a logical solution. Today there is still a big gap between behavior and consciousness.

[Question] In the meantime, your suggestion is being ignored.

[Answer] Not true. I have expressed in writing what many think. It has definitely elicited public discussion. Recently I have even been attacked for it by the Muslim Brothers at Bir Zayt. One quarter of their publication marking the anniversary of the Balfour Declaration was devoted to my proposal.

[Question] Why do you not try to mobilize people into a movement?

[Answer] I, Sari Nusaybah, cannot lead an annexation movement. The leaders would not be intellectuals, but businessmen, people motivated by economic interests, and the leaders of the professional associations in the West Bank, which are nothing but political organizations. Today they wave the Palestine flag--tomorrow they would understand that the dream has collapsed.

[Question] This week, AL-MAWQIF reported on its front page that there is hope for a peace conference in January 1986.

[Answer] If in January I am requested to choose clearly between autonomy and annexation, I would say: annexation!

[Box on page 17]

In Favor of Joining the State of Israel

On 19 October Sari Nusaybah published an article in AL-MAWQIF, one of the East Jerusalem newspapers. Here are a few selected passages from that article:

"By definition, autonomy does not grant full political rights. On the contrary, it provides private human rights, such as freedom of expression and movement. It also aspires to grant some collective human rights (such as city hall administration), but it does not allow the individual or the collective to realize their sovereign right to manage their affairs.

"Joining the State of Israel (...) would permit the individual and the collective (...) to participate in managing their sovereign affairs within the framework of the existing legislative authorities.

"The sovereign prerogative of self-determination, acquired through full participation in the realization of the political rights enjoyed by a normal citizen in his country, includes the right to elect representatives to the legislative authority of the state and to be elected to the executive arm.

(...) This prerogative does not exist within the framework of autonomy, but it does exist within the framework of fully joining the State of Israel.

"As the citizens of a conquered land, it is incumbent upon us to stop and consider these possibilities, because at a certain point it may be better for us to assist in the miracle of the "joining" and to receive equal rights. If we find that the slogan brandished now, that of an independent state as a nation with its own identity, cannot be implemented and there is a trend to replace it by autonomy, it is better to struggle for this objective."

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ISRAEL

KNESSET MEMBER OPPOSES DEFENSE BUDGET CUTS

Tel Aviv 'AL HAMISHMAR in Hebrew 3 Sep 85 p 6

[Article by Knesset Member Shevah Weis: "Bordering on Calculated Lack of Caution"]

[Text] The State of Israel's defense budget is its largest budget and in comparative and relative terms, the largest in the world. It comprises more than a quarter of the total budget and if we add to it the reserves budget and other strikingly defense-related costs, in the area of the civil guard, and in the area of building ("bomb shelters") then it is more than a third of the country's budget.

As to the type of government--Israel is still the Athens of the Middle East, but militarily she is without a doubt Sparta, or as sociologists like to define it: 'an army state.'

When the economy is in difficulty or in crisis, the voices asking that the defense budget be cut increase. These voices are heard loudly these days. These voices are heard from the left and their criticism of the size of the defense budget is connected with their overall approach to defense policy. The impression is created that he who thinks that Israel is the aggressor of the peace-rejecter, also claims that she exaggerates in her defense expenses, not out of defense need, but rather out of sticking with an aggressive policy.

Such criticism was heard when Ari'el Sharon was the Minister of Defense, but it continues and perhaps at greater strength, even now, when the left and members of the Labor Party itself are describing the present Minister of Defense in terms of activism. Rabin was not helped by the fact that he is the man, who within a very short time period brought the boys home from the killing fields of Lebanon. Those who attach labels, the professional stereotypers, maintain their pre-formed model and do not move from it. Also their criticism of the defense budget is nurtured by their anti-Rabin tendencies.

However, people from the Likud such as Dan Meridor, Olmert, and members of the center such as Ben-Eli'ezer, and additional members in the foreign affairs committee and defense committee are voicing criticism of the size of the defense budget. Thus it will not be precise to determine that all the criticism is anchored in prejudiced ideas about the defense budget, on Israel's peace-rejection, or on dislike of the Minister of Defense.

An Adventurous Gamble

There is no doubt that any cut in the defense budget is likely to turn much financial energy to other channels of activity, since every large object in the defense field is weighed against tens of thousands of dollars. It is enough to write that declining to acquire two sophisticated airplanes and channeling this money to the health system is likely to unrecognizably improve the situation in this important area. But no one can prove that additional reduction of the air force will not prove an Achilles heel in Israel's robustness and her defense capability. Thus the danger is great and there is something of an adventurous gamble in taking these chances.

I must admit, based on clear and detailed knowledge, that since Rabin entered his position, a recognizable reduction in the defense budget has occurred--a reduction which has taxed the delicate balance between the necessary and the beneficial, between the important and the existential.

It is permissible to assume, that in the area of expensive outfitting and the cost of routine operation, Israel has reached the limit of calculated carelessness. Anyone who rushes to take additional chances, will be entering the area of danger. It is important to know, that life comes before the good life, and it is forbidden to endanger life itself in order to have more comfortable living conditions. The demand for cuts for the affluent, whether self employed or not, is therefore more moral than the demand to tighten the defense belt any further.

Cancellation of the Lavi Project Against Unemployment

Moreover, those who aim for peace via territorial compromise, and even those who base their peace plans on the establishment of a Palestinian state, must preserve the IDF's military strength. Those who desire to prevent war, must be on the side of initiating peace, must strengthen the IDF's deterrent ability. When peace comes to this area, it will be "armed peace" for a long time.

Those who want to cut the defense budget have additional arguments. They want to cancel the Lavi Project, to cut the food and other services to soldiers. As to the Lavi Project, its cancellation will not, at this time, save Israel any money whatsoever, since the financing at this time is American and cannot be channeled into any other area of aid. Thus the real alternative is foregoing this aid and using it to buy ready made airplanes, while firing thousands of engineers and technicians in Israel that are now working on this project.

He who protests the trends in unemployment spreading in our economy, yet wants to cancel the Lavi Project, is contradicting himself. If in the future it becomes possible to use some of the funds from this project for other production channels in Israel, then perhaps it will be worth making changes in this project, changes that do not hurt the security or the economy of the State.

Especially annoying is the advice to cut the level of life of the IDF. We are all fathers of soldiers, we do everything to give our children warmth, good abundant food, to spoil them, give them good clothing and a good home. The "Jewish mother" and even more so the Jewish father are harnessed heart and soul to the long journey of raising their children. Yet see what a miracle, these

critics bearing advice, parents of children, are requesting to cut the level of the food, the level of housing and level of personal equipment of their children, exactly at the hardest time of their lives, the time of their military service! What a paradox!

To Strike Where Necessary

Of course, it is understood that occurrences of needless waste must be reduced and cancelled. The IDF must act the same as all public services. Thousands of tons of paper are wasted on games of suffering bureaucracy. Thousands of tons of paper are wasted on games of suffering bureaucracy. Thousands of pseudo-professional journals, and sectorial publications and thousands of needless meetings due to honor. Thousands of events of "Let's Get Together" in fancy restaurants, at the expense of the public. Millions of private telephone conversations in public offices. Thousands of tourists from various and sundry foundations traveling from one end of the universe to the other. The prophets at the gate preaching to cut the level of life in the IDF are full partners in these last days of Pompei of public waste, so why is their venom coming out against the IDF?

The IDF must make do with a minimum, must save, must avoid wastefulness, but others must more so! It is important to know that the IDF is strong and well equipped, a deterrent, which has a policy of effective training of its soldiers and its officers, necessary and positive exactly in this era of moving toward peace and order.

As for myself, I am ready to move in the path of peace, via territorial compromise and political compromise, perhaps more generous than that which appears in the platform of my party, but I will find it difficult to take this path if I do not feel enough security in my army.

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ISRAEL

ELTA INCREASES DEFENSE EXPORTS TO ASIA

Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 6 Sep 85 p 5

[Article by Hayim Bi'or: "Elta Increases Export of Warfare Material to the Far East by 65 Percent"]

[Text] The Elta corporation, which is a subsidiary of the Israeli Aircraft Industry, this year increased its export to countries of the Far East over 1984 by 65 percent.

Export of the company to these countries this year will reach \$20 million in contrast with \$12 million last year, and it includes systems for electronic warfare, radar, military computers, and communications equipment.

The portion of the Asian market in Elta's export is greater today than the portion of the American and South American markets. Exports of the company this year come to a sum of about \$70 million, in contrast with \$50 million in 1984 and \$25 million 2 years ago.

Elta, which has a plant in Ashdod that employs 2,200 people, is participating in the Lavi Airplane Project, for which it is developing electronic warfare systems for \$20 million. The Elisra and Rafael companies also received equal portions of the work under the framework of the Lavi Project.

The chairman of the Board of Directors of Elta, Major General David 'Ivri reported that next month the company will come out with a public issue of stock, in order to raise \$13 million, which it requires for its technological development.

Raising the capital, if successful, will cover a large portion of the company's development program, which stands at \$18 million. At a further stage Elta also plans to enter the American stock exchange.

Elta is one of the four plants of the Electronics Division of the Israel Aircraft Industries. This division, which has 6,000 employees, last year executed export of \$400 million, and already has orders which come to a billion dollars.

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ISRAEL

NEW GUN LAWS ENACTED

Tel Aviv HADASHOT in Hebrew 10 Oct 85 p 10

[Article by David Golan: "Ammunition--Not for Everyone"]

[Text] Within 2 weeks the Ministry of the Interior will be putting out new regulations on granting licenses for carrying weapons. According to the new regulations he who requests a license will have to prove with documents that he requires it for self defense, and the license will only be granted after he proves that he indeed lives far away, in a remote location, deals with money, or works/lives outside the boundaries of the green line.

According to the regulations in existence today, anyone who wished to carry arms could do this on the condition that he did not have a criminal past record and was of sound mental health. The aide to the managing director of the Ministry of the Interior, Ya'akov Markovitz, said yesterday to HADASHOT that it has been proven that many weapons which were licensed have been stolen, used for committing suicide, or have caused tragedies as a result of sloppiness in caring for them. It was not proven, that they aided real needs for self defense.

According to him, out of 180,000 weapons purchased with a license, 1,000 were stolen over the last year from homes or from motor vehicles. These weapons, according to him, make their way to the underworld or are sold to hostile organizations.

Markovitz also mentions, that people here use weapons in neighborhood fights. "Our population is quite varied," says Markovitz. "It contains internal tensions and the matter has to be studied in a wider light, before we turn into a Wild West."

Recently, Ya'akov Markovitz met with the commander of the Civilian Guard and suggested a number of solutions to the matter of protecting tourists. Among others, the possibility was raised of having a member of the civilian guard accompany every group which goes out on a trip, armed. "There must be control and supervision of arms, while giving a sense of security and self defense to the citizens," concludes Markovitz.

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ISRAEL

VIABILITY OF HIGH TECH INDUSTRY DISCUSSED

Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 15 Sep 85 p 15

[Article: "Underprivileged Samson? Discussion on High Tech Industry in Israel"]

[Text] Two basic questions were presented to the participants in the discussion: A) Are high technology industries in Israel an economic "Samson" that can move the economy towards economic independence?

B) What difficulties does this industry face, many of whose captains are demanding assistance and encouragement from the government?

Other subjects also came up in the discussion. Following are the highlights:

Israel Adir, Managing Director, RDT Electronics Engineering: If I did not believe that advanced technology is the basis of Israel's economy, I would not have entered this field, and I certainly would not continue developing it for the past twenty years, first as an importer and provider of services and recently as an industrialist. But there are problems.

One problem I see in the area of advanced technological industry in Israel lies in lack of awareness of the importance of the business sector. The industry is not capable of working without a commercial framework, which includes imports and services.

Lack of awareness of the importance of the business sector hurts the industry. The merchants' law initiated by the Minister of Defense hurt the system very much. Lack of awareness also finds expression in taxation. The government imposes taxes on software and on computers, while they are vital components of development of high technology, which is destined primarily for export.

Another difficulty lies in marketing. The Chief Scientist of the Office of Commerce and Industry gives funds to encourage development but there is no one to really finance encouragement of marketing, and without a real marketing set-up there is no real export. This problem is not so serious for large companies, but little companies, like RDT Industries, which develops sophisticated systems for analysis of printed circuits, needs encouragement.

Professor Hayyim Aviv, specialist in general Biotechnology, of the Weizmann Institute for Science in Rehovot and the Science Center in New Tziona: High technology industry is the best solution for Israel, since it is what we have. We have no natural resources. But we have the manpower with potential for developing knowledge. However, this is the solution for the middle or long term, and not for the short term. In the long run, there are no solutions to the problem of Israel's balance of commercial payments, not in agriculture and not in low tech labor-intensive industry. This does not mean that they have to be abolished, but we have to put together a ranking of priorities and on the upper rungs we have to place high-tech industry.

Both for economic reasons and social reasons we have to have a varied economy. Some personnel in Israel will never be suitable for employment in high tech industry. We have to provide employment for others. Part of this concern includes giving a shot of knowledge [high tech] to branches that today are low tech ["poor in knowledge"].

It must be clarified that when speaking of high tech industry, the reference is not solely to electronics. My field of specialization, biotechnology, becomes more and more high tech with every passing year.

[HA'ARETZ] Is the basket of advanced tech industry varied enough in Israel?

[Professor Aviv] It is varied enough but there is certainly room to enrich it. I will add another perspective to the discussion. We have a huge reservoir of knowledge in the academic world. We must build bridges for transfer of technology from academia to industry. Unfortunately, academia serves as an easy target for budget-cutters, every time belt-tightening is required, but captains of industry must comprehend that it is forbidden to make cuts in the sciences, for without them there is no development and no industry in the future.

In conclusion, I believe that despite the problems and difficulties, Israeli industry will be the principal factor in healing the economy even prior to the end of this century, and it will also bring improvement in the society and quality of life.

The benefit that it will bring will free us more to deal with culture and spiritual things, which in fact are the most important.

Elisha Shahmon, president of "Motorola Israel" and, until recently, of the Export Institute and president of the Organization of Electronic Industries in Israel: High tech industry in Israel developed principally from the electronic branch, and this branch developed and expanded until it became unrecognizable over the years. Today we are speaking principally of industries which produce medical systems, civilian communications, systems for water control, agricultural systems, computers and peripheral equipment, computerized graphics, electro-optics, electronic parts and sophisticated military systems.

The electronic industry began developing in Israel in the sixties. At the time it brought in a few million dollars. This year we are talking about \$1.8 billion, half of which is export.

In this industry the Value Added Tax is high, much higher than 60 percent. According to the employees' VAT law, it is among the highest in industry in general, and comes today to more than \$50,000. An especially high percentage of the personnel employed in this industry (45 percent) are technicians, engineers, and quasi-engineers. The result: a high percentage of R&D. This requires much risk capital, but it bears fruit: the new innovative products that were developed here are those which we export. And export is one of the principal causes of our high growth rate: more than 20 percent per year. All of these lead to the conclusion that high tech industry will enable us to stride toward economic independence.

It is important to note that over the years the percentage of locally developed products in our market basket of products has increased. Once we had to make do with 25 percent. Today it comes to an average of 75 percent. To reach this situation, we invest about 10 percent of our return in R&D.

There is urgent need to reduce the gross salary cost to plants (to be distinguished from the net amount which remains in the employee's hands) by reducing the direct tax paid by production workers. Only by reducing production costs can Israeli industry improve its ability to compete in the world.

The matter of marketing abroad was mentioned. It must be understood, that development of a marketing array abroad costs three times more than development of the product. Opening a representation office in the United States costs at least a quarter of a million dollars.

Zalman Shalev, managing director of Elisra: A trip of a team sent to demonstrate an Israeli system abroad costs several tens of thousands of dollars. And without a few of these trips, every year, it is nearly impossible to promote sales.

One of our problems is the absence of a government program. The State of Israel must plan. Here we talked about development areas, but no general plan crystallized. If the investments in the educational system and professional training were combined with the investment in factories, and steps in a defined direction were made, it would be possible to find a solution to the problem of the development towns. But there is no coordination between government offices.

There is not even a unified policy in a single office, like the Ministry of Education and Culture, or the Ministry of Labor and Welfare. I am a member of the directorship of ORT. This is an organization which deals with professional training. If the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Labor would cooperate with the directorship of this organization, it would be possible to do much more to advance the professional level and develop professional personnel in the country. The IDF did not rely on outside forces and developed its own system for training personnel.

If we want to develop a quality society here, which also enjoys cultural activities and a high salary level, and not slide to the status of one big development town, we have to concentrate on subjects that promise the highest possible return. The highest return lies in high tech industry. Elisha [Shahmon] noted that within two decades this industry grew from a few million dollars to close to \$2 billion. This is an achievement made by few in the world.

The problem of Israel industry stems from the limited scope of the local market. We must export in order to exist, and in order to succeed in exporting we must have government encouragement. We will not be able to develop, to create, and to export with success when we are bent under a heavy basket of taxes. Every dollar which we pay an engineer, costs us \$5 gross; an engineer costs us more than a comparable company in the United States. As long as the taxing system is not corrected as regards industry, it will not have the power to lead the economy towards economic independence.

Emanu'el Gil, president of Elbit Computers: When you speak of leading the Israeli economy toward economic independence, you must look for industries with high added values rather than high tech industries, even though in most cases they are one and the same.

Israel is suffering from a gap between intentions and results. The government is interested in helping industry. Its principal job, from the point of assistance, must be to focus on planning. The government must also deal with development of the infrastructure. It is not feasible that it takes hours to travel from Tel Aviv to Carmi'el, and it is not feasible that the telephone system requires so much time and so much nerves, and that such a great number of wrong numbers are received, and it is so unreliable for data communications.

As for marketing, not all the mistakes are to be blamed on the government. When a company--especially small and just starting out--wants to develop a product for marketing abroad it must start with serious market research. This is expensive but necessary. The best way is first to develop a product which can be tested on local customers. A product which succeeds here has good chances for success abroad as well. When a product is developed, which from the start is intended for marketing abroad, from the start there are problems due to great geographical distance between the developers and producers and consumers.

Yehuda Shin'ar, managing director of Exatec (a young company which developed and produces IBM-compatible computers, primarily for export: There is a basic difference between a plant which develops products for the military and later develops versions for the civilian market, and between a company which from the start develops for the civilian market. In the high tech field and in a place like Silicon Valley, things are relatively simple: a product is developed and produced, installed for a nearby customer, feedback received from the field, improvements installed, the circle of users widened--and you are on the road.

An Israeli high tech producer needs an American or European market. This market is far from him. In order to get quick feedback, necessary for the development of successful products, a system for marketing and support abroad is necessary. The assistance of the Chief Scientist in the stages of research and development is most important, but there is no similar assistance for marketing. The Government of Israel says: you are authorized to invest in advance of the marketing 10% of the scope of your exports. But how do you get to significant export without early-on investment in the marketing network?

Emanuel Gil: Perhaps the required conclusion is, that an Israeli company has to develop only products which can be initially successful on the local market.

Gil Weiser, general manager of Digital Israel, a subsidiary of the second largest computer company in the world: Despite the fact that the last two years showed signs of a slowdown in the branches of electronics and computers, there is no doubt that the raw potential in high tech industries is great. Israel enjoys a high prestige reputation. Leading companies such as Intel, National Semiconductor, Motorola, and Digital have established development centers in Israel. On the one hand, this is proof of the great respect which these companies have for the potential of knowledge in Israel. On the other hand, the knowledge and technology which the parent companies transfer to their people in Israel, for purposes of research and development in Israel, increase the local potential. The presence of foreign companies contributes much to Israel, both in information transfer and in the development of expertise locally by financing of R&D.

[HA'ARETZ] Is there no fear that these contributions to research will be accompanied by dictation of the topic for research and the drawing of research from Israel abroad?

Weiser: In the overall majority of cases, the process is the opposite, the foreign company asks what Israeli academic scientists are working on and supports those research projects which interest it. Of course, Israeli researchers who later leave for sabbaticals or post-docs or to research centers of foreign corporation abroad, bring with them their knowledge and experience, but on their return to the country they return with knowledge and experience acquired abroad. This mutual fertilization is useful for all involved.

Moti Carmel: general manager of 'Daisy, Israel': There is a tinge of pessimism in all that has been said up to now. I see things with glasses that are more rose-colored. First, the percentages of Israeli success is much higher than that abroad. In order to continue succeeding, the most suitable product for the chosen market must be found. For example, the Lavi airplane is not this kind of product: Israel has no relative advantage over the giants with which it competes in this realm abroad. If the consideration is the security of Israel and the reduction of dependence upon foreign factors, that is another matter.

Emanuel Gil: Thanks to projects like the Lavi, many sophisticated systems have been developed in Israel which are taking up a large percentage of our exports.

Moti Carmel: When speaking of defence, many of the considerations are different than those for the civilian market--and Daisy principally develops civilian systems. We have to aspire to a situation in which an Israeli company stabilizes with one foot in the country and one abroad in Silicon Valley, and this is what we did and it is good, because if we had started in Israel, we would not have achieved the initial surge that we did abroad, in the United States. In Israel we are changing over from development to production, and are predicting that within two years we will achieve sales of a total of \$50 million. At the same time we also are expecting difficulties, principally in being able to maintain the excellent personnel which we require.

To date we have brought half a dozen employees from our parent company in California to Israel. These are Israelis who were pleased to return to the country but with each passing month bringing with it an additional erosion of the salary, and with a small salary after withholding, in comparison with what remained the net salary from the very same salary in the United States, the motivation is wearing.

Yig'al Erlich, the chief scientist of the Ministry of Commerce and Industry: Industry is the solution for reduction of the gap in the balance of payments of Israel, and the high tech industry leads in this realm. The government is trying to help this industry, among other things by means of the Office of the Chief Scientist.

In the past years the Ministry of Industry and Commerce has taken a very liberal policy in all that concerns encouragement of R&D. We made no distinction between large companies and small and between fields. Certain criteria were established; whoever met them was entitled to receive a grant and encouragement but without any interference with what happened in the field.

The Government of Israel is willing to allocate resources in order to advance binational cooperation in R&D and thus to increase flow of risk money from abroad for the financing of R&D projects in Israel. When a binational fund is established the principle is equal participation of the two governments in the investment and in the profits coming from it. Today there are funds with the United States, with Canada, France, Holland and South Africa.

Yisrael Baron, responsible for government revenue: One of the questions which troubles developing countries and countries that encourage development is--if government support has to be direct, budgetary, or via the instrument of taxation. Israel today has had a mixed policy: on the one hand, financial grants were given to factories, subsidized loans and tax reductions.

The tax reductions caused some distortion. In the benefit period, all is good and well, but when the benefit period ends and the factory enters the regular tax channel, it looks narrowly at its younger neighbors, who are still enjoying benefits and are competing for the market.

The pressure is ebbing for giving incentives to industry via taxes. The question is asked: assistance how, and to whom? During the period of Pinchas Sapir the textile industry received preference. This "specialization" was detrimental in the long run. It is preferable to assist a varied industrial basket, and to assist small and large factories as one. If we succeed in developing a small percentage of "successes" out of the total-- that will be enough.

The Elscint Law was intended to open non-governmental sources of capital for industry. This is a relatively new law intended to reduce somewhat the pressure placed on the Chief Scientist. Last year about \$120 million was raised this way. This year it is harder to raise money and yet a similar scope is expected.

The law to encourage investment of capital is intended to promote establishment of new factories or to enlarge existing factories and the tax percentage will be 10-25 percent. We are now preparing an additional channel of benefits, which will offer the investor the possibility of requesting a low interest grant, or of passing up the grant and being exempted from tax for several years, or of paying a very low tax.

As to the tax instrument in encouraging industry, a committee I appointed is now acting to examine means of creating a situation in which the net received by the employee increases without making the cost to employers more expensive. It is not easy to find a way to do so, but the only way to decrease costs of salary to employers is via the tax instrument. I believe we will find a way, and then we can all be optimistic.

[HA'ARETZ] One of the more outstanding laws for encouraging investment in industry was the Ronel Law which recently expired, after 10 years of existence. What will replace it?

Baron: The Ronel Law was intended to encourage foreign investment in an economy suffering from inflation. When inflation passed 100 percent in 1981, the situation was created in which companies showed great profit on the stock exchange, but did not pay tax at all, or paid at ridiculous percentage rates. Accordingly, when this law expired, we decided not to extend it.

Shahmon: The considerations of the Treasury in deciding not to extend the Ronel Law are understandable; however, a fact of life from the area of high tech industry should be taken into account: the process of R&D takes a few years. A project started a year before the Ronel Law expired, will end-- let's say--in 2 years. In such cases the law should be in effect until the end of the project.

Baron: the date when the law expires was known to all affected parties. Planning should have been made accordingly.

Shahmon: The wheels of R&D cannot be stopped a year before some law expires, and in addition, over and over government sources calmed us saying: do not worry, a way will be found to extend the length of the law which encourages foreign capital investment in Israel. It is conceivable that now suddenly overnight companies who are making a worthwhile contribution to the Israeli economy should be so affected.

There is no disagreement on the size of the contribution. The 80 companies established in Israel in the area of high tech industry exported close to a billion dollars last year. However there were those who claimed that this was capital which was invested in the country and then taken out of it. This is not so. We checked the 80 companies and not one took its profits out of the country. However, should the day come that a company is found which will take some of its cash out of the country, we will have to find incentives to bring it back.

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ISRAEL

KINNERET WATER QUALITY IMPROVES

Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 23 Sep 85 p 11

[Article by Eli El'ad: "Good News from the Kinneret: Data Over Recent Years Shows that Positive Processes of Improvement in the Quality of the Water are Occurring in the Kinneret."]

[Text] The quality of the water in the Kinneret, the principal reservoir of drinking water for the country, is improving. No longer is there talk and dire forecasts that the lake is in danger of dying. Data over the last 3 years show that positive processes are occurring in the lake. Cautious forecasts are coming to pass, as predicted 4 and 5 years ago by Professor Colette Soroya, then director of the Kinneret Laboratory and today managing director for Lake and Sea Research, and Dr Moshe Gofen, then a senior researcher and today director of the Laboratory for Kinneret Research.

The picture forming is definitely encouraging; however, alongside it there are also certain negative developments, which cause worsening of the quality of the water of the Kinneret, at certain seasons during the year. However these also can be treated.

Today the Kinneret supplies about 430 million cubic meters of water per year--about a third of the national water consumption. Half of this quantity today is used for household needs. That is, this water is supplied in quality of drinking water. In the near future, this amount is said to be going to rise to 70 or 80 percent.

The data that more than anything make tangible the positive directions, are principally in the clear decrease during the last 3 years in the quantity of nitrogen in the Kinneret waters and a certain decrease in the quantity of phosphorous in the water. The nitrogen and the phosphorous serve as food for algae. An increase in their quantity in the Kinneret means more available food for algae and increased development of them decreases the quality of the water and requires the taking of measures such as filtering or chlorinating. Existing data shows that in the last three years the Kinneret has returned--from the nitrogen aspect--to its condition at the end of the sixties and beginning of the seventies. Then the general amount of nitrogen in the lake came to an average of 3,000 tons. Toward the end of the seventies, the picture got much worse and the quantity of nitrogen

reached about 4,000-5,000 tons in the lake. In 1982 the quantity lowered to 2,800, in 1983 and in 1984 the decrease continued to a level of about 2,600 tons of nitrogen in the Kinneret.

The phosphorous matter is to some extent different. Here there is only some improvement. At the end of the sixties the quantity of phosphorous in the lake came to about 60 tons. This quantity rose to a height of 120 tons in 1981 and decreased to 80 or 90 tons in the last 2 years.

Less Sewage Flows into the Lake

Generally two types of algae are found in the Kinneret: the large algae (phrydinium) and the little algae (nano-plankton). In conditions of lack of food materials in the water, the large algae multiply more and the small ones--they are the problematic ones--lessen. An increase in food materials--nitrogen and phosphorous--brings with it a rise in the quantity of small algae. Since in the last three years there has been a decrease in the nitrogen and phosphorous in the Kinneret, conditions for a decrease in the quantities of small algae were created.

Were the quantities of algae in the Kinneret dependent solely on nitrogen and phosphorous, a considerable increase in the quality of the Kinneret waters would have occurred over recent years. However, since treatment of the biological internal balance of the Kinneret is being accomplished at a rate which is unsatisfactory, the improvement is also limited.

The principal factors influencing the quality of the Kinneret waters are divided into factors outside the lake--the activity which occurs around it, and in its basin--and the activity that occurs within it.

The great advancement achieved in treating the Kinneret waters is first of all the result of the actions taken in the last 3 years outside of the lake. This activity is carried out by the directorship of the Kinneret, which is headed by Menahem Ben-Shlomo of Kibbutz 'Ami'ad. For example, more than 20 reservoirs have been built for collecting about four million cubic meters of sewage per year. This tremendous quantity of sewage previously flowed directly into the Kinneret and caused a rise in the concentrations of phosphorous and nitrogen. Today 1.5 to 2 million cubic meters of sewage water per year still enters the Kinneret and action to prevent this flow is continuing. Another type of polluted water which still does not reach the Kinneret: dirty water from the fish ponds in the Huleh Valley. Here also we are talking about millions of cubic meters per year, which today is partially being caught in new reservoirs. Moreover, the Huleh Valley, in which until 10 years ago there were 16 thousand dunam of fish ponds, has changed its landscape in recent yeras and the fish pond mosaic has been reduced to only 6,000 dunams.

The Good Fish and the Bad Fish

Another example of external activity which influenced the Kinneret waters is the treatment of beaches around the lake. Here a significant improvement has been made. If necessary funding is given to this, the project will

continue and advance. Among other things, beaches around the lake have been prepared and wet lavatories with reservoirs for removing the sewage to beyond the lake have been installed.

Also garbage cans have been installed and other improvements made on the beaches. Thus, despite the increased pressures during the summer months on the Kinneret's beaches, an improvement in the quality of the water at the bathing beaches' areas can be seen. From the laboratory data on samples of the water taken by the Kinneret laboratory of the water at the Kinneret beaches over the last four years, it appears that there is a decrease in the concentration of defecation germs in the summer months.

Dr Gofen claims that there is definitely an improvement in the public's behavior when it comes to the Kinneret beaches. The vacationers are taking better care of cleanliness than in the past. This encouraging picture changes when you see what is happening in the sea. The principal reference here is to fishing in the Kinneret. Data of the last 18 years clearly shows that there has been a constant significant decrease in the quantity of zooplankton, which is to say, in the quantity of microscopic crabs in the water. These crabs are the most efficient eaters of the little algae. At the beginning of the seventies the quantity of these crabs came to 45 grams per square meter, and today their quantity has decreased to less than half--about 20 grams per square meter.

The quantity of crabs decreased principally because of the increase in the pressure of the type of mini-fish which serves as food for them. The principal type here are the sardines, which due to difficulty of export are being less fished for. In contrast with the sardines, whose quantity is rising in the Kinneret while their market is decreasing, the "good fish" of the Kinneret is on the decrease. This fish is Amnon of the Kinneret, principal target of fishermen who receive high prices for it. Amnon is also the best fish for the ecological system: he is the most efficient user of the big algae as food. Over the last decade, exploitation of Amnon for fishing has been too intensive and the fish has decreased in the lake.

To compensate the fishermen, the fishing department in the Ministry of Agriculture populates the Kinneret with fish which mature quickly but at the same time this injures the ecological system. They are predator fish, and principally in the summer and fall they eat the little crabs: these are principally silver fish and Amnon of the Jordan.

The critical problem of the Kinneret fishermen is during the summer, at which time they suffer from a natural lack of food, and the pressure on the little crabs increases.

Says Dr Gofen: First we have to decrease the pressure on the little crabs, with increased fishing for sardines, and by stopping population of the Kinneret with silverfish and Amnon of the Jordan. Another recommendation from the scientists at the Kinneret laboratory is to significantly increase the population of the Kinneret with Amnon of the Galil, to 4 to 5 million

baby fish per year, in contrast to 2 million in recent years. Also it is recommended that the system be changed: instead of populating it when they are small, to do it when they are bigger. Beyond that, we recommend closing Biqlat Butayha, principally Zakhi and Mas'ndiyah, during the mating season of the Amnons, starting with the months of May and June, in order to aid their natural multiplication in the Kinneret. If implementation of the suggestions is speeded up, it is expected that the gradual improvement in the quality of the water of the Kinneret will continue.

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ISRAEL

PROFILES OF ISRAELI ARAB COMMUNITY

Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 16, 21, 23, 26, 28, 30 Aug 85

[Article by Roman Frister: "Between Allah, Marx and 'Arafat"]

[16 Aug 85 p 15]

[Text] A young man stood at his father's grave in the Muslim cemetery of 'Ar'ara and recited Kaddish [the Jewish prayer for the dead]. By his side, sobbing quietly, were his mother, brother, and sister. Those who had come to the funeral, mainly friends of the deceased and members of his family who live in Wadi 'Ara, stood around them in silence. The burial of the body brought to an end a complicated drama that had begun with the marriage of an Arab man to a Jewish woman. For many years the couple had lived in the Yad Eliyahu section of Tel Aviv. The husband worked for Eged [bus company]. The three children were raised as Jews in every way. The eldest did his service obligation in the Golani. They never had any problems of identity or religious contradictions. Their life together was a personal and private matter as long as the husband was alive. But on the day he died, his acquaintances and relatives in the village were shocked at the family's intention to bury him in the Jewish cemetery in Holon. A friend accepted by both the Jewish and Arab factions of the family went to Yad Eliyahu to dissuade the widow. "I told the woman: you honored your husband while he was alive, do the same now that he has departed this world. He was a Muslim who never converted. What will happen if one day this deception is discovered and fanatics remove his body from the grave, as happened with the body of Tirzah Angelovitz in Rishon [LeTzion]?...She was persuaded and we arranged the funeral in our village. We were more than a little amazed when his soldier son insisted on saying Kaddish at the grave, but we honored his wish."

This unusual story popped up suddenly on the fringes of the discussion--perhaps as a kind of supplementary illustration while we were talking with Muhamad Sayf about the complexity of relations between Arabs and Jews, about the ripples set up by the anti-Arab riots in 'Afula and about the meaning for both sides of Kahane-type extremism.

Muhamad Sayf, a tall, handsome 42-year old man, lives comfortably in 'Ar'ara and earns a good living as a private income tax advisor in Hadera. Commercial ties with the West Bank, the black market within Israel itself, and the

unending search for new, legal ways to launder capital have created a tremendous demand for good advice and assure him a prosperous livelihood. If everything goes right, says Muhamad Sayf, he will be able to retire at the age of 50. "I will have a farm with lambs and horses, a hunting rifle and inner peace." Meanwhile he talks proudly of his penthouse in 'Ar'ara, "360 square meters on two levels."

From that tangled incident of the Muslim villager and his Jewish children, Muhamad Sayf draws the following simple conclusion: Had he married a Jewish woman, he would never have given her children. It is his good fortune that he does not have that problem. He is married to a girl from the village who, besides a handsome dowry, has given him his five children. The oldest daughter registered this year for art at the University of Haifa. Iman, his 17-year old son, is enrolled at the Hadasim Institute.

The village of 'Ar'ara has seen an upsurge recently in "reborn Muslims." Youngsters for whom "'Arafat is a Mapai'nik" opened an Islamic library near the mosque and preach aloud for the non-recognition of the State of Israel. In their opinion both the Israel Communist party and the Progressive Movement for Peace are fundamentally flawed since "there is no party but Allah and no leader but Muhammad the Prophet." For the moment the group does not enjoy widespread support. Nevertheless it is tolerated and perhaps a bit feared. Who wants to come into open confrontation with young people who never stop speaking of God? Upon his return from Hadasim, Iman, Muhamad Sayf's son, will have to find his place in a society that vacillates between extremism and moderation, between loyalty to the state and Palestinian or Arab identification. With an "original sin" like his, this will not be an easy task.

His father knows well the troubled road of an Arab groping for an Israeli identification but stumbling on new obstacles whenever he thinks he has reached his goal. Muhamad Sayf was educated in Miqve Israel. His childhood memories are somewhat blurred, but nevertheless he cannot forget that every Friday, on the Muslim day of rest, he went to school as if it were any other day of the week but on Friday evenings he was forced to participate in the traditional sabbath welcoming ceremony. "But that did not prevent me from making it through and becoming an Israeli citizen, proud of my Arab origins", he says. However, even a superficial glance at his way of life makes one wonder about the truth of that determination. As an independent man, Muhamad Sayf did not encounter that wall of suspicion that bars the way to the Arab intellectual seeking employment in a Jewish factory via some pretext or other that is always justified by "security considerations." This inequality expresses itself in a thousand and one ways--starting with the behavior of policemen at roadblocks when he takes his car to a restaurant or movie in Tel Aviv, and ending with the memory of that day about 14 years ago when he tried to rent an apartment in Hadera and his Jewish neighbors strenuously objected.

Muhamad Sayf is not one to give up easily. "I went to the consumer protection council. I demanded their intervention and opened my office in the apartment where I wanted to. Today I have very good relations with my Jewish neighbors," he concludes and asks not to go any further on the matter. What happened--happened. Nevertheless, in the years that have gone by since,

Muhamad Sayf has not stopped looking for his place in Israeli society. At first he joined Shmuel Tamir's political group. He was active in MAPAI, and at the time of the split, followed Ben Gurion into RAFA. "I visited the old man in Sede Boqer and told him that Israel's attitude toward her minorities was her real showcase to the enlightened world. Ben Gurion liked the way I put it--but nothing changed. The discrimination continues." (Ra'anan Kohen, who holds the Labor Party's minority affairs portfolio, explained the matter to us with praiseworthy candor: It is a tragedy that my party wants the Arab votes at the ballot box but does not want Arabs in the system.) Disappointed with Labor, he jumped horses to the Shinui movement. Two days before the lists closed for the ninth Knesset, he volunteered to assist the Yahad party founded by Ezer Weizmann. "Having learned from experience, I no longer expected a dramatic turnaround, but felt that it would be enough if the Yahad Party could succeed here and there to round off some of the sharp edges and thus lessen the friction."

When I ask him somewhat critically what in hell impelled him to go from one Zionist party to the other, he responds in full seriousness:

"I was looking for a feeling of partnership. I believe in the future of the State of Israel and I want to feel that I am an inseparable part of Israeli society. That is why I sent Iman to Hadasim. I do not want him to close himself up in the village where I may find him one day among the reborn Muslims by the mosque. I want my son to know Jewish society and to form his personality while open to different ideas and perceptions. I know that this is a hard road, but it is the only one after all that leaves hope for understanding between Arabs and Jews. I hope that he will get close to Jewish society without losing his Arab identity. His mother is a conservative Muslim, and he has a grandfather who made the pilgrimage to Mecca. If he succeeds, there is no reason why he cannot enjoy both worlds."

The two worlds also meet in music, which is the love of Yusuf Hanna, a graduate of the computer science department of the Hebrew University in Jerusalem. He plays many instruments but loves the synthesizer best. It is particularly good for enjoying the music he calls "Franco-Arab," music that has western scales but does not give up the eastern quarter tone.

Yusuf Hanna was born with a silver spoon in his mouth. Before entering the university, he studied at the Kibbutz Genossar educational institute. His grandfather owned lots of land in the hills north and east of the banks of the Sea of Galilee, and the Hanna family has ties with the Jews in the surrounding area that go back to the days of the British Mandate. In addition to other businesses, his father now has the "Bread and Fishes" restaurant in Tabgha. Hafiz Hanna is a Christian and the name of the restaurant recalls the wonders and miracles ascribed to Jesus in the New Testament. The elder Hanna is rich, and when he has to help his son, he does not hesitate to do so.

I met Yusuf 2 years ago when I was a guest at the family home in Rama in the western Galilee. Around the table were his parents and his brother Ya'qub, then an IDF soldier doing his obligatory service. The bar in the Hanna home is equipped with the best drinks, and after one or two glasses, everybody warmed up. Yusuf sat opposite his brother in uniform and talked a great deal

about the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people. He himself, he said, was not about to serve in the IDF. The Hebrew University was then the arena for violent confrontations between Jews and Arabs, and in the Arab student union there was clear tendency toward extremism. Many of the ideas put forward that night by Yusuf had been voiced earlier by the radical activists on campus. Upon completing his studies, Yusuf was set to travel to America to work for his next degree. "I have no desire to return to Israel, because there is no chance of my finding work here to match my talents," he said. First I will travel to America and then I will move on to one of the oil principalities. That way I will be able to earn a good salary, to find satisfaction in my work and maintain contact with the Arab environment."

That was how Yusuf spoke in July 1982. This week we met him in Rama during a quick visit to his parents. Yusuf had found work at the Scintel corporation which operates on the campus of the Technion. This time he no longer spoke of the Palestinian people and its legitimate rights. It may be that that was simply coincidental, but I had the feeling that his being accepted at the Haifa electronics firm had moderated his political stands. At the center of the conversation was the new synthesizer that he had bought for \$2,000. His brother Ya'qub was not home. After his discharge from the IDF, he had been brought into one of the family businesses on the shore of the Sea of Galilee. But that same criticism that had 2 years ago characterized the words of his father, a loyal citizen who had served in the regular army for 11 years and attained the rank of master sergeant, had not evaporated. On a nice day you can look out from the porch of his house over the new houses of Karmi'el. He is not envious of the Jews for his house, too, is new and luxurious, even by the national standard. Even the confiscation of the lands upon which Karmi'el was built does not arouse him as it arouses others. "In the final analysis, the Arabs of the area find work and are raising their standard of living," he says. "What cannot be forgotten is the insult that constantly reminds us, despite our Israeli identity cards, that we are second-class citizens."

Hafiz Hanna was referring to Independence Day 2 years ago when 150 VIP's from the neighboring villages were invited to a festive celebration. It was only upon their arrival in Karmi'el that they learned that a separate gathering had been organized for them. "As if we were not worthy to be with the Jews, as if to demonstrate that our place was not with everyone else."

In Karmi'el, by the way, no one had intended to insult the Arab notables. This sad incident was nothing more than an unfortunate lack of understanding of the neighbors across the highway. "They treated us as if we were not human beings with feelings," Hafiz Hanna said.

In Sami Samahah's book on the orientation and politicization of the Arab minority, published last year by the University of Haifa, one can find an amazing research datum: Only 19 percent of the Jews asked said that they had at least one Arab friend. Zero percent of the Arabs asked said that they had one close Jewish friend. A deep abyss of lack of contact and misunderstanding has opened between the Jewish majority and the 700,000 Arabs who live in their midst.

"Because of this split we have nowhere to turn when something bothers us," Ilyas Hanna, Hafiz's brother, had told us at the time and immediately added: "Excuse me, there is somewhere to turn, the Communists, but they are not for me."

The journal of the Israel Communist Party, AL-ITTIHAD, was lying on Husayn Titi's knees when I entered his home in Kafr Ba'na. The village seems suspended in the foothills. Its narrow alleys wind between the houses, women look out from the window openings, men wander around with nothing to do. It is an exotic sight for the tourist but a gray reality for the regular residents. As in the repeated refrain of a well-known song, the complaints keep coming back of lack of an overall plan, which results in terribly overcrowded housing and illegal construction and turns the people into criminals against their will. Moreover Husayn Titi's living room is not like those of Muhammad Sayf and Hafiz Hanna. Everything is very clean but simple, almost without furnishings, because Husayn Titi is a laid-off construction worker hard hit by the slow-down in the construction industry. "Just a month or two ago I did not even have the time to scratch my head; today I do not know how to kill all the free time," he said.

He may devote the free time forced upon him by unemployment to expanding his home; he needs to build another room to house Muhammad Titi, a relative who fled Lebanon and returned to the village of his ancestors. Muhammad's story could serve as the theme for a breathtaking play: his wife Samiyah and their two sons Mahmud and Tariq were murdered by Phalangists in the Sabra camp. Mahmud was born on the 16th of August, just a short time before the slaughter. His parents brought him to the good fence to show him off proudly to their relatives living in the Galilee. When Muhammad Titi came to the fence the second time, with his daughter Su'aydah, who was only saved from the slaughter by a miracle, he had just one thing in mind: to cross the border and find a safe haven in Israel.

As in a story where all is well that ends well, Muhammad Titi was given permission to settle in Israel. The family gave him a warm reception, promised help and even worried about a fitting marriage. A short time after the tragedy the young widower (born in 1950) married Siham, Husayn Titi's sister-in-law.

When we met this week, Siham was in the 7th month of her second pregnancy. She bore their son 18 months ago. His name--not hard to guess--is Tariq. If a second son is born to them, he may be named Mahmud. Thus the next generation will be reborn as a kind of compensation for the terrible tragedy. But the more the conversation continued, the less joie-de-vivre it contained. The first enthusiasm of some of the relatives had cooled, and they were no longer extending support. A hard life takes its toll, everyone has his own troubles and his own family. "For lack of choice, they will have to live in the room I will build for them in my house," explains Husayn Titi.

But it is not only the housing crunch that weighs heavily on the refugee from Lebanon. Before the slaughter at Sabra he was the owner of a taxicab that assured him a decent livelihood. Here he has no money to purchase a "green number" or a vehicle. He has to support his family from whatever few jobs

come his way. And when he read the accounts and analyses of the events in 'Afula and the public support for the Kahane movement, he cursed the miserable day he asked for and received asylum in Israel.

Every sixth citizen of the State of Israel is a member of the minorities, struggles each day with problems that we Jews are totally unaware of: Where is his place in the universe between Allah and Marx, 'Arafat, and Herzl? These short vignettes should bring home how mistaken we are when we treat Israel's Arabs as if they were a single social group. We tend not to consider how much the politics of these 700,000 people is directly dependent on the position of the Jewish majority. It is a population whose problems the Jewish establishment and public stubbornly try to ignore--on the assumption that "a lack of policy is also policy." The comment by 'Aziz Jibli, a farmer who used to market his produce in 'Afula, shows where that kind of attitude may lead. 'Aziz told me:

"You were born in Poland, right? Didn't the anti-Semites there call out to you or your parents 'Zhids to Palestine'? They did. And what happened? In the end you went to Palestine. I am a quiet farmer far removed from politics. I never disobeyed the law. My main concern is for my house, my property, my family, but at the time of the riots in 'Afula hot-headed Jews attacked me shouting: 'Dirty Arab, go to the PLO!' And for the first time in my life, I began to think about it: Maybe that's where I really belong."

[21 Aug 85 p 7]

[Text] The words of poetry have an amazing sound when read against the background of hammer blows and engine roars. In a small restaurant squeezed between the workshops and garages of lower Haifa: "...it is in your power to uproot trees / from the midst of the mountain in my village / which embraces the moon, / it is within your power / to plow under all the houses of my village / until no trace be left / ...but you do not have the power to choke my song / I am the muse of the wind and the rain / and the lover of the land."

In all the surrounding area you cannot make out a piece of ground or a parcel of vegetation. The air is thick with the smells of gasoline and frying. But Salim Jubran, the man who wrote the poem, does not need the views of the Galilee to forge the nationalist longings for his creations. He carries within himself the land and the pulse of village life just as the camel carries his hump. Even if the picture should become somewhat blurred--in his own mind or that of his readers--the party will come and renew it in the events of Land Day.

"The confiscations of land which are given wretched names like 'the Judaization of the Galilee' only add fuel to the bonfires of the Communist Party of Israel," I was told the day before by Eli Rekhes, a researcher at the Dayan Center in Tel Aviv. His comment echoed in my ears even before Salim Jubran arrived for the meeting. He briefly interrupted his work at the Haifa branch of the Democratic Movement for Peace and Equality, where he is the editor of its literary journal, and came to this little restaurant in order to allow a Jew a hurried glimpse of his Arab world. He is a Communist with every fiber that is in him, one of those few members of the Israel Communist Party

who joined not out of hatred of the Jews but out of genuine conviction. It might be said that he was weaned on Marx and Engels by his parents. His father, a laid-off worker who could barely read or write, was one of the followers of the Mufti of Jerusalem--"until he came to understand that radical nationalism lacked the power to redeem the Palestinian people from its misery and became a Communist. I remember how, when I was a child, I would read articles to him from AL-ITTIHAD: Almost without understanding the process, I, too, absorbed and endorsed the Marxist approach to the liberation of my people."

There is a fateful twist of irony in the fact that Salim Jubran was born in Peqi'in, the only village in all Israel that can boast of continuous Jewish settlement. "Only a wall separated us from the Zinti family," he says and corrects me: "It was not fate but important symbolism." That symbolic wall, as it were, has thickened over the years and become an unbreachable rampart dividing Jews and Arabs."

A Frightening Picture

Almost all the young Arabs in the villages of the Galilee and the triangle know Jubran's poetry. I look into his eyes and wonder at how little I know about him and his creations and the multitudes of his readers.

"The wall will be breached when we each come to know the other well. We know you, but you do not know us," I said. But Salim Jubran contradicted me. "The fact is that you do not know us, but Israel's Arabs know Jewish society very well. We read Hebrew newspapers, watch TV and listen to the radio. The picture is clear to us and rather frightening. You talk about the 'Arab problem', but I would say that the problem is entirely Jewish. I am not afraid of Kahane and his gang, but I am afraid of his devastating influence on the Jewish public. The Jewish public is little by little getting used to the idea that to beat an Arab, and perhaps even to kill him, is not so bad. But Kahane is not a wildflower in a hothouse. Even before his rise there began to develop an ideology of two-legged animals and poisoned roaches. To kill a roach is really not a big sin. Immediately after the 1967 war Jewish society turned to the right and humanistic values began to retreat. I was never one of Ben Gurion's devotees, but at times I yearn for those days. The present Labor leadership flowered in the military-industrial bureaucracy--and that explains a lot. But the main loser is not Israel's Arabs. I think it is precisely Jewish society that has suffered hard punishment: it has turned into a society of troops and conquerors. An ancient Arabic proverb says that he who works in the sewer is not immune to vile odors."

What is frightening, Jubran ponders aloud, is the superficial view of things. The view of people and entire nations as stereotypes. "It is a dangerous and contagious illness," he says, and tells how his son, a 4th grade student, watched the screening on television of a part of the riots in 'Afula and how he reacted. "I will never be able to accept my son's saying 'All the Jews are dirty.' When he reviled the Jews, I asked him: Do you also revile your friend Yoram? Did Yoram also beat the Arabs? I am not sure that he was convinced because hatred feeds on hatred and it is hard to stop an avalanche."

Like most of Israel's Arabs, Salim Jubran defines himself as a Palestinian who holds an Israeli passport. Toward the end of the discussion he does not deny that he has a personal problem with the country's flag, national anthem, and independence day celebration. In his opinion, there will be no escaping the future development of Israeli identity on both sides of the barricade, an identity that will establish common symbols for Arabs and Jews alike. But without any connection to the future character of the State of Israel, Jubran wants, with all his being, the establishment of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza strip. But if and when that comes to pass, he will stay here, in the Land of Israel. "When I am asked 'where are you going,' I reply that I am going home and by that I mean my house in Nazareth. I would have difficulty seeing my home in Shekhem or Gaza. The definition of a homeland for me, besides its political significance, is one of geography. I was born here in the Galilee; therefore, this is my homeland. My belonging to the Palestinian people does not express itself in the packing of suitcases and moving from city to city."

"Would you prefer that both Peqi'in and your Nazareth be included in the borders of Palestine?"

Jubran is not upset by the provocation. He replies: "I have to look at all the alternatives realistically. As an individual I can emigrate to Arab countries or to any western country. If I choose a western country it would mean that my descendants in the next generation would cease to be Arabs. I have friends, mostly Arab intellectuals, who left and settled in America. Their financial situation is fine, but their psychological malaise only gets worse. This is the path that I have chosen. As to Arab countries, I no longer have any delusions. To be a Palestinian in those countries is not an acceptable solution. The only choice that remains is to stay here and fight for my place in society and the country. I know that there are many Jews who see us as a threatening and unwanted minority and would breathe easier if we were not here. And I know that there are Arabs who preach doing nothing and waiting patiently until Israel is removed from the map of the Middle East. In both cases, those are nothing but pipe dreams. We are here to stay, but the state is a fait accompli and anyone with any sense knows that it cannot be uprooted by force of arms. Therefore I have to seek a good life here as an individual and member of a minority. It sounds simple but under the existing circumstances it is an almost impossible task."

At the end of the hour, the poet returned to his work and I remained with his poems. "...I, too / as if crying and not crying / the sadness that is as dry as wrinkled figs / open a direct line between your song and mine / between your dream that burns and scatters like ashes / and mine which burns and scatters like ashes"--sings Salim Jubran as he turns to Yehuda Amichai and reminds him that "there is a holocaust in your past and in mine." I read his poetry again and again and ask myself if he is a "moderate" or an "extremist," a dangerous enemy or a partner for a dialogue that cannot be avoided. And like him, I, too, consider the alternatives: the people of the Progressive List? The Muslim Brotherhood? The reborn Muslims of Umm el-Fahm who worship Khomeyni? Uncompromising people like Salih Baransi, who established the "Center for the Palestinian Heritage" in Teibe? And when you

convey this political map of the Arab minority in Israel, you cannot but ask: where did we go wrong that it has come to this?

My Error:

In the first article in the series I inadvertantly switched the names of two of those interviewed. The man from 'Ar'ara is Mahmud Sayf, while the refugee in Ba'na is Muhamad al-Titi--and not the other way around. I hope that they will forgive me.

[23 Aug 85 p 13]

[Text] The smiling face of Salih Baransi shows no hint of the 10 years he served in prison for activities against the State of Israel. He is a short man, energetic and intelligent. A dangerous opponent. He has learned from his past experience. Now everything that he does is open to criticism, it is all on the table, all legal. He knows that the security services are keeping tabs on him and only waiting for him to slip. So he watches his step. The offices of the "Center for the Study of the Arab Heritage," his most recent creation, stand in the heart of Teibe, almost directly opposite the large and luxurious mosque, one of four whose minarets pierce the village skies. The truth of the matter is that all of the houses round about are new, two and three-story affairs, all modern and with a touch of oriental flavor. Most of them have marble floors in the living room and Italian ceramics in the bathroom. The building of the "Center for the Study of the Arab Heritage" is also redolent with fresh paint and plaster. After his attempts to establish an Arab university in the Galilee failed, Baransi founded this center and from here, from the second floor of this handsome office building, he conducts his war for the Palestinian soul of Israel's Arabs. Another branch was set up afterwards in Sakhnin, still another will be opened shortly in the south and in September--if Allah and the district official so will it--an annual festival of Palestinian folklore will take place in Tira .

The first festival took place last year in Teibe, in the schoolhouse. Immediately thereafter the Ministry of Education scolded the council head who permitted it to happen. This year Baransi rented a piece of ground in the neighboring village of Tira in order to set up a kind of museum of the Palestinian experience: costumes, work tools, and any and all symbols characteristic of his people. The district official was quick to sign a restraining order against "illegal construction." Baransi claims that this is merely a pretext since what is involved is a temporary structure that would be dismantled at the end of the festivities. "My rental contract expires on 15 September. Were I to appeal in court, I would win easily. But the court case would take at least 2 months and by then the rainy season would begin and spoil the program. The official knows that this is his best card."

Strangely, Baransi does not look at all troubled. In his heart of hearts he is convinced that in the end the festival will come off as planned. The opposition of the authorities only contributes to the publicity of the event, and the struggle has bestowed upon him the halo of a nationalist hero. Young people in Teibe and Tira speak of him as a fearless leader, an almost legendary figure. Someone makes sure to whisper in my ear that his village

sweetheart did not wait until he was released from prison and married another--and since then "Baransi has been married exclusively to the Palestinian cause." The more they speak in his honor, the deeper my conviction that if they would only allow the festival to come off without interference, his glory would decrease sevenfold. But the very mention of his name causes uneasiness among government officials. A man with a political past such as his often arouses feelings that are not thought through to the end.

Baransi's political career gathered momentum in 1959 when a group of nationalist intellectuals left the Communist party and established the radical al- Ard [the Land] movement. The movement was listed as a corporation under Ottoman law, but in fact was the first serious attempt to organize nationalist Arabs into a political party. The supreme court decision handed down in 1964 put an end to the political adventure. Most of the leaders of al-Ard emigrated to Syria or joined 'Arafat's staff in Beirut. But not Baransi. Baransi stayed in order to participate in the struggle in the framework of "the Socialist List," also the fruit of his initiative. When the list was disqualified by the Knesset elections council and the appeal rejected by the High Court of Justice, the man turned to underground activity. In 1969 he was arrested and convicted of security crimes. As soon as he got out he immediately found a new way to continue the old struggle.

He founded the "Center for the Study of the Arab Heritage" less than 2 years ago and can already count his accomplishments. "We list and preserve structures and sites connected to the history of the Palestinian people, encourage the establishment of folk ensembles and are preparing an extensive bibliography of the Arab and Palestinian heritage," he says with obvious pride, as if trying to demonstrate that he was neither humbled nor broken. In a conversation with a Jewish journalist Baransi talked a lot about coexistence between "two nations with equal rights." It is hard to tell how much of that is lip service and how much, astute evaluation of the circumstances.

"Don't we have the right to preserve our national values and history?" he asks with dishonest naivete. After all, what is he asking? Only his legal rights. He does not need our money. In the last 8 months of 1984 the Center took in about 32 million shekels. "Financing is not a problem." Where do the millions come from? It is all legal: Everything appears on the balance sheet. The Palestinian medical association in Paris, the League of Friends of the Center in London or the World Council of Churches are among the principal foreign contributors. An unidentified assistance group in Geneva sent \$25,000 to Teibe--and that was just an advance on double that figure. Baransi: "The contributors are generous with their money; they know that it will be spent on the highest cause of all--the preservation and continued existence of our national heritage. What is held back from the young Arab in the Israeli school and what, perhaps, even his parents do not tell him at home--he will get from us."

Baransi and his aides have serious competitors in the battle for the soul of the youth. In the village of his birth, Teibe, at least two radical organizations are active: the Muslim Brotherhood headed by Amir Jum'ah and the "al-Nahdah" (the revival) group. There is here, of course, a "village sons"

organization, and the movement of the reborn Muslims gets stronger from day to day. Baransi is not their hero, nor the secular 'Arafat, but rather Khomeyni. Their platform is written in the Koran, not in Marx' "Kapital". You can meet them on warm summer evenings as they crowd into the center of Teibe, walk by the mosque of 'Ar'ara or engage in conversation in the Umm el-Fahm town square. Their dress is intended to demonstrate modesty and asceticism; in their outlook on the world they are reminiscent of the Neturei Karta [ultra-fanatic Orthodox Jews], who do not recognize the right of the State to exist. In their behavior they are like Habad [Jewish Hasidic] missionaries who try to force passersby to put on the phylacteries or pray in a quorum [minimum of 10 adult males]. They, too, like our ultra-orthodox, aim for the creation of a state based on religious law.

It is not only Baransi who regards them suspiciously. They are also beginning to constitute a threat to the secular New Communist List and to the Zionist parties that have gained a foothold in the Arab community. Apolitical Arab citizens anxiously follow their activity. They bring with them a new kind of polarization to Arab society. "I despise all extremism, but I am afraid of religious extremism," we were told by Hafiz Hanna, the owner of the "Bread and Fishes" restaurant on the Sea of Galilee.

The inspiration of Allah descended first on the inhabitants of Umm el-Fahm. In this enormous village which will one day achieve the status of a city, in its narrow alleys winding between the houses, within the dark alcoves and the side chambers of the mosque, the character of the movement was formed. And whoever returns to Allah is not satisfied with the redemption of his own soul. The holy objective of these reborn Muslims is to make more converts for Allah.

When Mustafa Qala left his home in the village of 'Ar'ara he was denounced by a "weird young man" who said: "I hope that Allah wants you." Mustafa answered that he did not know, because he had not spoken recently with the divine presence. But the young man would not let up: "Do you not pray? You are making a big mistake. We live in a changing world--provide for the eternity of your soul..."

Mustafa Qala, a teacher and member of the steering committee for Arab-Jewish encounters held in a "Shomer Hatza'ir" kibbutz seminar in Giv'at Haviva, would have reacted to the incident as an amusing curiosity but for his understanding of how serious a phenomenon it is. Religious extremism makes giant strides from one village to another and takes root everywhere. As with western society and Jewish society in Israel, Israel's Arabs vent their disappointments and frustrations in a search for heavenly values. That by itself would not be cause for alarm but for the very real implications.

Says Mustafa: "In Umm el-Fahm the religious extremists were able to exert such pressure that for the first time in years, it was impossible to send village girls to participate in the Communist Party summer camps. I know youngsters who have stopped using shaving cream that contains alcohol. The Koran, of course, forbids the use of alcoholic beverages. Once a week, a female lay preacher arrives in our area from the West Bank, lectures on morality and drags the women off to the mosque. Arab women take little part in public life and are open to any doctrine that gives them a feeling of belonging. The

moment a woman falls into the preacher's net, she immediately brings in her daughter--and the chain gets longer."

These things are not limited to the tie between the individual and his creator. Behind the striving for the sources of Islam are the first buds of a political upheaval that is likely to overturn the political status quo in Arab society. Despite the fact that Muslims are a decided majority of Israel's Arabs, it was in fact the Christians who have regularly been appointed leaders of the New Communist List and have borne the banners of public struggle. That came about through historical necessity: with the rise of the State of Israel, when the traditional Muslim leaders fled the country, the Christians fill the vacuum. But meanwhile, a new generation of capable Muslims has arisen, an ambitious and uncompromising generation that is forcefully seeking its place in society. In the foreseeable future it will be them with whom we will have to conduct the dialogue on coexistence.

We can learn a bit about what awaits us from Zitam Watad, a biology teacher and educator in the 'Ar'ara high school: "I can successfully resist nationalist pressures and preach coexistence; but I am powerless against religious pressure."

I met Zitam by accident while visiting Giv'at Haviva. Little by little, three other Arab teachers joined our conversation: Nadir Nasrallah from Shefar'am, Riyad Qabha, who taught Arabic in an interim group in Kafr Qari', and Mustafa Qala. We proceeded from the common assumption that the education of the young generation will determine the future of relations between Israel's Jews and Arabs. The question that I put to them was: Is the national educational establishment capable of meeting the challenge? Does it constitute a reasonable response to the New Communist platform, to the slogans of the Progressive Movement for Peace, to extremism a la Baransi, to the extremism of the "village sons," to the preachings of the reborn Muslims and to the activities of the nationalist youth groups that are organizing in many villages on a local basis?

Nadir Nasrallah, a graduate of Haifa University and a certified sociology teacher, likens this establishment to a storm-tossed ship in the open seas. "The passengers on board the ship are Jews and Arabs," he says, and explains that we should want to "plug the leaks through which water is filling the hull of the ship but, where that is impossible, we must teach the young to swim."

I did my homework on this swimming with the generous assistance of Emanu'el Koppelwitz, the director of the Arab Education and Culture Department in Jerusalem. Koppelwitz, a native of Germany, who dealt with matters relating to the Arab population during most of his years of government service, was made head of the department in 1970 when the minister of education at the time, Yig'al Alon, wanted to draw conclusions from a number of studies that dealt with defects in the system. Koppelwitz:

The curricula in the Arab schools were loaded with Jewish content. If anyone wanted to delude himself that Arab youth could thus be removed from Arab nationalism--reality would be quick to catch up with him. The system did not stand the test, and the time had come to institute sweeping changes. We set

up working groups consisting mainly of Arab educators and got down to business. In Arabic literature we put the emphasis on modern poetry that speaks to the heart of the young. This was a complicated task. We could not include in the program poems that would allow the teacher a nationalist interpretation. But we found nothing wrong in the love of the student for his land. Poems that treat the beauty of nature and the environment were included in the new curriculum. In teaching history we increased the chapters dealing with the Middle East and the Arab nations to almost 40 percent of the material covered. We introduced vocational arts--in particular auto mechanics, electricity, woodworking, etc. I believe that we are now beginning to reap the fruit of those changes. The number of students who successfully pass the matriculation exams has increased, and the general level of teachers is higher. I think that we have succeeded in the area of education for good citizenship. I agree with the opinion that Arab youth have become more radicalized. There has been an increased awareness of rights."

"Citizenship for education?" Mustafa wonders. "When, when the tutor is here? What can you do in 45 short minutes when 40 students crowd in front of you?"

The hour with the tutor is the only one dedicated to public subjects. It is the most opportune time to analyze issues of the day with the student: questions dealing with the Middle East controversy and the nature of relations with the Jewish majority. Mustafa: "About 3 years ago the general director of the Education Ministry sent us a circular that spelled out what could be covered during the tutor's hour. I remember that several of us teachers sat down then, including Dar'usha, who has meantime become an MK, and that we tried without much success to understand the content of that circular."

Nadir Nasrallah continues: "I know that with the beginning of the academic year 10 days hence I will find on the bulletin board a list of topics for discussion during the tutor's hour. They will not include anything that directly relates to the Arab-Israeli conflict. The famous circular from the general director of the Health [sic] Ministry in fact does permit a certain amount of room for maneuver, but very few teachers will take up a controversial subject. No one will fail to remember that he requires certification from the security services in order to engage in education."

Mustafa Qala, in the second round of the discussion: "In Arabic studies the system puts the emphasis on the language. In Hebrew studies the emphasis is on culture. In a large number of the books the Arab is presented negatively. What do my students think to themselves when I make them read Smilansky's story about the Arab who steals the clothing of Jewish children who go out to bathe in the pool?"

Riyad Qabha: "The three stories of 'Al-Sanabil' for teaching literature were written in 1954. After all, haven't things changed since then? Isn't there modern literature? In the fifties, when we didn't have our own pedagogues, Arabic-speaking Iraqi Jews shaped the educational system. Do we have to drag that inheritance into the 21st century?"

Zitam Watad completes the picture: "The young people read the newspapers and watch television. They hear about Kanane and the public opinion polls that

predict increasing support for his camp. They see what is happening to the Palestinians in Lebanon and Syria. We ignore all of this during the tutor's hour, and what happens? We expose the student to external influences over which we have no control or criticism. Every one of us has a devil inside him. It is possible to release him--and it is possible to restrain him. Ten thousand Arab teachers are the 'big band' of the educational system. But the rhythm and key are set by the conductor."

[26 Aug 85 pp 7, 9]

[Text] My God, is that really you, Rafqa-Rafiq Qabha?

When I saw him for the first time he was sitting on a horse, in Western dress with a dark suit, a white shirt and a silk tie. In his left hand he held a colorful parasol. He was all masculinity, happiness and pride, surveying the diners and dancers. It was his wedding day.

Much water has flowed since then in the spring channel that divides the village in two. On that day it constituted the border. On the eastern slope of the mountain was Jordanian Barta'a, on the western slope, Israeli Barta'a. The dividing line passed right between the peach tree and the mukhtar's bathroom, continued along the Nahal Akhzib and then turned south. Why? Because! More precisely because that is how the line was drawn at Rhodes during the truce. Most of the inhabitants of Barta'a would not have known then if Rhodes was an island in the Mediterranean or a Greek delicacy. All that mattered was that suddenly the Qabha family found itself divided among two countries. Some 400 people got Israeli identity cards, while 1,600 were issued a passport from the Hashemite kingdom. They had only one thing in common: parents on both sides of the border taught their children the basic lesson in geopolitics: you could run up to the peach tree, but you had better not go one meter beyond! The children had difficulty in understanding that twisted logic. Why could you visit Uncle Mahmud but you could not go on to Uncle Ahmad who lived just 20 steps across the wadi? "The day will come, the borders will be removed and we will be one family again," they would comfort the children--usually not believing a word of it.

Do you remember, Rafiq?

Rafiq nods. He has put on weight, his forehead is higher and when he is not shaven you can make out some grey hair among the bristles of his beard. His wife Hana has borne him 8 children: the oldest daughter is off to teacher's college this year. And, thank God, he makes a good living. He has a grocery store at the entrance to the village and a spacious home. Many houses were built since my previous visit. The population of the village has grown from 400 to 1,350. All of it is natural increase. About 2 months ago the mukhtar passed away. His son Riyad, 32, inherited the position. Now he sits with us on inverted cases of beer in Rafqa's store. There is no town council in Barta'a, and the village is poor in comparison to surrounding villages. It is the young mukhtar's job to advise the people, to make peace between feuding parties and to write out all kinds of official certificates. It was that way in the time of the Turks, it was that way during the British mandate and it is still that way today. But alongside all of the regular duties, Riyad Qabha is

also trying to compose a document that no one asked of him: the history of the village.

Sweet Revenge Through Salt

Almost every Arab village has its own story, whether true or only legendary. I heard about the Qabha clan's past for the first time from Mahmud Qabha, my host at the wedding: "Our forefathers came from Qursa, near Jannin", Mahmud said. "The name of the founder of the family was Muhammad Qabhawi. He was a hot-tempered man, he argued with his neighbors and fled for his life to the area around the village of 'Ara. Four of his seven sons were saved with him. Three of them settled in the hills by Wadi 'Ara and each of them founded his own line. No one knows what happened to the fourth son. All trace of him disappeared like the ten lost tribes of Israel. The inhabitants of Barta'a are the descendants of Mustafa Qabhawi, but Mustafa also got into trouble. The relatives of his wife, a girl from 'Ara, murdered him during a family quarrel. When his two sons grew up, they decided to avenge their father. They built a big house, all on a foundation of salt, and surrounded it with a deep moat. For the dedication ceremony they invited their murderous uncles. At night they filled the moats with water. The water melted the salt, and the luxurious structure collapsed like a house of cards. The guests died in the ruins of the building..."

The continuation of the story includes further murders and further escapes from the curse of avengers, until the family finally found a safe haven in Barta'a, a forsaken spot nestled between the hills. The strength of their thirst helped them to find a spring. Until the outbreak of the Six Day War, this spring was the only source of water for both parts of the village. The Jordanians sought to keep the women from meeting at the well and built an open concrete canal that brought some of the water to the eastern side of the border. Now Riyadh Qabha, the new mukhtar, remembers: "That did not help them much. Ties of blood were stronger than any prohibition. The women would send notes with family gossip into the canal. Sometimes there would also be some politics. When our village got mad at Husayn because of his hostility to 'Abd-al-Nasir, we would send notes villifying the king."

On Rafiq-Rafqa's and Hana's wedding day, Riyadh Qabha was only 11 years old. Today he lives in his own house on the northern edge of the village. It has electricity and a telephone and hot and cold water that flow from the spigots.

On that day he lived, of course, in his parents' home. The old house stood at the foot of the mountain, almost touching the border. The back wall of the bathroom touched Jordanian soil. A small plaza near this house served as a dance floor. On both slopes, which ran down opposite each other to meet in the channel of Nahal Akhzib, the guests gathered to watch the ceremony, as if seated in a giant amphitheater. The binoculars passed from hand to hand: How does cousin Sulayman look, what kind of new dress does Fatimah have?...Down below, in the narrow strip of the banks of the Nahal, were the legionnaires in checkered red and white kaffiyehs and the soldiers of the national guard in green berets. A "sharp" trio, renowned as the best singers in the area, lavished musical praise on the beauty of the bride and the exalted character of the groom. A short pause after each stanza gave the family members on the

Jordanian side the opportunity to respond with the singing of parables. This vocal dialogue continued for a good hour, and when the list of family compliments was over, that only made room for songs of the love of the wandering bedouin, the flight of birds and peace. "Peace will come, and we will be together again," sang the members of the Qabha family on both sides of the border. It may have been that each side desired peace in a different way, but certainly no one foresaw the disappointment it would bring.

The Dream of Unification--Is Over

"In 1967 the border was eliminated, but not the partitions", said Riyad. "I remember the initial excitement. Everyone was looking for his relatives. Embraces, kisses, high spirits. But it was natural that we would also make comparisons. The Jordanian part of the village had a main highway that connected it to Jannin, two schools and a telephone in private homes. We did not have those things. No highway, no telephone, no school worthy of the name. Our educational distress is known to everyone. To this day, Arab schools in Israel are short about 600 classrooms. Some of the children of Umm el-Fahm, for example, study in rented rooms that are barely fit for pigs. It is no wonder that we envied their educational system and institutions. But our homes were prettier, and we certainly had a higher standard of living.

"Several weeks passed. We satisfied our mutual curiosity and our initial high spirits waned. We began to really probe our attitudes and discovered to our amazement that there was more to separate us than to unite us. Through binoculars or in forbidden meetings in the darkness of night, everything seemed different. Then we mainly talked from the heart. Now we look at reality with our heads."

"We, the Israeli Arabs, grew up in an open society. They were more introverted than us and very suspicious. The Israeli inhabitants of Barta'a saw them as very conservative people who had not yet liberated themselves from the yoke of long-forgotten tradition. They, on the other hand, saw us as Arabs who had sold their national birthright for a mess of pottage. There were phenomena that they could not understand at all. Sometimes they would ask in amazement mixed with suspicion: 'What? You studied at Tel Aviv University? Together with the Jews?' The feeling of belonging to the Palestinian people--which we do not deny either--was much more developed among them. But it was not only political views that separated us. We quickly realized the day-to-day differences. For them Jannin constitutes the nearest municipal center. They go there for a movie or to do some shopping. We go to Hadera. Our women and their women do not meet in the market or the grocery store. Their men pray in their mosque and our men, in ours. What is most important of all: there is no real meeting of the next generation. They have separate schools for boys and girls. We have mixed education. Our children have no common playground. As in the past we get together mainly for festive occasions or funerals."

"Mixed Marriages" of Convenience

In the hills on the eastern slopes of the mountain there is a surplus of women who have come of age and are looking for husbands. A large portion of the

young men emigrate to distant Arab lands to look for work or to study in the universities. Many do not come back. The men in Israeli Barta'a, whether they study or work in the city, do not abandon the place. It is easier to go home for a weekend from Tel Aviv or Haifa than from Abu Dhabi or Kuwait. Family matchmakers are more than a little busy arranging unions from both sides of the wadi. But the success is limited. In the 18 years that have passed since the border was removed, only about a dozen "mixed" couples have been married here.

Dr Yosi Ginat, senior aide to Minister Ezer Weizmann, who holds the Israeli Arab portfolio, investigated the subject of marriages between Israeli Arabs and those of the West Bank, and discovered that most such unions were against a background of immediate interest in reaching the high portals of government via the Israeli partner. "Meanwhile that wave has also stopped," Ginat asserts. "Today only people like Tawfiq Tubi or Tawfiq Ziyad maintain close ties with political elements on the West Bank or the Gaza Strip. When an Arab from the triangle come to Tulkarm, they call him an 'Israeli.' In Netanya he is considered an Arab." Even Eli Rekhes, a researcher in the Dayan Center who generally takes issue with Ginat's optimistic opinions, sees the contacts as mainly political: "Who if not the Palestinian politicians on the West Bank acted as go betweens for 'Arafat's people and MK Dar'usha when he went to Cyprus with the goal of attending a conference in Amman?" asks Eli Rekhes.

It is very hard to estimate the strength of these politicians against the reality in the field. Last Friday activists from the Progressive Movement for Peace gathered in Nazareth. A giant slogan decorated the hall: Palestinian blood strengthens the struggle!

The story of the inhabitants of Barta'a contradicts the importance of this blood tie, and even brings home the fact that there is no special chemistry between Israel's Arabs and those of the territories. Nevertheless there was a unique occasion in which the two halves of the village were united. In 1972, when IDF bulldozers moved toward an olive planting in Israeli Barta'a, the members of the Qabha family from both side of the dividing line stood like a wall opposite the tractors. The army then demanded the territory for training purposes. The villagers saw it as an attack on their rights. Moshe Dayan also thought so. With his intervention the decree was stayed. But we would do well to learn the lessons of this grievous mistake and remember them whenever the establishment attempts, without justification, to strike at the feelings and rights of Israel's Arabs.

[28 Aug 85 p 7]

Ibrahim Dana, a real estate broker in the Triangle, and his nephew Yusuf, who trades in land and houses in the Galilee, are prepared to say what would never cross the lips of any other Israeli Arab--the establishment of Jewish settlements in the Arab-populated areas has enriched a not inconsiderable number of landowners in the Galilee and the Triangle. Whoever has land that was not confiscated and is adjacent to Karmi'el or the Sagav industrial area is sitting pretty as a result of the action that almost aroused civil rebellion and gave rise to the famous "Land Day." In the Triangle, too, landowners have no reason to complain. Thus, for example, the founding of the

Jewish settlement of Katzir in the hills of Wadi 'Iron has significantly raised land values in 'Ar'ara.

"But it is those very same nouveau riche who are clamoring against the theft of Arab lands," says Dana. He explains that their vocal protest serves as a "national certificate of integrity," and even the most radical elements do not point an accusing finger at them. It is not pleasant to admit that some of Israel's Arabs are benefitting from the confiscations. In order not to weaken the unity of the struggle, even the Communist Party is willing to overlook the truth that should arouse anyone who professes a belief in the class struggle. After all, the more the price of the land goes up, the harder it is for those who really need it to buy it: the workers whose families are growing and cannot afford to build a house. Says Ibrahim Dana: "But for the awful mistakes made by the establishment since the founding of the State, land would never have become the rallying point that today unites all Arabs. The problem is that you have never taken the trouble to understand us, and in so doing you play right into the hands of those who are turning the land into the battlefield of the nationalist struggle."

Yusuf Dana says that "the Judaization of the Galilee," the term that accompanied the confiscations of 1975 was "like a fire in a field of thistles. When you finally realized your mistake, and changed the name to 'Development of the Galilee,' the land was already scorched and ready for protest." The New Communist Party saw the new reality for what it was and hurried to set up a national committee for the defense of Arab lands. Like the other Communist parties, the New Communists also preferred to hide behind a political curtain of public figures untainted by the smell of Marxism that could drive away the devout. At the head of the committee was the priest Shahadah Shahadah from Shefar'am, and only two declared New Communists sat on the secretariat. The party was modest in its presence but held all the reins. It should be remembered that in the events of Land Day 1967 there were six dead and many injured.

The unending controversy around "Territory 9" that serves the IDF as a training ground also adds fuel to the fires of rebellion. Recently the army uprooted olive plantings only to discover after the fact that the trees were planted outside the closed off territory and were uprooted in error. "The 'Front' people were all ready to declare 'Olive Day,' the twin brother of Land Day," says Dr Yosi Ginat, Minister Weizmann's aide. "With events such as these, we know how they begin, but we never know where they will lead. We acted to defuse the situation and promised to find solutions that would be acceptable to both the army and the villagers of Sakhnin, Dayr Hana and 'Araba. When the matter became widely known, we received letters in our office addressed to 'Muhammad Weizmann--the man who returns national lands to the Arabs'..."

"We are creating situations with our own hands that increase the strength of the New Communists or some other nationalist movement," according to Eli Rekhes, a researcher in the Dayan Center. He adds: "I would not be surprised if the incident in 'Afula and the continuing incitement by Kahane were not to give rise soon to some Arab committee to fight racism or to some similar front group with a New Communist foundation that would be even more extreme. The

problem is by no means that of the Arab minority, it is first and foremost a problem of Jewish leadership. Where is the Jewish leader of sufficient stature to say: 'Arabs of Israel, this government will not put up with a situation in which fanatics from both peoples try to destroy any prospect of coexistence between Arabs and Jews.' I know that such a declaration will not change the political positions of Tawfiq Ziyad or Tawfiq Tubi. It must be aimed at those 700,000 Arabs who are up to their elbows in the day to day struggle to make ends meet. It is a big mistake to think that the Arab shopkeeper or paver or painter ponders the Palestinian National Charter 24 hours a day. It is only on election day or a day commemorating events of nationalist significance that they are asked to choose their place on the political map."

6,000 Destruction Orders

Most of the inhabitants of the village of Tamra in the Galilee are now under such destruction orders. The Israel Land Administration issued a destruction order against the home of 'Aziz Shahtut. The home was erected on national land. The law is on the side of the authorities. But in Tamra there are another 300 or so houses like Shahtut's, and whatever happens to the Shahtut family will happen sooner or later to their houses as well. Thus overnight the problem has become a public issue. Hamad Salim Sulayman and 'Abd-al-Hamid Buq'i founded a local committee 2 weeks ago, the goal of which is to protect the inhabitants from "the arbitrariness of the authorities."

In the Galilee, the Triangle and the Negev there are about 6,000 outstanding destruction orders against the owners of homes that were built without a permit on mainly agricultural land. Almost all of the "criminals" built because they had no other choice. There are few Arab villages in the 37th year of the State's existence that have earned a master plan defining explicitly what is allowed and what is not in the area of development and construction. But life goes on. From 1949 until today the Arab population has grown from 160,000 to 713,000. Additional rooms and stories have been built. The housing crunch is intolerable. With the improvement in the standard of living, young couples are not satisfied with another room in their parents' house, every new family wants to build a house of its own. These houses sprout up like mushrooms after the rain, generally under the open eyes of the authorities. "These illegal houses constitute a whip in the hands of the district official and in the hands of the Israel Land Administration. Whoever keeps his peace and does not rock the boat has a reasonable chance of not seeing his house destroyed. But woe to anyone who causes trouble or does not vote the right way," says Ibrahim Dana.

Now 6,000 pairs of eyes are glued to the events in the village of Tamra. The incident involving the bedouin 'Aziz Shahtut has ceased to be a private affair. Like many others, he, too, bought his land in the fifties. But in those days an official land system was not yet in place, and the required registration was not made in the title books. Of the 10 dunams that he purchased at the time, the Administration has allotted him just 5. Shahtut would have gladly accepted that arrangement but for the fact that his house was built on precisely that half that was not included in his parcel. Any lawyer will tell him that this is entirely legal. But there is no power on

earth that can remove his feeling of deprivation and no one who can persuade him that this feeling of deprivation is not justified.

It is not only the inhabitants of Tamra who find it hard to swallow the justice and logic of this sad episode. In the village of Qasim, the land arrangement has also left the landowners only a half of their holdings. There were those who took what the authorities allowed them and accepted it with frustrated silence. But there were some who were stubborn, like the patriarch of the Taha family. "Once I had 120 dunams; 40 dunams were confiscated in the first wave of confiscations and I took the Administration to court over 20 dunams and lost. Another 20 dunams are still in litigation. What are they advising me now? That I should willingly compromise over the small half that I still have left?" Taha lamented. Eight years ago Taha built 2 rooms, of course on the portion that passed into State jurisdiction. In his unending stubbornness, he again went to court--and again lost. Now a destruction order has been issued against him. The irony is that there is a very simple way for him to avoid the decree: the Administration is willing to sell him the land on which he built his house.

In Teibe and in the other villages of the Triangle, the Israel Land Administration is also selling lands that were, in part, confiscated in the past from their Arab owners. In Teibe a dunam of construction land today costs between \$40,000 and \$45,000, a sum that only a few can afford to pay. (By way of comparison, in the prestige area of Savyon a dunam of land costs between \$120,000 and \$150,000). A government official told me: "I know that we will never carry out the 6,000 legal and valid destruction orders. But if we do not destroy some homes in order to serve as an example, we will never collect the monies that are due the State."

It may be that the empty State coffers need every shekel; but has anyone added up the cost in additional feelings of deprivation? It may be that in all this activity there is not the slightest deviation from the letter of the law that applies in the State of Israel, but has anyone considered the political, social and human aspects of the matter?

[30 Aug 85 p 13]

"The Arab community in Israel numbers about 720,000 and is now more than 17 percent of the State's population. Eighty percent are 40 years of age or less. According to the forecasts, by the year 2000 the Arabs will make up about 23 percent of the total population and their electoral power will be 20 seats."

These figures are revealed in a unique document. A short time after the establishment of the National Unity government, the prime minister came to the conclusion that far-reaching changes were needed in the system of relationships between the Jewish establishment and the Arab residents. At the beginning of September 1984 Shimon Peres appointed a steering committee to draft a new policy. It was headed by Ra'anan Kohen, the official in charge of the Labor Party's "minority branch." On October 17 Kohen reported the conclusions that he had reached together with about 30 other people, Jews and Arabs, among them well-known personalities such as MK Abd-al-Wahab Dar'usha, the writer Mahmud Abbasi, Professor Shlomo Ben Ami from Tel Aviv University

and others. The recommendations of the steering committee were founded on the basic assumption that "we have before us a problem of deep-rooted qualitative contradictions for which there is no radical unequivocal solution and that the correct path is one of blunting those contradictions, mutual recognition and respect, and the search for common ground."

That detailed report, stretching to 20 pages, is gathering dust in the government files, and Kohen makes no attempt to conceal his anger. He is entirely absorbed in preparations for the Party congress and keeps as far as possible from the matters that he is officially charged with. But the echoes of the riots in 'Afula and Kahane's rising strength are eroding the few good intentions that remain in the attitude of the authorities toward the Arab citizenry. There is no great figure in the parties today who can confront that "problem of qualitative contradictions" mentioned in the committee's report. There is a mixture of personal disappointment and professional frustration in Ra'anana Kohen; he was twice promised a realistic place in the list of Knesset candidates, and twice the solemn promise was broken. Afterwards he sought the position of advisor to the prime minister on Arab affairs, but that position, too, was given to another. Finally the basic lines that his committee had proposed were also dropped.

"Today I would not accept any position, not even the highest, that had to do with Arab affairs," Ra'anana Kohen says, and explains why:

"The Arab problem in Israel is really a Jewish and not an Arab problem. We demand loyalty from them but always treat them as if they were suspect. One terrorist event is enough for every Israeli Arab to be stopped and searched at the police roadblocks. We tend to see them as a fifth column, and this lethal suspicion is our undoing. This negative approach is testimony to a lack of understanding in one of the most critical areas. Because of it, possible solutions are put off over and over again; the more time goes by, the more involved the situation becomes. Turning the matter over to Ezer Weizmann only worsened the problem. Weizmann is enormously popular with Israel's Arabs. They see him as a man of peace who understands them. But Weizmann has also created expectations that will apparently never be fulfilled. The awakening from this latest delusion is likely to be destructive in its consequences. Unfortunately there is no one in my party either who can see what is happening. I headed the election staff in the Arab sector and went through seven levels of hell before I could convince my colleagues of some obvious truths. The Labor Party wants Arab votes, but it does not want Arabs integrated into the system. Why do they not understand that without their full integration into Israel's social life, we will never be able to demand their full loyalty to the State?"

Ra'anana Kohen says that he "is completely stymied" when he claims that in the future--he cannot say precisely when--a new Arab party will come into being that will garner the majority of votes. In his opinion this will not be a nationalist-Palestinian party but a party whose leaders will come before the Arab public and ask: "What have the New Communist Party and the Progressive Movement for Peace done for you? Nothing. There is no peace and no Palestine. Come with us and we will struggle over what can be achieved: civil equality in the State of Israel; budgets for Arab schools; money for sewers in

the villages and the initiative to create employment opportunities that will match the talents of our young intellectuals." Such a party would have excellent prospects for gathering strength, and, in time, could take the traditional place of Agudat Israel as the swing vote, Kohen claims. He rejects the notion that the Zionist parties will not sit down at the table with representatives of such a party. "They won't sit with them? True, no one considers a coalition with the New Communists. But when we wanted to assure Shlomo Hillel the chairmanship of the Knesset, we did not hesitate to establish contact with the 'Progressive Movement for Peace.' In politics, when there is no choice, reality outweighs ideological considerations."

From the porch of Ibrahim Nimr Husayn's house, you look over the roofs of Shefar'am, a city laden with contrasts and tensions between the different segments of the population. Muslims, Druze, and Christians live together here, but not always in pastoral tranquility. But Ibrahim Husayn was so accepted by all the groups that in the last elections he garnered 55 percent of the votes and is now mayor of what may be the most troubled of all Israel's Arab settlements. The secret of his strength is not to be found in the alleys of Shefar'am. In the last decade this introverted and suspicious man has become very popular in the gallery of Arab leaders in Israel. He does not wave the flag of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people, and he does not preach solidarity with the inhabitants of the conquered territories. He speaks in clear and simple language to the needs and day-to-day problems of Israel's Arabs. In Hebrew he expresses his positions cautiously, as if weighing each word. In Arabic his words are less contorted and more caustic. Experience has taught him to adjust his manner of speaking to his audience. When Ra'anan Kohen told me that the Israeli Arab is very sophisticated and very intelligent, but that at times it suits him to pretend to be an idiot, he apparently had this kind of person in mind. You can never tell what is behind Ibrahim Nimr Husayn's introversion.

A dozen years ago Husayn was among the founders of the Committee of Arab Councils in the western Galilee. A year later representatives of a similar committee in the Triangle visited him. Both bodies had a common objective: to get budgets identical to those given the Jewish settlements. "We met in a restaurant in Yafi'ah near Nazareth. At the first course we were two separate bodies, but by the last course we had decided to join together," Husayn relates. He smiles when he recalls the founding congress held in February 1974. It may be that he is smiling at the naivete of the authorities who could not see which way the wind was blowing.

Ibrahim Husayn: "Attending that congress in Nazareth were Shmu'el Toledano, the advisor at the time on Arab affairs in the prime minister's office, Pinhas Elon, the chairman of the local government, General Director of the Interior Ministry Qubersky, and other nice people who praised our initiative and promised assistance. For 2 years they really did help, mainly in building schools. But after Land Day they announced that they detested us and that they no longer wanted the national committee to exist. They treated us as if we were little children who had behaved badly and they were therefore taking away our toys. But we continued the game, and our strength increased from year to year. When we held a congress in Shefar'am dedicated to the theme of education, the general director of the Education Ministry refused to honor us

with his presence. Afterward I found out that he acted in accordance with the recommendation of Binyamin Gur-Arye, advisor on Arab affairs in the Shamir government. This Gur-Arye understood Arab problems like I understand raising turkeys. It was clear that he had taken away our official recognition. But we are holding our own, God willing, even without a written charter. Today we represent the Arab municipal authorities in the local government center, and nothing moves without us."

All of this is true. The main committee of Arab councils, with 16 members, has become the one representative body that speaks for the entire Arab sector, regardless of philosophy or political orientation. Its organizational foundation and technical tools are supplied mainly by the Communist Party, but the New Communists do not hold a majority in it and, in fact, the committee could exist and act without that support. All of the bodies that deal with Israel's Arabs know its strength. With one directive the committee could cause riots and demonstrations, and with another it could assure quiet. Its activity has long since gone beyond what is strictly municipal, and it certainly contains the kernel around which a movement or party could develop that could compete under the banner of Local Nationalism. When we asked Ibrahim Nimr Husayn why he does not try to set up such a party, he responded: "It would be a premature birth. Meanwhile we are coming to an understanding on every issue. In the political sphere each of us speaks a different language."

On August 13 the prime minister received the committee heads for a discussion in his Knesset office. The conversation, indeed, did not revolve around political matters, but the very fact of the meeting signals a certain change in the dialogue with the Arab minority, and there was at least a little bit of political recognition. The previous governments did their best to spoil every attempt at Arab-nationalist organization on a national basis. In the more extreme cases such as that of the nationalist Al-Ard movement, administrative and judicial means were employed. But most of the attempts never reached the stage of implementation. Certain Arab personalities who had a reasonable chance of establishing a supra-political body were quickly apprised by the establishment as to where their bread was buttered. They generally got a share of the slush fund--and kept quiet. Not so Ibrahim Husayn. "We suggested that he join the Labor Party and get his reward, but he steadfastly refused," Ra'anan Kohen told us.

Meanwhile relations have continued between the Israeli establishment and the heads of the Arab councils as if it were a game of hide and seek. Dr Yosi Ginat, MK Ezer Weizmann's senior aide, explains:

"We do not recognize the committee, but we do not ignore its existence. Our policy is based on maximal involvement of the Arabs in all decisions affecting their lives. We do not believe that the councils should set up political bodies, but we know that their committee also deals with matters that go beyond the limits of municipal problems. MK Weizmann maintains contact with them because they are a legitimate representative body, and you have to talk to such a body. Does the meeting with the prime minister mean political recognition? That is a matter of interpretation. Ibrahim Nimr Husayn decided on the composition of the delegation and certainly saw it as political

backing. Our interpretation is entirely different, but in practical terms it comes to the same thing."

That is a somewhat murky and awkward formulation, but it is characteristic of a situation in which the government avoids defining its objectives vis-a-vis the Arabs in Israel. For years it has not brought up that burning question for discussion.

An academic dispute rages between two researchers: Eli Rekhes of the Dayan Center in the Shiloah Institute maintains that we are witness to a process of intensive Palestinization of the Arab population of Israel. According to him, "for the first time the New Communists have lost their monopoly in representing Arab interests, and they will have no choice but to radicalize their stance in the future. Who are the members of the moderate camp, as it were? Dar'usha, who travelled to meet 'Arafat?" Eli Rekhes' conclusion is self-evident: the question of the Arab minority in Israel will not be solved until a proper settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict is achieved.

Dr Ginat: "There is no radicalization on the Palestine issue. We are witness to the development of local nationalism. The 1948 war left the Arab population without a leadership worthy of the name. But in the meantime, without our having had any say in the matter, a generation of intellectuals has grown up that is aware of its rights as citizens of the State; a new leadership is growing out of this generation, largely Muslim, and we must maintain a dialogue with it. I believe that the Arab engineer will not lean toward extremism if we provide him employment to match his talents. Of course, there are nationalist groups at work within the Arab population that dream of an Arab state from the sea to the desert. But their strength is limited. The time of test was election time when the Arabs were called upon by the radicals to boycott the ballot boxes--and did not. When it is a question of village affairs, the last word still belongs to the local clan and not to 'Arafat."

But even the developing local nationalism has not forgotten the flag of Palestine. For many this is nothing but lip service. But when Arabs like Ibrahim Nimr Husayn say "I was born in Shefar'am and my father was also born here; I will rejoice if a Palestinian state arises, but my place is here in the western Galilee"--they really mean it. There is only one topic that the people refuse to discuss: what their situation will be when the dreamed about Palestinian state comes into being.

"The condition of the Jews will become intolerable and our lives will turn into hell," said the one interviewee in this entire series of articles who insisted on anonymity. "If a Palestinian state should, in fact, arise and maintain good neighborly relations with Israel, you will no longer be able to hide behind your defense excuses to keep us out of the workplace in industry and government services. Peace with the Palestinian state will expose the conventional lie of the "security danger" that we constitute, as it were. Today there are dozens and perhaps hundreds of plants and offices that have no connection with secrecy or state security, but whose personnel administrators have appointed themselves emissaries of the security services and closed them to Arab workers. You leave us to wash dishes in the restaurants and to clean

the city streets. How will you explain that once we have peace? But on the other hand, the establishment of a Palestinian state will enormously exacerbate our identity crisis. The young people will have to decide where they belong. I personally will continue to live in my village and will make do with providing monetary assistance to my brothers in Palestine. I will live like the good Jews in Brooklyn or the Bronx who contribute generously to the cause. But of course there will be Jews--and, apparently, even Arabs--who will feel that our place is in Shekhem and Ramallah and not in Nazareth or Umm el-Fahm, not to mention Haifa or Yafo. If, God forbid, one Israeli Arab should be caught spying for the Palestinian state, undoubtedly there will immediately appear a Kahane or someone of his ilk to accuse us all of treason. The riots in 'Afula will be nothing compared to the devils' dance that would then ensue. I could trace another scenario and another, but why spill salt on open wounds? The solution to the question is not to be found in political developments in the area. You hold the key in your hand and you will decide whether to open the door to relations based on equality--or whether it will be a Pandora's box."

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JORDAN

AL-RIFA'I ATTEMPTS TO DEAL WITH ECONOMIC DOWNTURN

Paris LE MONDE in French 14 Nov 85 p 10

[Article by E. J.: "The Liberalism of 'Rifa'i's Boys'"]

[Text] In addition to foreign policy considerations, the appointment of Mr Zayd al-Rifa'i to the position of Prime Minister last 4 April 1985, replacing Mr Ahmad 'Obeidat, was with the specific purpose of re-energizing the economy, stimulating the private sector and encouraging foreign investments in Jordan. Briefly, the purpose was to help the kingdom come out of the recession into which it had been sinking for several years. Furthermore, many Jordanian observers saw in this ministerial reshuffling a return to the economic liberalism which had marked the previous Rifa'i government in 1975-1976. During the months preceding 'Obeidat's resignation the grumbling of Jordanian business circles had risen to an unprecedented level. The Cabinet had been accused of practicing a "planned economy," "statism" and even, worst of all, "socialism." Merchants and industrialists blamed 'Obeidat, as, in fact, they had blamed his predecessor Mudar Badran, for what they considered an excessive interference of the state to the detriment of the private sector. The state monopoly of apple imports had thus become a symbol of an increasingly vilified policy....

The contrasting of 'Obeidat's "planned economy" against Rifa'i's "liberalism" was largely exaggerated. Actually, Jordan had never stopped being a country with a liberal economy. To be sure, those in charge of Jordan's economy under 'Obeidat and Badran were essentially technocrats, whereas "Rifa'i's boys" quite frequently come from business circles, as is the case, actually, with Rifa'i himself. In reality, however, what the former were accused of mainly was to have been unable to resolve the economic difficulties which have afflicted Jordan starting with the 1980's.

Considerable Investments

Badran's accession to power in 1976 coincided with a growing influx of petrodollars from the Gulf countries. This relative abundance of means had to be managed and channeled into sectors which had been given priority at that time, which was done. Jordan acquired a heavy industry based on natural resources, phosphates, potash, fertilizers, cement and glass. At the same time, substantial funds were invested into the development of the Jordan River

Valley (the richest agricultural area of the country), the road infrastructure, the port of Aqaba and others. The Hashemite kingdom also acquired an ultramodern telecommunications system, which was supplied and installed by a consortium of French enterprises (CIT-Alcatel TRT and Cables de Lyon) within the framework of a financial protocol signed with Paris.

Finally, the Badran and 'Obeidat governments tried as best they could to repair the nefarious effects of this inflow of petrodollars, particularly the widening gap between the richest classes and the rest of the population, by establishing a retirement fund and a social security system and subsidizing government-owned stores and a certain number of consumer goods. But then came the Iraq-Iran war, the oil crisis and... the end of the economic boom.

Will Rifa'i be able to do better than his predecessors? What is certain is that he will be confronted by the same restraints. Jordan is a small country with limited natural resources: quite promising results have been achieved in recent years in petroleum surveys but the possibility of producing black gold in commercial quantities is still distant. This is a country more than 80 percent of which is a desert and which is greatly dependent on foreign aid and regional and international circumstances. Loyal to his reputation, the prime minister took quite rapidly a number of steps in favor of the private sector. Specifically, he lifted price controls (with the exception of prime necessity goods) and abolished a law which called for the "Jordanizing" of foreign banks in the kingdom. He also called for the study of a project for denationalization of the Jordanian Telecommunications Company, which was the most profitable of the country's publicly owned enterprises.

Protection of Agriculture

However, his policies did not exclude a certain dose of "planning." Thus, his government banned imports of some 30 items and levied taxes on other imported goods. The purpose was to protect domestic agriculture and industry.

One of the main targets of the next 5-years (1986-1990) is to develop the productive sector by encouraging the establishment of private industrial enterprises oriented as much as possible towards exports. The Jordanian authorities would thus like to emphasize the development of agriculture in the plateaus (grain, livestock feeds, orchards), which have been neglected so far. Wherever the ground has water reserves, in the southern part of the country in particular, the government has decided to lease or even grant miri (state) land to private companies and entrepreneurs. This would resolve the double problem of reducing the commercial deficit and food dependency (in 1984 Jordanian food imports reached 184 million dinars) and create jobs.

The Unemployment Challenge

Unemployment was virtually unknown in Jordan in the 1970s and until the beginning of the 1980s. Today its rate is becoming alarming: 6.5 percent according to the Ministry of Planning. Cohesion and family, not to mention tribal, relations, which are still very strong in Jordan, are for the moment at least, a substitute for unemployment insurance. However, the Jordanian leadership is quite anxious to curtail this phenomenon which appears to

present the major challenge for the years to come. The active Jordanian population, 595,000--strong today, will increase by at least 40,000 job seekers between now and 1990. An even greater concern is the possibility of a massive return of Jordanian expatriates¹, caused by the economic difficulties experienced by the Gulf Arab countries. Jordanian experts estimate that 5 years from now the unemployment rate would reach 7-8 percent, even with the ideal hypothesis according to which the plan for the growth of the GNP--6 percent annually in real figures--would be implemented.

"In order to solve the unemployment problem satisfactorily, a higher growth rate would be necessary, which would force us to make investments higher than those we could afford," commented an aide to the minister of the plan. This is one of the dilemmas of the Jordanian leaders, who would like to maintain an economic growth which would at least equal the population's natural growth (3.9 percent) and also to keep Jordan's foreign debt within reasonable limits.

The investments planned for the next 5 years--3.5 billion dinars--will have to be partially procured through loans assessed at 1.2 billion dinars. The Jordanian civilian foreign debt is relatively modest--978 million dinars last June. However, to this we must add the military debt which is at least double that.

FOOTNOTE

1. Currently 800,000 Jordanians live outside their country, 325,000 of whom are employed; 85 percent of the latter work in the Gulf countries.

5157

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SAUDI ARABIA

ARAB SECURITY STUDIES CENTER INAUGURATED IN RIYADH

London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic 6 Nov 85 p 2

[Article: "Prince Nayif Discusses Comprehensive Arab Security Plan To Counter Terrorism"]

[Text] Saudi Arabia's Interior Minister Prince Nayif bin 'Abd-al-'Aziz has confirmed the existence of a security plan to counter terrorism, and said, "Of course, the interior ministers will bring up any topic related to this matter at their next conference. Everything pertaining to security will always be a matter of concern to the interior ministers." He said that the dangers surrounding the Arab nation and encroaching on its beliefs and security can be faced by making the security forces more efficient, and, at the same time, by getting the Arab citizen to cooperate with the security agencies so as to be the first line of security. He also stressed the importance of coordinating security efforts and activities among the Arab countries, so that mistakes can be prevented or made less likely.

These remarks of Prince Nayif were made while he attended the official opening of the Arab Center for Security Studies and Training in Riyadh.

Responding to a question as to what has been accomplished in the area of Arab security integration, Prince Nayif said, "We are still in the process of doing this. The interior ministers' meetings have built bridges and channels of communication among Arab security agencies."

He stressed that security integration is a goal: "We feel that we have just started along this road, and we hope to complete the process in order to achieve this goal."

Voicing his feelings about Arab participation in the inauguration of the permanent headquarters of the Arab Center for Security Studies and Training, he said, "We are happy and delighted that this endeavor, resolved on by security men and especially by the interior ministers, has been achieved, praise God, and that we should see security officials, representatives of interior ministers, brother Arab ambassadors, and present and past board members taking

part here today. Mankind will no doubt be very happy to see that an endeavor which had been a hope has now become reality. Our happiness will be even greater when we see the results of this center reflected in human efficiency, helping to find solutions to the security and social problems besetting our Arab societies."

With respect to the center's accomplishments, Prince Nayif said, "Compared to the length of time the center has been in existence, we find that it has made major accomplishments with respect to classes and activities. I believe that the very fact that the center exists is one of the greatest achievements of collective Arab action, and that this will certainly be reflected in the efficiency of security personnel, courts, and social welfare throughout the Arab world. This makes us pin great hopes on the center; God willing, the center will take its rightful place, not just in the Arab world but on the international scene."

Prince Nayif added that the center has become internationally recognized: "Surely, comparing the center's accomplishments to its short life-span, I expect the center to have a fine future satisfactory to all, God willing."

Responding to a question as to why the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia comes first among nations with respect to stability and security, he stressed that this is due to the application of the Islamic Shari'ah.

As to the information media's role in helping achieve security, he emphasized that information is a double-edged sword; if used constructively for the good, its gifts will be great, but if used wrongly, its harm will be correspondingly great. "There is no doubt that the Kingdom's information media are trying to help the security agencies carry out their duties."

Prince Nayif praised the positive step taken by the Kingdom's information media in prohibiting the showing of films and serials which encourage crime and which are intended for sheer material gain. Likewise, he praised the information media's role in assisting the security agencies by making people more conscious of security and by showing those program which the security agencies think should be show to the citizens. He said, "We are holding out great hopes that all information media in all Arab countries will effectively and responsibly share in the responsibility for the Arab world's security."

As for the part being played in collective Arab security activity by Arab security bureaus such as the narcotics bureau and the civil defense bureau, the Saudi interior minister explained that they are making a big contribution to joint security work. All those bureaus have been in existence ever since the founding of the Arab League, except for the civil defense bureau, which was established at the last interior ministers' meeting. Headquartered in Morocco, it is now directly carrying out its tasks. In general, these bureaus have made a very fine effort considering their capabilities.

Speaking of the Arab interior ministries' efforts to eliminate the discrepancies among their various legal systems and to arrive at a standardized

legal code, he said, "This proposal is one of the goals of the council of Arab interior ministers, as well as a goal of the security studies center. For this reason, we hope that homogeneity in Arab criminal law will be achieved soon."

Referring to Saudi Arabia's measures to protect the country from the narcotics epidemic, Prince Nayif said that every country in the world suffers from this epidemic just like the Arab countries. He said, "We are trying to resist and combat narcotics effectively within the Kingdom, and the Kingdom is also working with fraternal Arab countries and concerned international organizations. We hope that the efforts of all the organizations involved will come together in order to fight this epidemic, which is aimed at destroying the nation's young people."

The Opening Ceremony

Yesterday morning Prince Nayif bin 'Abd-al-'Aziz officially opened the permanent headquarters of the Arab Center for Security Studies and Training in Riyadh. Governor of Riyadh Province Prince Salman bin 'Abd-al-'Aziz cut the ribbon, thus proclaiming the official opening of the center, and unveiled the commemorative plaque. He then went to the ceremonial hall, accompanied by Center Chairman Dr Faruq 'Abd-al-Rahman, representatives of Arab interior ministers, and several Arab ambassadors, and the opening program began. He delivered a speech in which he said, "This organization of yours is an Arab organization serving all the security agencies of all the Arab countries. As you know, it follows a course charted and financed by all the members of the Arab league without exception."

"The government of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is proud to be the host for the center's headquarters, and has provided everything the center needs to help it carry out its task well. King Fahd bin 'Abd-al-'Aziz has also graciously expressed his feelings of duty towards the fraternal Arab states and his belief in the center's mission."

Murad's Speech

Then Center Chairman Dr Faruq 'Abd-al-Rahman Murad delivered a speech in which he said, "The center's scientific activities in the field of crime prevention throughout the Arab world fhas made specialized foreign and international organizations, particularly the United Nations and its research centers, look upon this center as an Arab scientific authority specialized in this field, and thus they have tried to forge firm bonds of cooperation with it. The Arab Center for Security Studies and Training in Riyadh has continued to organize specialized scientific conferences and seminars in cooperation with these international agencies. In fact, the United Nations requested the center to help organize and prepare its seventh conference on crime prevention and the treatment of criminals, which was held recently in Milan."

He added, "As for the security climate in Saudi Arabia, security and stability prevails throughout Saudi society by virtue of the firm application of the Islamic Shari'ah." He referred to the Arab interior ministers' insistence

that Prince Nayif assume the permanent chairmanship of the center's board of directors, thus pinning great hopes on the center's progress and activities under Prince Nayif's supervision and guidance.

The Arab Center for Security Studies and Training is a scientific agency permanently headquartered in Riyadh. It was founded by Arab decree as a result of the meetings of Arab police chiefs, and was approved by the Arab interior ministers, for the purpose of linking scientific research with training and pursuing subsequent integrated activities related to the application of the center's activities, which serve the security agencies of all the Arab countries.

The center's headquarters is a complete city with its own utilities and services, covering 160,000 square meters, and comprising all the equipment which will help the center achieve its purpose as an Arab organization with an international legal identity.

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SAUDI ARABIA

OVERALL COST OF LIVING CONTINUES TO DROP

London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic 26 Nov 85 p 4

[Article: Cost of Living in Saudi Arabia Drops For the Second Consecutive Year, By 2.2 Percent"]

[Text] An official source at the Saudi Ministry of Finance and Economy has announced that the General Statistics Administration's periodic report on prices and relative changes in cost of living indices shows that in 1985, the cost of living in Saudi Arabia showed a 2.2 percent decline from the previous year, as a result of falling prices for some goods and products.

The cost of food dropped 2.7 percent, with the price of fish dropping 10.1 percent and eggs 19.6 percent. Clothing costs registered a 4.6 percent drop and household furnishings a 4.1 percent drop. The report also referred to an overall 3.2 percent drop in rents, a 5 percent drop in the cost of education and recreation, and a 9.7 percent drop in prices for personal items.

Categories registering a rise in prices included the oils and fats group, showing an 11.4 percent rise; the fuels and energy group, showing a 25.2 percent increase; and medical care, showing a 1.1 percent rise. Transportation and communications was the only category registering no change at all.

Altogether, the final result for the overall cost of living for 1984 was a 2.2 percent decline.

It should be mentioned in this context that the Kingdom's overall cost of living for 1984 dropped for the first time in 14 years, by 1.3 percent. Comparing the 1985 drop with 1983, the decline in the cost of living amounted to 3.5 percent.

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SAUDI ARABIA

MAJOR PHOSPHATE DEPOSIT DISCOVERED IN NORTH

London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic 18 Nov 85 p 4

[Article by Mansur al-Badr: "The Latest Mineral Discovery In Saudi Arabia: A Huge 1-Billion Ton Phosphate Reserve In the al-Jalamid Area"]

[Text] Muhammad Rashid Dahlawi, project director general for Saudi Arabia's General Directorate for Mineral Resources in Jiddah, has announced that studies are now under way to determine the economic and commercial worth of the huge discoveries made by the geologic team sent out by the Mineral Resource Directorate's Jiddah project department. The team discovered a huge phosphate source, initially estimated at close to 1 billion tons, in the al-Jalamid area of the Wadi al-Sirhan basin in the Turayf region of northern Saudi Arabia.

In his statement to AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT Dahlawi said, "This discovery is not the first such discovery of mineral resources in Saudi Arabia and will not be the last, since phosphate was discovered in the Kingdom more than 10 years ago. However, the recent discovery is a major one, since in recent years we have concentrated on this area."

National Expertise

Dahlawi explained that the Ministry of Petroleum and Mineral Resources, which is responsible for mineral prospecting in the Kingdom, is working with international teams staffed with experts in order to carry out prospecting operations. He said, "In addition to the international experts, there is a group of Saudi engineers and geologists working side by side with the international experts and geologists. The very team which discovered the phosphate in al-Jalamid included a group of Saudi geologists as part of the team."

Speaking of this discovery's economic value, Dahlawi said, "We don't have the final results yet, for such studies usually take some time. Samples will be taken from the discovery area for analysis and testing, since it is hard for us to analyze 27 square kilometers. After we get the laboratory results of the sample analyses, we will be able to determine the possibility and economic advantages of extracting the phosphate."

Comparing the volume of the phosphate discovery with world discoveries, Dahlawi explained that the current estimate of 1 billion tons is only a preliminary estimate and, considered from the practical standpoint, represents a major discovery compared to the amount of phosphate in the world.

Preparations For Mining

He said, "The discovery site is an easy one to extract phosphate from, since it is located on an open plain, which is considered one of the discovery's advantages. There are other things to consider, such as transporting mining machines and equipment."

Muhammad Rashid Dahlawi, Jiddah project director for the Mineral Resources Directorate, concluded his statement to AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT by discussing the exploitation of mineral resources in the Kingdom. He said, "The Kingdom's mineral resources have not yet been fully exploited, although the relevant studies are complete or almost complete. However, there can be no economic exploitation until an infrastructure for the mining area is completed and readied--and this requires great efforts."

It should be mentioned that the recent phosphate discovery in the al-Jalamid area of the al-Sirhan basin in the Turayf area of northern Saudi Arabia, which according to preliminary estimates amounts to 1 billion tons, consists of a layer of phosphate-bearing rock varying from 4.5 to 5 meters in thickness, containing from 17 to 18.7 percent phosphoric pentoxide, at a depth of 11 to 15 meters below the surface. The discovery area covers 37 square kilometers containing strata of "al-fitani" phosphate some 11 meters below the surface. The area is located on the 360 north and the 295 east lines.

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SAUDI ARABIA

STATE BUYING FARMERS WHEAT AT FAVORABLE PRICES

London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic 26 Nov 85 p 4

[Article: "Incentives and Facilities For Purchasing Wheat From the Farmers; New Crop Estimated At 1.7 Million Tons"]

[Text] Director General of Saudi Arabia's General Organization for Grain Silos and Flour Mills Dr Ahmad Shinawi has announced that to date about 1 million tons of wheat from the 1985 crop have been received at the Kingdom's silos, which are still accepting wheat from the farmers. It is anticipated that 1.7 million tons of wheat will be delivered, inasmuch as the 1984 crop amounted to 1,346,943 tons and the 1983 crop was 674,631 tons.

In his interview with AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT, Dr Shinawi said that this increase in wheat production was primarily due to the enlightened agricultural policy being followed by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia with the support and guidance of King Fahd. This policy has had a significant effect on increasing wheat production to this abundant level, since the generous material incentives offered the farmers and agricultural companies by the state has allowed them to make use of the most modern production methods and agricultural machinery and the best types of seeds. The Kingdom, after having depended on imported wheat for the past few years, has recently been able to offer wheat as aid to some countries.

Concerning the material incentives offered to the farmers by the state, Dr Ahmad Shinawi pointed out that the policy whereby the silos purchase the wheat at incentive prices has ensured a stable market and rewarding profits for the farmers.

Some 8,699 farmers in 1982, 11,884 farmers in 1983, and 15,911 farmers in 1984 have benefitted from these incentive prices for Saudi wheat delivered to the silos.

Net incentive profits in Saudi riyals for Saudi wheat delivered to the silos are as follows: 807,978,704 riyals paid to farmers in 1982, 2,351,677 riyals in 1983, and 4,284,174,378 riyals in 1984.

The cabinet has set these incentive prices at 2 riyals per kilogram. It should be noted that the wheat farmers' production costs have dropped, while the state has offered loans, aid and other incentives which have had a major effect in getting the farmers to make better use of irrigation equipment and modern machinery. This has allowed the owners of such equipment to spread out into producing other kinds of agricultural produce besides wheat.

Referring to the grain silos and their storage capacity, Dr Shinawi mentioned that through the state's aid and encouragement for grain silo projects, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has acquired a number of silos in various parts of the country. There are silos in Riyadh, al-Qasim, Ha'il, Khamis Mushayt, Jiddah, Dammam and al-Jawf capable of storing about 1 million tons of wheat, and next year this storage capacity will be increased to 1.5 million tons once the Tabuk and Wadi al-Dawasir silos are built.

The organization has other activities besides storing wheat. Dr Shinawi pointed out that in addition to building up a suitable reserve of wheat to meet any emergency, the grain silos are producing flour at modern flour mills capable of producing 4,000 tons of flour a day; once expansions now under construction are completed, this capacity will reach 5,500 tons a day. The organization's projects also include processing and producing various kinds of fodder to help develop animal resources, and supplying such products to the Kingdom's markets.

Over the past 2 years, the organization has produced the following amounts of flour, fodder and bran: wheat flour, 592,933 tons in 1983-84 and 636,284 tons in 1984-85; fodder, 102,895 tons in 1983-84 and 139,051 tons in 1984-85; and bran, 129,215 tons in 1983-84 and 180,676 tons in 1984-85.

In this context, he pointed out that state aid takes many forms, such as setting sale prices for organization-produced flour at levels far below the cost of production, selling fodder at subsidized prices, and buying local wheat at incentive prices well above world prices for imported wheat.

Table 1. Value of Local Wheat Delivered to Silos, in State-set Incentive Prices

<u>Year</u>	<u>Amount Paid, in Saudi Riyals</u>
1978	6,593,282
1979	61,264,231
1980	116,018,945
1981	298,102,609
1982	807,978,704
1983	2,351,677,362
1984	4,284,174,387
TOTAL	7,925,809,520

Table 2. Budget of the General Organization for Grain Silos and Flour Mills

<u>Year</u>	<u>Amount, in Saudi Riyals</u>
1985-86	2,443,540,000
1984-85	2,029,059,000
INCREASE	414,481,000

8559

CSO: 4404/157

SAUDI ARABIA

VARIOUS RIYADH URBAN DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS

Riyadh AL-RIYADH in Arabic 3 Sep 85 p 4

/Article by Ibrahim al-Kulayb; "Construction of Important Urban Projects in the Towns and Villages of Riyadh Province"/

/Text/ Recently 39 municipality projects were awarded covering the towns and villages of Riyadh Province and costing a total of 268,902,523 riyals. Construction has started on some of these projects and will start on others during the next few days. Meanwhile, the General Department of Municipality and Village Affairs in Riyadh Province carried out a number of projects in various towns the last fiscal year, 1984-85, including the construction of six public rest houses for pilgrims in the towns through which pilgrim caravans pass--al-Zilfi al-Mujamma'ah, Shaqra', al-Quway'iyah, al-Dawadimi, and 'Afif--at total costs of 43,782,718 riyals; work has been completed and delivered on some of these and is on the verge of being completed on others, and pilgrims in God's holy place will benefit from these this year.

The recently appointed director general of municipality and village affairs in Riyadh Province, Eng Sa'd Ibn 'Abd-al-Rahman al-Hammudi, told AL-RIYADH that a number of public bids have been awarded to provide equipment and cars for municipalities and communities in the province at a total cost of 5,437,768 riyals. He said that 10 projects had previously been put up for public bidding and their envelopes have been opened, and these will soon be discussed. There are also a number of public bids to provide machinery and equipment for the province's municipalities and communities on which discussion will take place soon, and in addition to that there are 10 projects and five operations to supply potable water by tank truck which have now been put up for public bidding.

Awarding 39 Projects

Eng Sa'd al-Hammudi stated that the 39 projects which were recently awarded include the towns and villages in Riyadh Province. These are: in al-Kharj, the temporary paving and lighting project, the central market project, and the paving, sidewalk construction and lighting project; in al-Mujamma', the construction of two canals, the lining of the flood channel, paving, sidewalk construction and lighting in Hurmah, paving, sidewalk construction and

lighting in al-Mujamma' and completion of the project to fence in cemeteries in al-Mujamma'; in al-Zilfi, the paving, sidewalk construction and lighting of the al-Kuwait Road; in Shaqra', temporary paving, lighting, construction of three vegetable and meat markets in Shawra', Ushayqir and the religious trust in al-Qara'in, the arrangement and planting of trees in public parks in Ushayqir and the religious trust in al-Qara'in; in al-Dawadimi, the project for a water system, the process of maintaining and operating the existing potable water system project and construction of a mortuary; in Wadi al-Dawasir, the construction of vegetable and meat markets in al-Khamasin, al-Lidam and al-Nuway'imah; in Hawtat Bani Tamim, a water system project with a tank; in Jalajil and al-Tuwaym, a project for paving, sidewalk construction and lighting and preparations for providing potable water by tank truck; in al-Sulayyil, paving, sidewalk construction and lighting; in Thadiq, the construction of a flood channel, paving, sidewalk construction, lighting and a vegetable and meat market; in Darma' and the villages belonging to it, temporary paving; in Tamir and its villages, temporary paving and the provision of potable water by tank truck; in al-Ruwaydah, temporary paving and lighting; in al-Dalam, temporary paving and construction of an irrigation wheel to discharge rainwater; and in al-Rayn, temporary paving and lighting.

In al-'Ayyinah and al-Jubaylah, the project to pave streets; in Marrat, the project to pave streets, fence cemeteries and fence in a square for celebrations; in al-Hayathim, the construction of a waste incinerator; in al-Aflaj, the construction of a public esplanade in the al-'Uyun area; in al-Bajadiyah and its villages, a temporary paving and lighting project; and in al-Hilw, a street paving project.

Concerning the projects previously offered up for public bids, whose envelopes have been opened and which will be discussed soon, Eng al-Hammudi said that there were 10 projects: in al-Kharj, the temporary paving project; in al-Mujamma', the construction of the slaughterhouse and completion of the public street with the construction of a bridge over Wadi Hurmah; in al-Dawadimi, the temporary paving and lighting project; in al-Sulayyil, the paving, sidewalk construction and lighting project; in al-Hariq, the paving, sidewalk construction and lighting project; in al-Dilm, the paving, sidewalk construction and lighting project; in al-Hayathim, a water system with two tanks; in Huraymala', the fencing in of a cemetery north of the town of al-Barrah; and in Sajir, the fencing in of the cemeteries of Qasr al-Mashuh, al-Khadra', Butayyin and al-Thandwah. In addition to that, there are 10 projects and five operations for providing potable water by tank truck which have now been put up for public bids. These are the supply of potable water to al-Zilfi, al-Dawadimi, al-Quway'iyah, Darma' and Hawtat Sudayr, the study of rainwater discharge in Sajir, the study of rainwater discharge in al-Hariq, the paving, sidewalk construction and lighting project in Marrat, the project to pave and construct sidewalks for the public street in 'Afif, the temporary paving project and the paving, sidewalk construction and lighting project in Hawtat Bani Tamim, the paving, sidewalk construction and lighting project in al-Aflaj, the paving, sidewalk construction and lighting project in al-Ghat, the temporary paving and lighting project in al-Hayathim, and the paving, sidewalk construction and lighting project in Huraymala'.

Followup and Attention to Projects

The recently appointed director general of municipality and village affairs in Riyadh Province, Eng Sa'd 'Abd-al-Rahman al-Hammudi, went on to say that most of these projects extended to projects upon which the towns and villages of Riyadh Province had previously been graced by orders of his majesty the king, may God protect him, in accordance with the recommendations of the committee drawn up under the chairmanship of His Royal Highness Prince Salman Ibn 'Abd-al-Aziz, governor of Riyadh Province, with deputy ministers as members.

120 New Projects

In concluding his statement, Eng al-Hammudi stated that these projects were being studied, their plans and specifications were being prepared within the department in coordination with the province municipalities and communities, and that work was going on at full pitch to supervise the projects now under construction in the towns and villages of the province, numbering more than 120, to complete the procedures for the projects which were awarded recently and to complete the studies and plans for projects soon to be offered up for public bidding, thanks to the directives of His Excellency the minister of municipality and village affairs, Mr Ibrahim al-'Anqari, and his daily follow-up on the accelerated execution of these development projects for the towns and villages of the province, in keeping with the upright policy of the government under the leadership of his majesty the king and his highness his devoted crown prince.

He pointed out that the Riyadh Province department was carrying out all its projects through Saudi contractors, in application of the lofty orders in this regard.

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SAUDI ARABIA

VARIOUS EASTERN PROVINCE AGRICULTURAL ACHIEVEMENTS NOTED

Riyadh AL-RIYAD in Arabic 8 Sep 85 p 2

/Article by Hani al-Hadif: "Activities of the Eastern Province's Agricultural Branch Last Year"/

/Text/ The General Department of Agriculture and Water in the Eastern Province has established guidance fields for farmers on their farms. These number 127, covering areas ranging from 1.5 to 3 donums.

This was pointed out by Mr Muhammad Ibrahim al-Khalil, director general of the Ministry of Agriculture and Water branch in the Eastern Province.

He added that the department had issued 144 agricultural workers' entry certificates for 500 agricultural workers. The following are the statistics enumerating the department's activity last year, 1983-84:

Permits were issued to drill artesian water wells for drinking and farming purposes; these came to 59 in number, of which 19 were government-owned and 40 were private.

The treatment of farms covering 23,828 donums in the province to combat agricultural pests, as well as treating and spraying 77,155 fruit trees.

Poultry projects up to late 1984 totalled 102, 46 of which were for eggs and 56 for meat production. A total of 181,189,136 eggs were produced as well as a total of 6,687,153 meat chickens. The department and its branches immunized fowl (poultry) with preventive injections against diseases, immunizing 13,873,40 fowl; 743,503 animals and livestock were immunized and a total of 593,967 animals were treated for diseases.

The agricultural and veterinary quarantines in al-Dammam, al-Khafji and al-Raf'i:

Total various agricultural imports through these three points of entry came to 2,121,515 tons. A total of 929,044 head of livestock, 1,454,627 fowl (poultry and so forth) and 38,741,172 kilograms of diverse animal products were imported. The following local output was to Fraternal Cooperation Council countries through the three points: 14,741,172 kilograms of fruit

and vegetables, 52,164 kilograms of Saudi Fish Company frozen shrimp product and 10,049 date palm seedlings and shoots.

Concerning the projects that were completed, the director of the branch said that the following projects had been carried out:

The project to lay the water system for the potable water project in al-Qatif (the third stage), at a cost of 12,256,840 riyals.

The potable water project in al-Ajam, which has been put into operation; its total costs come to 2,932,920 riyals.

Water projects in Safawi, Sayhat and Abu Ma'n, which have been put into operation and whose total costs have come to 18,016,911 riyals.

The drilling of nine potable water wells for total costs of 2,768,687 riyals in Sanabis, Abu Ma'n, al-Jarudiyah, Umm Rabi'ah and al-Saman.

Projects under construction:

The potable water project in Hafr al-Batin. The project has the goal of covering Hafr al-Batin and al-Qaysumah and consists of the following (first stage):

A field of wells: the drilling of seven productive wells with an average production of 1,400 gallons per minute per well.

Transmission lines and systems: pipes are being supplied for a total cost of 67,500,102 riyals. The pipes have also been installed for a total cost of 85,320,690 riyals.

The main water transmission lines come to about 75 kilometers in length. The length of the main and branch distribution lines is about 327 kilometers; that is, the pipelines total about 402 kilometers.

The purification plant and annexes to it:

These include a water treatment plant of 18,000 cubic meters a day, the erection of four high towers (tanks) in al-Qaysumah and Hafr al-Batin with a capacity of 8,000 cubic meters per tank, and the establishment of ground-level tanks in the treatment plant at the well sites. The total cost of the treatment plant with annexes comes to 98,216,525 riyals, along with the supply and installation of pumping units and the necessary facilities.

The total cost of the first stage of the potable water project in the Hafr al-Batin area now being carried out has come to 251,037,317 riyals so far.

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SAUDI ARABIA

VARIOUS WADI AL-DAWASIR PROJECTS REVIEWED

Riyadh AL-RIYAD in Arabic 3 Sep 85 p4

/Article by Nasir al-Hamdan: 'AL-RIYADH Goes on Tour and Observes Wadi Al-Dawasir's Requirements: The Region Has Been Covered by Ambitious Modernization and Construction Plans' /

/Text/ It is now the experience of the Wadi al-Dawasir area, like other areas of the kingdom which have been covered by modernization and development, as part of the concerns of the ambitious development plans, that the people in the rural areas in this territory are getting services and generous provisions similar to those the people in the towns are receiving. In the Wadi al-Dawasir area, you can glimpse some of these great achievements which have been provided here and there, since the green areas extend in their turn to participate in realizing self-sufficiency in food, along with all the other facilities which have been created for these citizens' sake.

A number of citizens in the Wadi al-Dawasir area expressed these facilities' capability and effect and the direct reflection of their services on their lives to AL-RIYAD in the course of some brief meetings with them, where they said:

The citizen Sa'd Ibn Muhammad Ibn Hazib from the village of Al Hymaydan: The area enjoys many of the services which have been provided for it, but it needs an airport and telephone service so that the sequence of services the region enjoys can thereby be made as complete as those the other areas of the kingdom enjoy.

The citizen Majid Hasan 'Abdallah Shari', from the village of Al Nahish, pointed to the importance of having an airport serve the region. He also hoped that the Rinah-Wadi al-Dawasir road would be paved because of its importance for citizens in the area.

From the south of the valley, the village of al-'Uwaymir, the citizen Muhammad Nasir al-Quday' said that the growth which the region has experienced has become obvious and visible and does not need much effort, God be praised, except that the airport remained a hope commonly felt by the citizens of the valley, along with the provision of a water system, on which construction has begun.

In the town of al-Walayin, which is considered one of the main ones in the valley, the citizen Mabruk Salman al-'Uthman said, "Through God's Strength, the region has been supplied with much of the wherewithal for growth and construction it needs and it is being supplied with the resources of modern life in every sense of the word. However, in any event, this does not constitute all the aspirations of the citizens of the region; undoubtedly, like the other areas of the kingdom, it is striving to have the sequence of facilities and services the ambitious development plans in our country have provided it be completed. One of the most important requirements is the construction of an airport to serve the region, a public square for official occasions and celebrations and the expansion of health services in a broader form than those that exist at present.

In the capital of Wadi al-Dawasir, al-Khamasin, the citizen Muhammad 'Abdallah Tamim asserted that the region was experiencing many aspects of agricultural resurgence and it was being provided with all the accessories of modern activity in terms of modern equipment and the elimination of agricultural pests to farm wheat in accordance with modern systems.

Shaykh Mijdal Muhammad al-Dawsari referred AL-RIYADH to the agricultural roads. After stressing their importance and absence, and hopes that they would come into being, he addressed himself to the Raniyah-valley line and beseeched God, and officials in the Ministry of Communications, that work on paving it would be done because of its major importance for the region and the farmers' need for it in particular. He said, "We market our agricultural products in the city of Riyadh, which is 700 kilometers away from the region. If the valley-Raniyah route was paved, that would enable us to market our products in the al-Hijaz area, since the distance is no more than a mere 180 kilometers."

He addressed himself to another problem facing farmers in the area, that of marketing, and hoped for the creation of a company to market agricultural products. (He said) "For example you find consumers here sometimes who get a box of tomatoes for 50 riyals and on some occasions its price is no more than just 5 riyals. The farmer and the consumer sustain the losses at the same time. Our goal as farmers in creating this company is of course to get fresh agricultural produce into the hands of the consumer in good condition at a reasonable price."

We headed north, where the town of al-Makharim was located. There, we met with a citizen, Mr Mansur Fahd al-Sa'id, who hoped that there would be an airport, then referred to his town's need for telephones, although telephone lines pass alongside them no more than 500 meters away. He beseeched officials in the Ministry of Post, Telephone and Telegraph that this hope would be realized, as he said.

The director of the education department in Wadi al-Dawasir stressed the importance of having an airport, as the most important facility the Wadi al-Dawasir area required, and stated that the presence of an airport had become an urgent necessity more than at any time in the past for a number of reasons,

one of the most important perhaps being the region's remoteness from Riyadh as the closest city to Wadi al-Dawasir, 700 kilometers away, in addition to the increasing pressure on overland transportation and the hardship and waste to which travelers are subjected.

Mr Ali also pointed out that it had become necessary to pave the Raniyah-valley route in view of the maximum importance that entailed for the region, especially since it connected it to the Western Province, the al-Hijaz and the holy shrines, adding that that would help reduce the costs of services and consumer goods and lower transportation costs, as well as marketing agricultural products between the region and the Western Province and raising the capability of some government departments and agencies, in particular health and municipality services, to keep up with the blessed resurgence and the giant aspirations the national development plans entailed.

AL-RIYAD, through its correspondent, continued its tour of the towns and villages of Wadi al-Dawasir. It met elsewhere with a citizen of the town of al-Nuway'imah, 'Abd-al-'Aziz Muhammad al-Ghinam, who sustained the insistence on the need to have a civil airport serving the region. He referred to urgent cases of illness which required treatment in Riyadh, since there was extreme difficulty in traveling, especially since the distance was 700 kilometers.

Al-Ghinam also addressed himself to an important point, which was the large number of animals which had been hit on the Riyadh-Wadi al-Dawasir road, often causing grievous accidents which innocent people of the region going to Hemen, Najran and the south were subjected to.

Wadi al-Dawasir's correspondent headed northeast, where he stayed as a guest of the town of East al-Shirafa, which greets you with innovative vegetations since its homes are in beautiful green gardens, in order to meet with a citizen there, Mr 'Isa Dansh 'Abdallah al-Dawsari, who welcomed us and said that the Wadi al-Dawasir area's general demand was for an airport, without a doubt, then a linkup of the Raniya-Valley road with a paved route.

He then talked about his town's demands, stating "I in the name of the inhabitants of the town of al-Shirafa consider that the beloved officials in each ministry should meet some of its demands, especially for telephones, especially since they are only a short distance away from the town of al-Quway'iyah, where there are telephones. I also hope for the opening of a post office and the staffing of the town clinic with skilled doctors."

We also met with another citizen from the same town, the citizen Jum'an Khurays 'Abdallah al-Dusari, who stressed the need to have telephone service.

He then expressed his hopes that a sports city would be built in the region, owing to urgent, essential need, because there were two official sporting clubs there and a large number of young athletes, who need playing fields where they can engage in their sports hobbies.

We then set out eastward, a bit to the southeast, making an appearance in the town of Kamidah, an emerging town which stands proudly, viewing a brilliant future with high hopes, with God's permission. We came upon the citizen 'Abdallah Ibn Zafir al-Haqbani, an inhabitant of the town, who expressed his great thanks and that of the people of his town to AL-RIYAD newspaper for this unique, pioneering initiative, which was the first of its kind, then addressed himself to the most important needs of the town of Kamidah, which he summarized in four points:

The opening of a clinic to serve citizens.

The opening of an intermediate boys' school.

The opening of a civil defense center, since this town is agricultural and spacious and has a number of gas stations.

He beseeched the officials that the hopes and requests of the people of the town of Kamidah would be realized.

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CSO: 4404/89

SYRIA

KHADDAM REJECTS 'HEGEMONY' OVER LEBANON

Beirut LA REVUE DU LIBAN in French 16-23 Nov 85 pp 19-22

[Interview granted by 'Abd al-Halim Khaddam, Vice-President of the Syrian Republic; date and place unspecified]

[Text] He is relevant, extraordinary perspicacious and persistent, and with a great deal of courage which, despite 5 assassination attempts, has helped him to maintain an unaffected high morale. Add to this a lofty spirit of honesty and a sensible way of exercising his prerogatives.

He is considered by everyone the godfather and maker of anything related to Lebanese policy, for President Hafiz al-Assad trusts him totally, which is consistent with his competence, morality and subtleness.

His speech proves his dexterity of thought and elocution. Nothing can surprise him, for he remains receptive at all times. Deep within him are traces of a brilliant lawyer who knows how to deal profoundly and knowledgeably with cases, concerned with protecting the interests of his "petitioners."

He dislikes being called "his Excellency the Vice-President," preferring to be called Abu-Jamal, for in his opinion it expresses simplicity and brings him closer to the people. He cherishes such simplicity and closeness to the citizens. Moreover, to him they are a source of happiness.

He did not reach the "summit" with a helicopter but mounted the ladder leading to the highest positions gradually. He was a well-known attorney, then administrator, minister of the economy, minister of foreign affairs and deputy prime minister.

He excelled in all positions. He is as skillful in speaking as in listening, displaying an extraordinary comprehension. Furthermore, he has an unlimited amount of patience, which allows him to share the suffering of people, to tolerate their whims and faults and even their pretentiousness.

In Lebanon and in the Arab states, he is considered the greatest "Lebanologist." He earned this title as a result of his long experience and after having burned his fingers in dealing with our crisis.

Such is, briefly, the personality of 'Abd al-Halim Khaddam, vice-president of the Republic of Syria, who was kind enough to grant an important interview to the newspaper AL-BAYRAK, LA REVUE DU LIBAN and MONDAY MORNING.

Three Lebanese Generations With Different Visions

[Question] It is known that you are the main artisan of Syrian policy of President Hafiz al-Assad, both international and Arab. What have you had to take from Lebanese politicians, the old, the "traditionalists" and the new, in the last few years?

He burst out laughing before answering: "We must find an answer which will help us to find a solution rather than prevent it." He went on: "Like any country, there are different generations in Lebanon. There is a generation of independence, the one which contributed to the advent of the era of independence and the formulation of the current situation.

"There also is a generation which was raised in the shadow of the first, whereas a third generation was raised with the regrettable Lebanese events. If we want to find a way to settle the Lebanese crisis, we must consider the situation in a realistic and practical manner, for otherwise reaching a solution would be difficult.

"The three generations I mentioned are not limited to any specific part of Lebanon or to any exclusive category. I had the opportunity to become thoroughly familiar with these three generations by virtue of my contacts and meetings with a large number of Lebanese in the past few years. Each of these generations has its political vision and thoughts different from the others and that is what I was exposed to by these three Lebanese generations."

The Logic of the Gun...

[Question] It is said in Lebanon that those who have acceded to the leadership with the gun would lose it if they give up their weapons, regardless of slogan or other considerations. What has been the impact of this state of affairs on currently formulated agreements?

[Answer] This is not a question of whether one carries a gun or not. Actually, the struggle in Lebanon pits against each other armed against unarmed factions. In frequent cases those without weapons have been the most virulent in this war compared to those bearing arms. In other cases the latter were the most irredentist. That is why we cannot distinguish between the armed and the unarmed. What there are are ideas. Therefore, we must distinguish among ideas, opinions and political orientations.

The bearers of guns in Lebanon are citizens providing the material means to politicians in this war. I have found out that many of them had committed themselves to a war decided by others, by those who would like to use the war

as an instrument and a means of setting things ablaze without playing a role in building the Lebanon of the future. That is why this question does not apply to those who carry guns, but to those who have made such decisions and exploited those who carry guns.

[Question] Could the latter help to promote security and obey orders?

[Answer] Those who carry guns would obey orders if we could reach an agreement which would stipulate the dissolution of paramilitary organizations which should surrender their weapons to the state. Such a decision would have to be made, of that we are certain.

No Solution or Religious Hegemony

[Question] The impression is that the Sunni in Lebanon would be the main beneficiaries of an intialed and implemented agreement, for they do not resort to arms and have had no militia, which would help them to gain more converts. Is this accurate?

[Answer] We in Syria do not look at the Lebanese situation in terms of separation among religions, as it appears on the Lebanese scene, for we consider such a division the cause of all Lebanese misfortunes. The agreement which should be concluded does not take something from a given faction in order to give it to another; it takes from everyone to give it to Lebanon only.

It would be illogical to trade one religious solution for another or to replace one religious hegemony with another. Any solution, any agreement would put the decision in the hands of the Lebanese people, of all Lebanese; it would return security, peace and sovereignty to Lebanon as a state and as a Lebanese people, rather than to one party or another. Syria cannot accept a solution or support an agreement which would sanction a division based on religion, religious hegemony or religious orientation."

Syria has no Claims in Lebanon

[Question] Mr Vice-President, some leaders of the Lebanese Front say that the draft tripartite accord, as published in some newspapers, sanctions total Syrian takeover of Lebanon. What do you think?

[Answer] Such statements rate neither an answer nor a discussion, for in my view those who have stated them do not believe their authenticity. They are well aware of the fact that Syria has no claim in Lebanon whatsoever. Its sole ambition is to see Lebanon regain its unity and vitality, achieving a national accord on the basis of the recovery of its unity and independence, as well as reforms which would grant the Lebanese equal rights and obligations. Nothing should differentiate among the Lebanese other than which they contribute to their country."

Democratic or Presidential System

[Question] Some Lebanese parties claim that the amendments inserted in the new agreement make the republic's presidency marginal....

[Answer] Lebanon has a president of the republic, who does not become marginal with the agreement; the agreement establishes his powers within their natural context.

According to the new agreement, the president of the republic is the head of state and the symbol of its unity, in charge of protecting the constitution. He is the chairman of the Defense Council. He chairs the Council of Ministers in some basic stipulated cases, such as study and approval of the budget, declaration of war, peace or state of emergency and, if he deems it to be in the interest of the country, summoning the Council of Ministers.

A system may be parliamentary, democratic or presidential. In a parliamentary and democratic system the government is answerable and accountable to the national assembly. The assembly, therefore, must be the decision making center, for it is the assembly which passes judgement.

Decision making by the Council of Ministers allows all parties to become involved, for they assume the responsibility. If the Lebanese choose a presidential system, the president of the republic will be answerable to the people who would elect him, regardless of religious affiliation, for the president would be elected on the basis of universal suffrage and every citizen should vote in the presidential elections.

If the president of the republic does not preside over the Cabinet this is not to say that he does not count. In Syria the president does not preside over the Council of Ministers. All decisions made by the executive branch--the executive authority in Lebanon--are made by the Council of Ministers. This provides for proper development of governmental activities.

Every single day the state must resolve a number of problems. It is not logical for the president of the republic to deal with them, neglecting basic problems for the sake of undertaking the study of and settling problems incumbent upon others. In Syria the president has extensive obligations. If he were to bother with details he would be unable to govern the country and direct it in a way which has led, as is unanimously agreed, to accomplishments on the triple internal, Arab and international level.

The value of a president of the republic is not measured in terms of daily practical accomplishments but the great achievements the president accomplishes thanks to his good management of public affairs.

[Question] The Lebanese Christians, the Maronites in particular, say that if the agreement is concluded they would become second class citizens. What can you say on this subject?

[Answer] This is not true in the least. Actually, the agreement covers basic problems. It does not tend to eliminate political affiliations but to

equalize the Lebanese. Would this make a Lebanese, whoever he may be, a second class citizen?

The agreement stipulates that the only distinction between one Lebanese and another is based on the extent to which each contributes to his country. Does this mean that he has become a second class citizen? If the agreement favors the rebuilding of Lebanon on a democratic basis, which would lead to an occasional flair-up in the country, does this mean that it classifies the citizens into different categories?

Let us speak realistically: The Lebanese president is a Maronite, as are the commander-in-chief of the army, the person in charge of military security and other people holding economic and security positions. Have they ensured the security and stability of Maronites in Lebanon?

Let us consider the situation as it is: There are those who hold positions but how many thousands of Maronites have emigrated and how many thousands have been killed in the course of the war? Those who have lost a son or a husband, those whose house was destroyed or who deserted their village, did they obtain from the people who hold the actual positions the guarantees they are entitled to as citizens rather than simply as Maronites?

The Guarantee Rests on a Modern State

No position can provide guarantees to anyone. The guarantees can come only from the building of a modern state, cohesive and unified, where the citizens truly feel that they are linked to a homeland directly rather than through certain connections.

Currently national affiliation in Lebanon is achieved through the intermediary of the community rather than through faith in the fatherland. Let me also specify that the Lebanese political structure has not allowed the citizen to be linked with the land and the fatherland. This explains the fact that a substantial number of Lebanese welcomed with satisfaction the Israeli invasion of Lebanon. The Israeli enemy entered Beirut, which did not prevent some people to deal with the invader although he was occupying Lebanese soil.

The real reason for this state of affairs is the fact that in Lebanon allegiance to the fatherland is through the community, for which reason we should look for the guarantees within the citizens themselves rather than within communities.

When we speak of the guarantees of the communities, we assume that the fatherland remains dismembered, for each community would claim similar guarantees. If the presidency of the republic with its extensive prerogatives constitutes a guarantee for a given community, another community would demand identical guarantees. The country should have a single president and not two, three, four, five, six, seven or eight.

The guarantee, therefore, does not rest in individuals, positions or prerogatives, but in a national system which would link the citizen to the Lebanese homeland and its land, and to Lebanese unity. This is what would

provide a guarantee for everybody. As to religious guarantees, they are secessionist guarantees which would lead to the breakup of Lebanon, which is an Israeli objective.

We are Dealing With People on the Basis of Their Political Line

[Question] Statistically, what is the number of Maronites and what position do they hold in terms of the total Lebanese population?

[Answer] To begin with, you know that Lebanon is not Syria. Secondly, I have no statistical figures and we are not concerned with such type of information. In Syria we do not consider such facts and do not look at the internal situation of an Arab country in terms of its social context. We deal with people in the light of their political line. It matters little to us to determine the size of a community, for we cannot contribute to a solution based on a religious breakdown.

[Question] What would happen if the draft tripartite agreement is not signed by the negotiating parties or by any one party? You let it be understood during your meeting with the delegation of the Lebanese Bar Association that other solutions were available. What are they?

[Answer] The nonsigning of the agreement should not be interpreted as a renunciation of efforts aimed at reaching an agreement. In Syria, President Hafiz al-Assad is firmly determined to do everything possible to put an end to the state of war and achieve national agreement in Lebanon. As we know, His Excellency the President dedicates a substantial part of his efforts and his time to this matter.

In my meeting with parliamentarians of Arab origin I said that the warring parties were quite courageous in taking the road to peace. I wish some politicians would be courageous enough not to compromise the peace process.

Naturally, the nonsigning of the draft agreement would cause bitterness and disappointment without meaning a break. Syria is resolved to persevere in its efforts until the crisis has been resolved. We are aware of the extent of external interferences, American as well as Israeli, aimed at scuttling this agreement. However, I would like to say a word to those who listen to American and Israeli advice: may they profit from the lessons of the past. Such advice would bring nothing but suffering. The time has come for all parties to act in accordance with the interests of Lebanon and not of others.

The Tripartite Accord is a Work Program

[Question] Mr Khaddam, does the draft agreement commit the negotiating parties and is it enforceable? Does signing it mean undertaking its implementation or else is it an attempt which could be scuttled?

[Answer] The agreement is a practical work program formulated within a broader framework, such as the national congress. The draft will have to be ratified by the Chamber of Deputies, i.e., by the constitutional institutions.

[Question] Does it necessarily have to go through a national congress, a national assembly and constitutional institutions in order to become enforceable, or could it bypass the national congress?

[Answer] This agreement defines the modalities of the reestablishment of security in the country and it is natural that all of us would try to ensure it with the broadest possible support. We do not wish for any given party to remain outside it. What matters is for the belligerent parties or, in other words, the new generation which has appeared during the war, to be able to conduct a dialogue. In the final account, it is that generation which will live in the shade of the new situation, considering its physical and political age, which is relatively young. The initiation of a dialogue among them was important and basic. However, this does not mean in the least that the others will remain outside the agreement. Hence the concern of securing for it the broadest possible support and participation.

Syria will Impose Nothing on Any Party

[Question] Who will supervise militarily the implementation of the agreement? Will Syria impose its will by force, even though the agreement may be rejected by some parties?

[Answer] Syria has no intention whatsoever to impose anything on any Lebanese party. We are acting with a view to obtaining an agreement through dialogue, for we believe that normalization in Lebanon can be accomplished only through dialogue and agreement.

[Question] Would Syrian forces be deployed in all areas of Lebanon, including the eastern part?

[Answer] This will be discussed in the light of the security plan which must be agreed upon by the concerned parties.

[Question] Has Syria dropped President Amine Gemayel and will the forthcoming agreement make his position marginal as I have already asked?

[Answer] I find it strange that such a question would be asked at all!

[Question] What is the nature of your relations with the Lebanese Forces and with Mr Elie Hobeika personally?

[Answer] Actually, a dialogue took place with the Lebanese Forces and there have been repeated contacts with them. As a result of such contacts, we have noted that the Lebanese Forces were oriented towards peace. We have considered such orientation a matter worthy of attention; it was the basis of the tripartite dialogue among the representatives of the National Union Front and the Lebanese Forces.

Lebanon-Syria

[Question] Syria has the right to maintain special relations with Lebanon. In your opinion, what are the limits of such relations?

[Answer] You know that Lebanon and Syria are two fraternal countries with historical and geographic relations and substantial common interests. As to their dimension, it should be determined by the Lebanese in the light of what serves both Lebanon and Syria.

I say that it up to the Lebanese to determine it, for there are those who would like to harm both countries by asking some questions which could cast a doubt concerning such relations. Yes, relations between Lebanon and Syria should be of a distinctive nature, for it is our duty to act in such a way to serve both countries.

Syria has no demand on Lebanon whatsoever and does not intend in the least to exert its hegemony. Lebanon is a brother country and we cannot base our policy and cooperation with any fraternal Arab country on the basis of hegemony or the inclination to seize it.

[Question] To this there are others who answer that you intend to raise the idea of Great Syria or to set up what is known as the "Bilad Ach-Cham," which would constitute the merger of Syria with Lebanon, Jordan and Palestine. Is this accurate?

[Answer] Arab unity is a political doctrine for all Arabs. We believe that unity is the destiny of the Arab nation. However, is the question of unity between Syria and Lebanon raised at the present time? Anyone who considers this possibility aims at compromising the agreement process.

Naturally, we dream and aspire for the Arabs to achieve unity. This dream is not shared by Syrians alone; it haunts the minds of Lebanese, Egyptians, Palestinians, Iraqis and the entire Arab world.

The United States and Israel Are Trying to Scuttle the Agreement

[Question] Do you believe that America is trying to scuttle the agreement in Lebanon? Does Israel play a role in this case and, in your view, what parties would benefit from scuttling it? Furthermore, can they upset everything?

[Answer] Yes, the United States and the Hebrew state are making great efforts to paralyze the agreement project. The United States is doing it for regional reasons. It believes that the Lebanese problem is a burden for Syria.

Israel is acting for these and other reasons. It would like to dismember Lebanon and the entire area. The Israeli concept of security is based on two considerations: the first is regional expansionism, that which the Hebrew state describes as "safe borders." The second is to divide the Arabs and to keep them weak and unable to confront Israel.

[Question] You said in your meeting with the bar delegation that America is trying to implement the second stage of the Camp David Agreements. What are its targets and foundations of this stage?

[Answer] The second stage of the Camp David Agreements favors separate negotiations with Israel. We believe that peace is a fact to be decided by

the Arab summit, within the framework of the Fez resolutions. However, the peace which was agreed upon at the Fez Summit is one thing and that of Camp David another.

That is why any attempt at negotiating with the Israeli enemy directly or indirectly, individually or bilaterally, would be a stage or steps along the Camp David way. In such a case Syria would take the necessary stand.

[Question] You are considered a specialist in Lebanese affairs or an excellent Lebanologist, the way others are known as "Kremlinologists." Do you believe that the presidency of the Republic of Lebanon has exceeded its prerogatives ever since independence and, on this basis, has contributed, one way or the other, to triggering the current crisis?

[Answer] Asking this question of any citizen of Lebanon would spare me from answering it.

Agreement Presumes a Government of National Union

[Question] Does the draft tripartite agreement stipulate the forming of a new cabinet, whose members would be drafted from among those who bear arms?

[Answer] Naturally, the agreement supposes the formation of a government of national union, representative of all parties. Those known as the "bearers of arms" are a segment of Lebanese political life. Anyone who believes in such an agreement, who may be involved with it or is working for its success, should participate in such a future government.

[Question] Assuming its approval, would this formula be viable or exposed, as is the current one, to shakeups?

[Answer] Lebanon has been trying the religious formula since 1860. The 1860 agreement concluded among some great powers had instituted a system based on the religious formula for part of Lebanon. The formula was extended to all of Lebanon in its current borders in 1943. Let us consider what happened with the application of the religious formula: all we can see is suffering. I believe that the proposed formula is a national Lebanese formula whose success would be assured.

[Question] Do you believe that the politicians were wrong at the beginning by not allowing the various militias to participate in the talks, specifically those held in Geneva and Lausanne?

[Answer] In Lausanne we clearly realized that the absence of armed organizations, which were operating within a political framework, had played one role and not all the roles in the noncompletion of the agreement dialogue. Nevertheless, the main role here is always based on the fact that some leaderships look at Lebanon through the lens of their own position rather than that of Lebanon.

[Question] Who will nominate the new members of the assembly? Furthermore, is the nomination an acceptable form of representation of the citizens, considering that we are at the end of the 20th century, under a Lebanese democracy which has not collapsed despite all crises?

[Answer] The question of the nomination is based on the faulty state of security and of the Lebanese force majeure. The country lives in the shadow of a civil war and armed confrontations. A transitional period should follow. In any case, considering the current chamber, despite our entire appreciation of this legislature for, from the political point of view, it played a great role by remaining the symbol of national unity, it is the only constitutional institution which represents the unity of the fatherland. This fact must be acknowledged and our appreciation to this assembly expressed.

However, going back to constitutional logic, the assembly renewed its mandate after having been granted the trust of the people for a 4-year term. Revising the law after the end of the legislature is a transgression of the rules, for which reason it was necessary to revise the law, the holding of general elections having been impossible. The force majeure which imposed the renewal of the legislature is the very same which necessitates the deputies' nomination.

We are Playing the Role of Mediators

[Question] What would happen if Christians and Lebanese Forces reject the suggested formula?

[Answer] This concerns them. As far as we are concerned, we have neither exerted nor intend to exert any kind of pressure on any party. This is their country and the future belongs to them. By this very token each party will decide for itself in this sense. We are the mediators. As I have frequently repeated it, this forces us to maintain an equal distance between us and any other party.

[Question] Will the current discussions provide for a firm security or an armistice at the expiration of which the bombing will resume if agreement is not reached?

[Answer] That which is taking place and has been the object of the agreement will guarantee the definitive peace in Lebanon, for by virtue of this agreement no party would possess arms any longer.

[Question] The Lebanese agreement mentions a security plan. Does it mean that Syrian forces will enter Lebanon in areas other than the areas where they are now stationed?

[Answer] As I have already mentioned, the agreement will assign to an ad hoc committee the care of supervising security throughout the country and formulating a security plan for the entire Lebanese territory. Should this committee request Syrian aid, Syria would determine whether it is necessary to provide it. Naturally, the committee reserve for itself the right to determine the extent of such aid and the areas where it would be required.

Syria has no intention of taking the initiative for such intervention or to advance even by a single meter. The role of Syria is to come to the aid and, should such aid be sought, it would examine its possibilities and act in consequence.

[Question] You told the leader of the barristers that displaced people would be able to return to their homes within a transitional period of 5 years. What type of guarantees would allow them to regain their villages within that period of time?

[Answer] The implementation of the agreement would provide a perfect guarantee for this.

[Question] Would the condition for the nomination of the deputies be that they come out from behind the barricades?

[Answer] There are no two categories of deputies coming from behind the barricades or anywhere else in Lebanon. Virtually anyone involved in politics in Lebanon is behind a barricade, military or political.

[Question] What is the situation with the Arab summit: will it take place at the stipulated date or will it be canceled? Will Syria participate?

[Answer] The way we see it, nothing specific has been said concerning an Arab summit and we have no information on the subject.

Assad Feels Well

[Question] How is the President's health? Is he in excellent physical shape as we wish him to be?

[Answer] The President is in excellent health. You can see the way he is doing his job and guiding the country with dynamism and great vitality. God be thanked, the President's health is better than ever before.

[Question] What is hindering the holding of an international conference on finding a solution to the Palestinian cause and in which the USSR would participate?

[Answer] The rejection by Israel and the parties which support it of the type of international conference to be held under the auspices of the United Nations and on the basis of its resolutions.

[Question] What impact would the Reagan-Gorbachev meeting have on world peace and on settling the Lebanese and Middle Eastern crises?

[Answer] Unquestionably, the meeting between Presidents Reagan and Gorbachev is an important fact which will have repercussions on the sum total of world problems. Should the Soviet Union and the United States succeed in taking a step toward detente between them this would have positive repercussions on the international situation. In the opposite case their failure would have negative repercussions.

Relations Between Damascus, Moscow and Washington

[Question] What type of relations exist between Syria, on the one hand, and the USSR and the United States, on the other?

[Answer] The USSR is a friendly country who stands by our side and supplies us with all sorts of aid, which has made it possible to face the enemy. Our relations are based on a cooperation pact initialed by the two countries; they are developing in an excellent way on the basis of this pact.

As far as our relations with America are concerned, they are linked to the American position concerning the Israeli-Arab conflict and most of the problems in the area.

[Question] What is the situation with the efforts to promote a rapprochement between Syria and Jordan and what has happened to the Jordanian-Palestinian agreement?

[Answer] There have been two meetings in Riyadh and today (last Tuesday) we shall be meeting with the Jordanian side. During the first two meetings an agreement was reached on a certain number of basic problems: first, observance of all resolutions passed at the Arab summit; second, rejection of any type of separate and partial solutions. Thus, we consider the Amman Pact as extant by virtue of this accord; third, acknowledgment that the Fez decision is the Arab draft peace plan on the basis of which the Arabs should act. It was also agreed upon that peace should be sanctioned by an international conference to be held under the aegis of the United Nations.

These are the basic points. As to relations strictly speaking, they will be the topic of a meeting and we expect a positive development in this area.

The Amman Agreement is Dead....

[Question] King Hussein has made public his desire to reestablish relations with Syria while holding on to the Amman agreement. Should the Hashemite king persist in this attitude would he meet with President Assad?

[Answer] We believe that the Amman agreement is dead for it was based on bilateral action between Jordan and Arafat. In the course of the Riyadh meetings it was decided to reject any type of unilateral action. A bilateral action is considered unilateral. That is why in our relations with Jordan or any other country we proceed on the basis of a clear and stable policy. We consider the struggle against the Israeli enemy a national struggle to which no Arab party has the right to put an end other than within the national general framework.

We want peace which has its givens and conditions. The givens of that peace are, first of all, Israeli withdrawal from all occupied Arab territories and the acknowledgment of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people, including their right to return, self-determination and the creation of an independent state.

As far as the conditions are concerned, they are to achieve a balance between us (the Arabs) and the enemy, the negotiations having to take place within the framework of an international conference under the auspices of the United Nations.

Syria-PLO

[Question] Has the name Arafat been stricken out of Syrian vocabulary or else are attempts at rapprochement between Syria and the PLO being made?

[Answer] I do not wish to mention names and personalities, for it is rather a question of style of action. The style followed by Arafat and some of his brothers is contrary to the interests of the Palestinian cause and Palestinian people. That is why this matter conflicts with Syrian orientations and policies. Quite clearly, this case has been disposed of, for do not base our policy on feelings or personalities but on style. As to the status of Yassir Arafat, this is not our concern but the concern of the Palestinian people.

[Question] In terms of the strategic balance with the Israeli enemy, how far have you advanced in that area?

[Answer] We are working to attain this objective. We have made and continue to make great efforts to attain it and the Syrian people are withstanding this burden. I believe that we have crossed a major stage in this direction; other stages remain to be crossed.

[Question] Is an eventual military confrontation with Israel possible and has Syria taken the necessary provisions to face it?

[Answer] Since the battlefield remains open we should expect an eventual aggression and, on that basis, a confrontation.

[Question] Your friends are proud of the fact that you have been the target of five assassination attempts without your morale being affected. Furthermore, these attempts have strengthened your determination to work even more dynamically. Is this based on faith in the apostolic nature of your mission or else are you naturally brave?

[Answer] It is neither a question of an apostolic mission nor of innate courage. Whoever wants to work within the national framework should be able to endure the risks of his actions, for it is his destiny to endure all. That is what I have done. What increases my capacity to endure is President Hafiz al-Assad's and the Syrian people's support and the clear and firm national policy followed by Syria.

Arab Support for Syria is not Regular

[Question] Let us go back to Syrian affairs: is the Syrian "National Progressive Front" on vacation?

[Answer] Not in the least. Relatively speaking, the Front is active. The leadership is trying to reactivate it so that it may operate in a permanent and absolute manner.

[Question] Is Arab support for Syria regular and has it been resumed by those who had suspended it?

[Answer] I cannot say that Arab support for Syria is regular. Some Arab states have suspended their support and we hope that they will reconsider their decision, for this support is for the sake of confrontation. We hope that this will take place.

[Question] What is the nature of relations between Syria, on the one hand, and Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states on the other?

[Answer] Our relations with Saudi Arabia are excellent. They are based on mutual respect and the agreements concluded between the two countries. The same applies to our relations with the Gulf states.

[Question] It is being said that relations between Syria and Iran have cooled off of late and that Iran is on the verge of breaking economic relations with you. Is this true?

[Answer] Relations between us and Iran are based not on interest but on a strategic vision. We recognize that the Iranian revolution is a great acquisition for the Arabs and the area. This revolution, expelled the Americans and raised the slogan of participation in the liberation of Jerusalem is a great acquisition for the Arabs, more than anything else. Had it been the fate of this revolution--had there not been the current war--to play a direct role in our conflict with the Hebrew state, we would have realized its importance, as well as the importance of the fact that Iran is on our side in this struggle, after having taken the side of Israel during the time of the Shah.

Our relations are not lukewarm in the least and there is absolutely no reason for them to be such.

What of Syrian-Iraqi Relations?

[Question] Is it accurate that your relations with Iraq are beginning to normalize and that a reconciliation between Damascus and Baghdad is possible?

[Answer] There is nothing new to be said in this area.

[Question] What is the situation of the "rejection front," particularly since some of its parties are renewing relations with Egypt. And what is the fate of Syrian-Libyan unification, which was previously proclaimed?

[Answer] The "rejection front" is static and steps have been taken to reactivate it. As far as our union with Libya is concerned, it is being steadily discussed by the Syrian and Libyan commands.

Egypt has Abandoned its Authenticity

[Question] Let us speak of Egypt. If Egypt were to rectify the Camp David Agreements, would this be sufficient for it to rejoin the Arab ranks, even though most of the members of the League have reestablished relations with Cairo one way or another?

[Answer] It is not a question of rectification. The most deadly poison is the one mixed with honey. It is a question of politics. Does the regime in Egypt realize that Camp David and its agreements conflict with the interests of Egypt and the Arab nation or not? That is the question. If yes, let it take the proper steps and it would see then Syria at its side, struggling with it to maintain and protect this orientation.

However, if it considers that Camp David serves Egyptian interests, and the Egyptian people, like us, do not believe this, as confirmed by what is taking place on the banks of the Nile, possibilities of a meeting are nonexistent. We want Egypt and that which existed between Syria and Egypt has not existed between any two other Arab countries. We jointly fought the Tartars and the Mongols, the Crusaders and the Israelis. Relations between the Syrian and Egyptian people are deep, special and emotional.

However, the regime in Egypt has abandoned its authenticity, its Arabic nature and its national line, having followed the Camp David line and signed a peace agreement with the Hebrew state. We support the Egyptian people in the struggle they are waging to return to Egypt its natural position after the failure of Camp David and the peace treaty with Israel.

[Question] Lately, while Peres was in Washington, a joint communique clearly stipulated the proclamation or nonproclamation of a communique by Amman and Tel Aviv announcing the ending the state of war which has lasted since 1942, the establishment of a Jordanian-Palestinian delegation consisting of West Bank and Gaza Strip Palestinians, in anticipation of peace negotiations with Israel, to be preceded by an Israeli withdrawal from occupied territories, while Palestinians from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip would set up a council which would assume autonomous powers.

What do you think of this and what can you say on this subject?

[Answer] These are facts which have been rejected both in terms of their base and their form. There will be no Israeli or American peace in the area. The United States is not entitled to play a peace role, because it is not equidistant from all sides. The United States supports Israel in the area and that is why American peace is rejected as is Israeli peace, both of them having no chance of succeeding.

5157

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IRAN

RAFSANJANI ON COOPERATION WITH GULF STATES

Tehran ETTELA'AT in Persian 18 Nov 85

[Interview with Hojjat ol-Eslam Hashemi Rafsanjani, date and place not specified]

[Text] In its 79th issue, the publication AL-'ALAM carried an interview with Hojjat ol-Eslam Hashemi Rafsanjani, which is a straightforward discussion of various issues, including the problems of the Persian Gulf, Islamic economy, Mir Hoseyn Musavi's government, the problems of Lebanon, and so forth. We have translated the interview verbatim, and it appears below.

Hojjat ol-Eslam Hashemi Rafsanjani is Speaker of the Majlis, the Imam's representative on the Supreme Defense Council, and Deputy Chief of the Assembly of Experts when this assembly discusses the matter of successor to the chief theologian. A number of people consider him the number one politician after Imam Khomeyni. Some consider him the man of balances and the fulcrum of the various factions and internal processes in Iran's political and religious affairs. Others regard him as a moderate because of his positions. Hojjat ol-Eslam Hashemi Rafsanjani was the first person to write and translate on the subject of Palestine, and he was imprisoned for writing a famous book on this basic Islamic issue. He is a man of prisons, constituencies, and action, because he has gone from one city to another, from one party circle to another, and from one constituency to another, without becoming associated with any one constituency or group. Because of this very volatility, he was attacked several times soon after the triumph of the revolution. AL-'ALAM visited Hojjat ol-Eslam Rafsanjani, and he spoke extensively and clearly about various issues, and the interview is presented below.

[Question] Hojjat ol-Eslam Hashemi, as Imam Khomeyni's representative on the Supreme Defense Council, what is your analysis of Iraq's recent attention to the Persian Gulf? What is the extent of the damage caused by Iraq's air attacks on Iran's oil exports? Will this lead to the closure of the Strait of Hormoz, and what are the effects of this matter on conditions in the area?

[Answer] In the name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate. I have discussed this matter previously in Friday prayer sermons and elsewhere, and here I will emphasize what I have said. The aim of the recent activity and for causing the new disturbances is actually to further the cause of saving Saddam. They think if they weaken us economically, we will not be able to continue the war. It is clear that since under natural circumstances we rely on oil, they are trying to cut off our oil exports. When we look at the weapons and the propaganda they employ as well as the positions taken by some of the countries in the area, we conclude that Iraq is not doing this alone. There are numerous programs upon which they have reached agreement behind the

scenes. Iraq's role and mission in them has been specified, and it is now merely carrying out orders. Naturally, the Ba'thist party is pursuing a course to strengthen and save itself, but it is not alone in this, and others are also taking part. As for the extent to which this is affecting our oil exports, it may stop oil exports for a day or two, or at most cut down the quantity in some cases, but we do not think this will completely cut off oil exports for several reasons.

First, we have numerous resources and ready methods with which we can export oil from this very Khark Island, and many of them are not in any danger.

Second, within Khark Island, in addition to the defense facilities, we have numerous ways to export oil, and in view of the great vastness of the island, it is unlikely that the export of oil would be completely cut off.

Third, we can extend the oil terminals from the oil fields and storage areas to the eastern part of the Persian Gulf; we can even extend these pipelines to the Strait of Hormoz and that part of the Sea of Oman. Of course it would take time to do this, but to distance oil export operations from the danger zone and to get them out of range of aggressor aircraft would not take much time. We are doing this very thing now. We can say that even if this bombing continues, it will not cut off the export of our oil. A closure of the Strait of Hormoz is therefore unlikely at present. We said that if we cannot use the Persian Gulf, we will close it to others, but we will not close it if we can make partial or full use of it. If at times we feel that our use of the Persian Gulf has been limited in some way, we will restrict the use of the Strait of Hormoz to the same extent. We must say that our policy concerning the security of the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormoz actually has a direct relationship to the extent of our use of them. Our logic is firmly based on the idea that as long as Iraq uses the Persian Gulf indirectly through other countries such as Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, who give them financial, logistical, and propaganda assistance, if we are to be deprived of its use, the just answer would be for Iraq to be deprived of its use by us, and this would not be easy without depriving those who help Iraq. We are now aware of the assistance these countries are giving to Iraq, but as long as we ourselves have use of the Persian Gulf, we will overlook their use of it. As you see, we try to make things difficult for them to the same extent that they make them difficult for us. For example, in the inspection and detainment of oil tankers and the like, we have done these things to the same extent that the other side has done them to us. If it reaches a point, however, where our assistance channel is cut off completely, we will also cut off their assistance channel. There are of course those who say that Iran could not recover from this, but this is just like the analyses that say we cannot continue the war. These people reach the conclusion that the export of oil will be cut off, and that Iran cannot give a decisive answer to the area. We believe that these calculations have arisen out of unfamiliarity and improper assessment of our power, and they are like the mistaken calculations with which they began the war. We have calculated such days, and we knew that we were determined to continue the war to final victory, and we will not stop until we recover the losses we have suffered and tried the aggressor according to Islamic law. We have therefore anticipated such an important stage and prepared ourselves for the day when we would have to live completely without oil, and we have also made plans for that day. This plan, under which the life of our nation would continue using non-petroleum natural resources, will be announced to the people. Of course this plan exists for the sake of our peace of mind, and will be implemented as needed. For example, much of our manpower which is now employed in economic and industrial areas, could at that time be temporarily called to military service. Likewise, much of our industry which is now used for public welfare would be brought into our military programs. All of us together, with the powerful and extensive resources we have, will enter into a people's war supported by millions of people trained and mobilized for sacrifice and effort. It is natural that we will enter into a comprehensive people's war. Naturally, every stage has its special weapons, and if need be the world will see us

bring forth weapons that were not in their calculations, just as it occurred several months ago in the war of rockets. It is natural that at that time we will advance the war at full speed in our own interest, and of course in the long run it will bear good results, even though it will carry a relatively high price for our economy. In my view that stage will bring greater success and more victory for us. As much as we try to prevent such conditions from arising, if they do arise, we will meet them. With regard to the passage of ships and the waters of the Persian Gulf, we have prepared contingency plans that will allow us to control the waters and deprive them of the sea completely.

[Question] Is it true that Iran plans its relationships with area countries, especially the Arab countries of the (Persian) Gulf, based on their positions on the war? If this is true, then when will the good relations you want to establish with them take place, and in view of the current crisis, how can you assure the countries of the (Persian) Gulf and persuade them to reciprocate the friendship?

[Answer] Our policy is actually based on cooperation with these countries. Clearly, the countries in the southern part of the Gulf, because of their nature, cannot be enemies or try to impose their point of view on other countries. As it is, these countries want only to survive and maintain their existence without trouble. In this regard we are prepared to cooperate with them, but our foreign policy is always being distorted and maligned by the policies of the imperialists. These powers have brought these countries into the war, and clearly the support and involvement of these countries in the war will not go unanswered, but despite this, we have not yet lost our composure.

We have approached them tolerantly, overlooking their slips, confining ourselves to advice, warnings, and threats, without giving them a serious answer. We are still using this approach, and in this regard we believe that they are afraid of Saddam in a way because in the past they have been exposed to threats and danger from him. Since their thinking is still dominated by the spirit of dependence and fear of world imperialism, they are therefore unable to see the future of the war and to imagine the possibility of victory for an independent country in the face of the imperialists in the region.

Thinking in this way, they still believe that since Saddam is dependent, he can remain in power and the future of the Islamic republic is weakness and helplessness, perhaps even elimination. It is in this context that we see them adding fuel to the fire. We believe that when they reach the point where all hope is gone, they will come to themselves and stop their mischief. Of course at that time we will still deal with them with tolerance and magnanimity, but we believe it is better if they stop doing these things, because it is possible that the avenue of return could be blocked. They should therefore leave the avenue of return open. In any case, we want security, welfare, and peace for this Islamic region.

Likewise, we want independence and respect for Islam, as well as good treatment of the Muslim nations of the area, and the provision of higher thought for them. At that time we will be able to live peacefully with them. On the one hand, with the previous experience they have had with our behavior, they have confidence in us, because they know that if we wanted to hurt them we would do so without a second thought, but they know we have not done so, and we hope not to lose our composure in the future.

[Question] You personally have a special and historic relationship with the issue of Palestine and the Palestinians. Is it true that this special relationship is the reason for the Islamic government's continued relationship with the PLO, despite the many disagreements that exist, and why doesn't Iran negotiate with the leadership of this organization in order to resolve these differences and establish lines of cooperation in the interest of Palestine?

[Answer] Concerning the issue of Palestine and the PLO, I want to say that yes, the issue of Palestine has had a special importance for me personally since I went into the areas of politics and struggle. It even became a focal point for struggle. I still take such a position, when the presence of Israel is a very dangerous matter in the area. As long as Palestine is occupied and is in this condition, clearly it will remain in a state of weakened identity and the feeling of incompleteness will remain. It is the natural and definite right of the Palestinians to remain in their own land. Those who wish to live with this nation must get permission from the Palestinians and obtain their satisfaction in order to be able to continue living this way. This can be done if the Palestinian nation agrees to it. On the other hand, I believe that the Palestine Liberation Organization formerly had a prominent role in the struggle and that it played a good historical part in the region's struggle which cannot be overlooked or ignored. Their struggle, which began more than 15 years ago, and their active presence on the scene is a lesson which has always been an inspiration to the struggles of the region. There are still many excellent cadres in the ranks of this organization. I am not in favor of a purge of this organization, but I see it as a necessity that efforts be made to stop its current deviation. I believe there is a basic mistake which appeared in the last two or three years among Palestinian officials, and that is that they despaired due to superficial calculations concerning the idea of obtaining their rights through war and serious armed struggle, and began betting on a path of compromise. They imagine that their rights, or some of them, can be obtained through some of the Arab countries. Evidently these leaders are unaware of what can be expected of the people they are betting on, because a simple superficial assessment gives the conclusion that this bet will bring no result. In any case, it is evident that these leaders—just as a high Algerian official said—are saying that we have been through five wars without gaining our rights, so let's try opening the "door" to peace. That is, they have tried to gain their rights five times with wars, in addition to their long struggle, and today they want an opportunity to try the "door" of peace and compromise. Naturally, this is a very dangerous conclusion, because what a price it will be to pay for these steps, when they lose all the gains of five wars and even all the gains of the struggles and uprisings of martyrs. This is a very great danger, because it amounts to a declaration of defeat for the entire past.

As for the question of why we don't take steps to return them to the right road, we must say first that we are making such efforts. One problem we have, however, is that we are involved in a war, and these people especially have not remained neutral in this matter. Most of them are going to Iraq with expressions of friendship. Mr Arafat and his friends have actually been coming and going in Iran since the beginning of the war, while most of their support has benefitted the Ba'th Party. They called for a cease fire at the beginning. It is clear how dangerous such a proposal was for us when Iraq was still on our soil. Their proposals after that, which we think were essentially aimed at getting the Ba'th Party out of a tight spot, continued in the same vein and were repeated, and their remarks must be added to this discussion.

In general you can see that they are compromising behind the lines, and even now they are rotating between Iraq, Jordan, and Egypt, with abundant collaboration now being done in those circles. It is therefore not an easy thing for us to correct things with them from our side. It is actually they who need to reform. They must completely change their positions. They must leave these circles, adopt an uncompromising position on the Palestine issue, cut their relations with reactionary Arabs, and cooperate with the steadfast Arab countries more than other countries. Of

course we are not saying that they must become enemies with the majority of the Arab world, which is now pursuing a path of compromise, and cut off their relations with them, but we think these countries are obligated to help them. Today none of these Arab governments have the courage to boycott Palestine, and all of them are obligated to help Palestine in some way. It would be appropriate, however, if the PLO's relations with the steadfastness front were sincerer and warmer, and they must also adopt a specific position concerning the question of the Iran-Iraq war which is similar to the one held by Libya and Syria. Otherwise, the situation will be difficult. The question of war is a primary one for us. We cannot accept it if someone aligns himself with Saddam in this war while we have a friendly position with them elsewhere. Such a situation is very difficult. This has been discussed with them, and we have heard some of their analyses and interpretations, but we still don't have confidence in what they say about the road they have taken; in the event that they are really serious and have actually taken this road, for our part we are fully prepared to reach an understanding with them and to turn a new page. In any case we wish no ill on those PLO leaders with track records of struggle known to us. We simply believe that they have chosen the wrong path. I personally do not think their intentions are treasonous. I think they have taken a path that is wrong as the result of great pressure and suffering, and they think that by talking and receiving official recognition from America they will be able to resolve the Palestine issue. We say that if they really accept their former positions and analyses to the effect that America considers Israel its dependent state and that America's vital interests have to do with Israel's existence, then we cannot believe that Reagan or Kissinger's smile can so easily resolve the Palestine issue. Such a compromise would absolutely benefit the Americans more than the Palestinians. Just as we saw with Egypt's position five or six years ago, what did Egypt gain except a few bits of residue as so-called American aid? Where are Egypt's interests? Of what use has it been, and what problems have been solved by this aid?

In the end Egypt will be obliged to extricate itself (from this situation). The Egyptian nation will arise one day and carry out its serious role of struggle against America and Israel. This aid and other chains and shackles they have thrown around the necks of the Egyptians, as well as this dependence will weaken Egypt in the broad confrontation. We therefore say that Egypt has been hurt in general by deviating from its path and changing its course. The Egyptian nation will not always accept this situation, and the Arab and Muslim world will soon join hands with Egypt to decisively resolve the Palestine question, of course with a slight delay due to the damage done to the current course of the Palestine question as the result of this deviation.

[Question] It is said that your position as Majlis Speaker will play a special role in the economy and the future of the country's economic system. Everyone is asking, however, where this issue stands, whether with respect to the Majlis or with respect to establishing it in society, and where other disputed issues now stand, such as issues of foreign trade and land.

[Answer] I must say first of all that concerning my special role it is not as you say. My role is not without effect, but neither is it the deciding role, because the Majlis, the Council of Guardians, the government, the presidency, and other important centers such as the Supreme Judicial Council and others can all work together. Even now we have begun to reconstruct the economy and we have taken effective steps with positive results in this. Clearly, however, we have not achieved all of our aims. There are various viewpoints among the Muslim clergymen of our country concerning the economy, and this slows our work somewhat. If we consider the open and free atmosphere prevailing over the system of religious sciences, we see that despite the natural environment and the lack of restrictions on such studies, various viewpoints clearly do emerge, and, in view of our religiously lawful obligations, we must accept the situation, but ultimately these differences of opinion will be resolved one day and there is a way to do so. For example, the Council of Guardians has the right, concerning basic economic issues, to issue vetoes. With regard

to the bills you asked about, as you can see yourself the Majlis has enacted them and they have remained before the Council of Guardians until now. Such disagreements exist throughout the world and in all governments. Clearly, such differences will also arise among us, despite our various religious authorities and our understanding of Islam.

In general it must be said that throughout the history of the Muslim world, wherever there have been religious authorities, there have also been differences of this type, and it has been possible to untangle them with some adjustment despite the slowness of the process, but the solution needs deliberation and depth. Ultimately, through the use of experience, discussion, and the exchange of views, these affairs will reach a desirable conclusion. Since there is good will among the responsible clergymen of the Islamic republic, and since differences of opinion are certainly not the result of bad intentions, one can be hopeful that these affairs will improve in the future. For example, matters such as foreign trade, land, and other such issues need discussion, study, and a bit of experience, since the issues are partially "subject matter" rather than law. We must decide which path to take to achieve the proper objective, and what practical results will be achieved through the adoption of each possible path, because the commandments of Islam and its totality can be studied. Some differences of opinion come from "subject matter," others based on derivations from law. It may be said, however, that our general concern is for achieving and implementing the commandments of Islam, and day by day there will be improvements over the past situation.

[Question] In your view, will the question of the selection of the prime minister be resolved in the course of resolving other disputed issues, and, if not, then how do you analyze the connection between this issue and the severe differences of opinion that exist, whether in the Majlis or in other political centers? Finally, what is your assessment of Mir Hoseyn Musavi's government, and what candidate do you support for the position of prime minister?

[Answer] Praise God, the issue of the selection of the prime minister has been resolved. A decision was taken before the question reached the Majlis, and it is currently being presented to the Majlis (this interview was done before Musavi's government was confirmed by the Majlis). A believe a majority of the Majlis favors confirmation of this selection, especially since the Imam has announced his position. Although the Majlis and the Presidency have been left free by the Imam in the selections, they do not wish to take positions contrary to his, because we have long believed in submission to the Imam, and this submission has always been useful to us. We believe that his views have always been the key to lighting the way and resolving our differences. Concerning Engineer Musavi's government, we have said in the past that his government, in the conditions we have had, has been a good and successful one. Especially if we take the war into consideration and the positions of the enemies of Islam against us, it may be said that the government's work has been good and acceptable. The government has made great efforts in the face of difficulties, and no one can say that if so-and-so had been president or if such-and-such a plan had been implemented the situation would be any better now. This may or may not be true. In any case, in view of what has been and what we have been able to do we are satisfied, and our general assessment is good. Under current circumstances I know of no one other than Mir Hoseyn Musavi with the appropriate qualifications. Current social conditions do not permit a change of prime ministers, because we are at war, and a change in government would inevitably have an effect on us in a period of transition, perhaps even creating problems for us, and such a thing is not permissible at this point. The powers of the current prime minister and his administrative and executive government are clear to us, and its virtue is its awareness and mastery of the country's various problems. Concerning others, however, whose names have been or will be put forward, although we do not have a bad opinion of them, in the end they must be tested, and since we are at war and are in a period when there are many plots afoot against us, to which I referred

in my answer to the first question, the issue is clear. Now is therefore not a time for testing and experimentation. The Imam's view that it is not advisable to change the government now is perfect logic, and I have no other thought.

[Question] Today's world has seen many changes with regard to the existing equations in the Arab and Islamic region including Iran, and it appears that countries such as the Soviet Union, Western Europe in general, and finally France will change their positions concerning you. What, in your view, has prompted this change of position, where have these changes gone in practice, and what effects will they have on the area's future equations?

[Answer] You are saying that it is likely that the large countries will revise their positions concerning the Islamic republic. I say that there are references to this, but it is still too early to judge. Based on their superficial comments, it can be said that they have concluded that their former assessments were wrong, because until recently they thought that the Islamic republic would not be able to endure with its current government, and that it would fall in the face of society's economic, military, and cultural difficulties. They were preparing to install a successor government of their own choosing, and naturally to this end they tried to bring down the reigning government as quickly as possible. For this task each of them had its own methods and tools, but the brave and powerful struggle our nation put up against the world must have persuaded them, or at least given them doubts, that their former equations were wrong. I consider it more likely that they are in a state of doubt and hesitation concerning their former assessments and conclusions, and naturally the reason for such a point of view is the failure to understand Islamic society, Islamic power, and the power of this republic. Moreover, since they are unable to assess the extent of the influence of Islam, their equations have always come out wrong. On the other hand, when the Islamic revolution gained strength, they lost their tools, their spies, and their lackeys within the country, and their organization was destroyed. This is why they lost the ability to make precise assessments and think correctly. It is on this basis that we now say they are at least in a state of doubt and hesitation concerning what they are doing. If we were to say, however, that they have gained a new perception, or that they have reached a new conclusion, we would then act more seriously. It has not yet become clear to me, however, that they have reached new conclusions, or that they want to resign themselves to current conditions. To whatever extent it can be said that, in view of the doubt and hesitation they have concerning their former assessments, they have begun to open a new way for the future, it is my view that the sooner they perceive these things the more will be the damage done to the world and the area. When they realize the truth and understand that the Islamic republic is a stable force and that they must view Islam as a force in the world, then the current division of the world into two poles will end and the world will open accounts for a third power, because this power will be different and distinct from some uncommitted faction or other, which has no guarantee of survival, has always been threatened by the great powers, and has failed to fulfill its role. This third faction, which has risen independently with popular Islamic force, relies on an Islamic world view, and revolves around the Islamic republic, is at work in this world today with full force. It is natural that this matter has become very costly burden for both the superpowers of East and West, because they see before them a real, combative, and stable force, and this new force has called their legality into question. The world views these superpowers with enmity, for they are lacking any kind of proper world view. The superpowers have tasted this power, and they may have no choice but to submit to reality, but in any case their withdrawal will not be so easy.

I believe that we must be prepared to protect ourselves for a long time, and even if we take firmer steps, there will be a new period before us, and we will create positions using our world view.

[Question] For the final question I will ask you for your views on conditions in Lebanon. What do you see for the future there, and what is your view concerning the constant conflicts between the leftist and nationalist parties on the one hand, and the Islamic forces and events on the other?

[Answer] I am somewhat worried about Lebanon, because it suffers with many difficulties. It is because of the hopes the superpowers have for this country that they will not give it up easily, and secondly, it is because of its proximity to Israel that it has always been a dangerous place. Third, it is due to the existence of numerous party groups within Lebanon that these groups have numerous world views, procedures, affiliations, and various and conflicting relationships with one another, especially since most of these groups have paramilitary forces and pursue their own interests and those of their allies. The Lebanese question is a complex one, and it is natural that it be a complex question for the Lebanese themselves, for the world, for the superpowers, and for Israel. In general Lebanon has become an arena for fighting among the world's various powers, which carries suffering on its shoulders, and due to the lack of security and the long-term war, one cannot hope for the establishment of peace and the general improvement of conditions there. On the other hand, there is also a positive point in which hope can be placed, and this is the Muslim majority in Lebanon, which has now become aware and politically knowledgeable. This bright spot contains the good news that if the majority of the existing factions realize that they must rule, they will then have good security, because government will go to the majority, that is to the Muslim nation that is striving to establish an aware Lebanon, which contains in it the beginnings of a free Lebanon. At that time one can expect a new life for the people in that country.

In my view, there is no way to save Lebanon except by relying on the majority, because a return to the former divisions with posts divided among Christians, Sunnis, and Shi'ites is not acceptable now. One cannot return to it. It is not beneficial, the people do not accept it, and it cannot be implemented. The Christians, who formerly held the reigns of government, are now a minority. It is natural that since they once held power, they will not now submit easily to a Muslim government. This is one of the factors for the continued crisis in Lebanon. The leftists in Lebanon can act in concert with the Muslims, and this goes back to the slogans they usually use, because Islam came to protect the deprived, and this Islamic characteristic must be applied, especially in Lebanon. If the Muslims of that organization give priority to this characteristic, which defends the tormented and the deprived, and prevent the deviation which portrays Islam as the defender and spokesman for capitalism, the weapon of the leftists will be automatically taken away from them, they will be left empty-handed, and the slogans they chant among the people will be empty and ineffective. As for those who look to Marxism as a world view, or those who prefer political affiliation, they will not completely disappear from Lebanon, and for a nation that wants justice, the Muslims will procure that justice. Therefore it may be said that the possibility exists for a joint line coming into existence between Muslims and those who chant leftist slogans in Lebanon, and this is precisely what happened in Iran. Leftist parties have no effect today in Iran, and a nation that was once deluded by the lying slogans of leftists and followed them, has today concluded that it can attain those vital goals by clinging to Islam and preserving religion and the hereafter. This is how those parties were eliminated, and this is practical in Lebanon as well. What is left is the difficulty of living with Christians, and those are matters whose interests are related to the outside world. This problem will remain, but if a strong popular government is established in Lebanon, and is protected by progressive, advancing, and independent forces, the problem of Lebanon—however difficult—will be solved.

9310

CSO: 4640/108

IRAN

OPPOSITION PAPER COMMENTS ON SOVIET-GULF RELATIONS

GF221144 London KEYHAN in Persian 12 Dec 85 p 4

/Excerpts/ It is no wonder that the UAE established diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union on 14 November; about 7 weeks earlier everybody was surprised when Oman, the staunch anticommunist regime in the region, announced that, after a lapse of 15 years, it was ready to normalize its relations with the Soviet Union. The UAE had been willing for a long time to establish relations with the Soviet Union but was afraid this might upset the Saudi regime. Previously, only Kuwait among the Persian Gulf emirates had established relations with the Soviet Union, and this was despite Saudi displeasure. This bold political decision by the UAE does not bother the capitalist elements. Dubai commercial circles are happy to see any relationship which may be good for trade, especially at a time when they are suffering from economic stagnancy. However, in comparison to the decision by the UAE, the announcement by Oman, after 2 years of quiet talks under the patronage of the United Nations, surprised everybody; even the United States, which considered this country the most reliable ally in the Persian Gulf, had not received any prior information about this move. The Americans were not happy over their talks relating to the renewal of the 1980 treaty with Oman. They wanted service facilities for their warships in the Indian Ocean and the right to maintain bases for their RDF in exchange for military and economic aid to Oman. But the Omanis gave a negative response, with only some very routine changes being made to the 1980 treaty.

For the present, the Soviet Union will not open an embassy in Muscat, but in any case the obstacle in this respect has been removed. Bahrain will take steps soon to set up diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, followed by Saudi Arabia and Qatar. But when? Most of the Persian Gulf countries see the Soviets bogged down in a quagmire in Afghanistan and, therefore, they do not fear Soviet influence in the Persian Gulf for the next 10 years.

/12228
CSO: 4640/126

IRAN

EXERCISES ORGANIZED TO COPE WITH 'COUP, PUBLIC RIOTS'

London KEYHAN in Persian 12 Dec 85 p 2

[London KEYHAN weekly in Persian; founder and publisher Dr Mesbahzadeh]

[Text] Tehran--KEYHAN Political Service--More than 30,000 revolutionary guardsmen and komite members, along with 15,000 mobilization security forces, carried out a series of military exercises in 34 major cities and provincial centers--including Tehran--in the project to cope with a military coup d'etat or public uprising.

These exercises were carried out on the fifth day of Mobilization Week at the beginning of last week.

According to reports received from Tehran, in the exercises to cope with extraordinary situations, which were planned by North Korean military experts some time ago under the code name Khandaq, none of Iran's military or police forces failed to participate, and Seyyed 'Ali Khamene'i, President of the Republic, personally witnessed part of the these exercises in Tehran. The mosques in Tehran and the municipalities, as guidance centers for these operations, were responsible for the task of dividing ammunition and responsibilities among mobilization and revolutionary guard personnel.

The exercises began at 8 a.m. and continued until midnight.

The most important part of the revolutionary guard and mobilization training exercises was carried out in Tehran. Mohammad Sham'khani, acting commander of the revolutionary guard, directed the operations personally.

At 8 a.m., after the order to begin the operations was given by Seyyed 'Ali Khamene'i--who supervised the exercises from the Baghshah Base command post--when ammunition was at the radio and television stations, telephone centers, the water and electric

power stations, Tehran Silos, the Majlis, the police magistrates, the komites, the railroads, and Tehran airport--the operations were begun by the strike units.

Since these operations had not been previously announced, the coming and going of hundreds of armored and motorized vehicles and the passing of revolutionary guardsmen on motorcycles in full battle dress through the streets frightened many Tehran residents.

In explaining these operations, the ISLAMIC REPUBLIC NEWS AGENCY announced that the forces participating in these exercises had been divided into motorized units, ambulance units, fire-fighting units, and strike units, and each unit was able to fulfill its responsibility immediately after the operations began without delay.

Revolutionary guard units conducted war games from bunker to bunker in the streets, some of them acting as insurgents and others as defenders. It is interesting that in the course of the Khandaq exercises, personnel and units were selected who would not have any kind of affiliation with the area to which they were deployed.

Thus, for example for the first plan, which included the occupation of sensitive urban areas and the installation of weapons, Azarbaijani units were deployed in Mashhad and Tehran, while units from Khorasan were deployed in Tabriz and Sanandaj. The second phase of the exercises, which the regime claimed was to cope with a possible assault on the capital by a foreign enemy, was carried out only in Tehran. In this part of the exercises revolutionary guardsmen and mobilization personnel closed all roads and streets leading to the capital and took up defensive positions before government buildings, installing sand bag bunkers and anti-aircraft artillery.

Some units, acting as commandos, were given the task of penetrating imaginary enemy lines and striking at enemy forces.

Informed sources in Tehran said that the show of revolutionary guard and mobilization force in the Khandaq exercises was mainly carried out because in the last two weeks, since the selection of Montazeri as Khomeyni's successor, the many rumors have intensified of an impending revolutionary guard coup d'etat against one of the wings in power--Khamene'i's--in the event of Khomeyni's death. Khamene'i's presence at these exercises has been interpreted as a show of presidential power against the Rafsanjani wing.

Although Western military sources consider a military coup d'etat in Iran a remote possibility at present, diplomats in Tehran say that the Islamic Republic is very frightened of a public uprising and street demonstrations, and by baring its fangs on the fifth day of Mobilization Week, it was trying to forestall such an uprising.

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CSO: 4640/103

IRAN

RELATIONS WITH FRANCE SAID TO BE DETERIORATING

London KEYHAN in Persian 12 Dec 85 p 16

[London KEYHAN weekly in Persian; founder and publisher Dr Mesbahzadeh]

[Text] Although Majlis speaker 'Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani announced last week that a French parliamentary delegation headed by Jean Marie Daier will come to Tehran next week, Mir Hoseyn Musavi said at the conclusion of a meeting of the Council of Ministers that the Islamic republic had not invited this group and that it will not receive them.

According to informed sources in Paris, the French delegation had planned to discuss Iranian-French relations, the possibility of a French agreement to sell Krutal rockets to the the Islamic republic, and the future of the Ayatollah's opponents in this country, with officials of the Islamic republic. According to statements from these sources a group of French officials, including Minister of External Relations Roland Dumas, believe that France's relations with Iran must be revised in some form, and that the Iranian market must be somehow regained.

The Kuwaiti newspaper AL-QABAS reported in its 5 December issue that in order to show its good will, Paris, concerning the activities of the Ayatollah's opponents in France in the last two or three months, has promised many restrictions on Mas'ud Rajavi and the Mojahedin. This newspaper, quoting French sources, wrote that one month ago Mas'ud Rajavi asked the French government to allow him to convert a large building in Paris purchased by Mojahedin supporters to a residential center for those with asylum who are affiliated with this organization. This request was concurrent with the receipt of complaints to the French government from the Islamic republic concerning a packet bomb sent from Paris to Hojjat ol-Eslam Khosrowshahi, the Islamic republic's ambassador to the Vatican. The Islamic republic claimed that this bomb was sent to Rome by the Mojahedin.

To this point it appears that circumstances are favorable for a trip by the French delegation to Tehran, but French sources say that the publication of news on the matters the French delegation intends to discuss with officials of the Islamic Republic spoiled things.

It became apparent that the French officials intended to discuss with Islamic republic officials the four French hostages which were taken by supporters of the Islamic republic in Lebanon. This implies that France officially holds the Islamic republic responsible for the hostage-taking. Ayatollah Khomeyni's regime, which was, in the words of Ayatollah Khomeyni, "deceived" on a similar occasion last week, was not interested in discussing hostages.

Two weeks ago, when Terry Waite, the Anglican Archbishop's representative, began his mission to free four American hostages, Kuwaiti officials apparently looked favorably upon the terrorist demand to free 17 al-Da'wa party prisoners in Kuwait.

Kuwait's aim was to establish the Islamic republic's responsibility in both the Lebanon hostage-taking and the "bombings and sabotage" in Kuwait.

The Islamic republic was not aware of this intention. For this reason Terry Waite visited the Hezbollah leaders holding the hostages through the Charge d'Affaires of the Embassy of the Islamic republic, and with thanks to Mahmud Nurani, the Islamic republic's Charge d'Affaires in Beirut, he went to Paris and Washington to talk with American and Kuwaiti officials.

At this point Kuwait announced that it was not ready to release the imprisoned terrorists.

Initially Mrs Kaufmann, wife of Jean Paul Kaufmann, the French newspaper reporter taken hostage, sent a letter to Ayatollah Khomeyni asking him to use his influence to free her husband. In an interview with Paris radio, Mrs Kaufmann announced that the Iranian Charge d'Affaires promised her in a meeting they had that the Islamic republic would help free her husband.

French sources said that several days after the publication of Mrs Kaufmann's remarks, Hoseyn Mo'iri, Charge d'Affaires at the embassy of the Islamic republic, who had, in his meeting with Mrs Kaufmann, unofficially acknowledged the Islamic republic's responsibility in the fate of the hostages, was recalled to Tehran.

At the end of last week, Jean Marie Daier, French parliamentary representative of the VDF party, whose leader is former president Giscard d'Estaing, announced that he is awaiting a final answer from Tehran concerning the visit.

Daier is the supervisor of the Aulurus Institute. This institute invests in various countries, and Mr Daier was planning to discuss the possibility of investment in the Islamic republic during his trip to Tehran, accompanied by Lavique Buvar, Francine Geng, and Emanuel Hamel, all representatives of right-wing parties. He expressed the hope that the Islamic republic would ultimately allow him to visit Tehran.

9310

CSO: 4640/105

IRAN

DUBAYY BLASTED FOR EXTRADITION OF PILOTS SEEKING ASYLUM

London KEYHAN in Persian 12 Dec 85 p 6

[London KEYHAN weekly in Persian; founder and publisher Dr Mesbahzadeh]

[Text] Last Wednesday the Sheykhdum of Dubayy extradited two Iranian pilots in handcuffs, who had sought refuge in that country, to the Islamic republic.

One day later the newspapers of the United Arab Emirates, of which Dubayy is a member, announced that the pilots were executed by the revolutionary guards of the Islamic Republic. Whether the news of the execution of these pilots is correct, or whether they were imprisoned, is irrelevant to this incident, which was a betrayal of the most elementary humanitarian principles. This is especially true if we recall that this Sheikhdum on two other occasions turned over a number of Iran's best naval and air force officers to Tehran. If there is doubt and hesitation today concerning the news of the execution of the two pilots, for the previous incidents the names and the news of the execution of nine naval and air force officers have been published several times.

In a statement published on the extradition of the two Iranian pilots, the crown prince of Dubayy claimed that the measure was taken solely to prevent air piracy in the future. In a political statement expressing its appreciation for Dubayy's action, the Islamic republic said: In doing this, the Emirate of Dubayy has shown respect for international laws and regulations, and has not submitted to the blackmail of air terrorists.

Of course, in the first place it is important to study the claims of Dubayy and the Islamic republic concerning the acts of the Iranian pilots. Were two pilots--who were responsible for piloting the aircraft--actually air pirates? Did they change the course of a non-military flight with the force of arms? Did they endanger anyone's life or make illegal demands of the Dubayy officials? All the two Iranian pilots asked of an Emirate which

owes its existence to the former Iranian regime was temporary asylum so that they could obtain authorization to go elsewhere in the world and save themselves from Khomeyni's prison.

These two pilots did not want to go to Dubayy. Dubayy is no paradise, and the petrodollars of the oil sheikhs held no appeal for the Iranian pilots.

There is no doubt that distress and desperation drove the two Iranian pilots to face hundreds of mortal dangers and fly to that end of the Gulf, thinking that the inhabitants of that land had retained their humanitarian ethics and spirit of hospitality, and that they still adhered to the customs of their forefathers--who even generously received their enemies when they sought shelter in their tents. They flew to an Emirate whose ruler has received security from Iran for years, and, thanks to the Iranian army's protection of security in the Persian Gulf, has been able to stand against his competitors in the United Arab Emirates and to gain the position of deputy to the supreme leader, Sheikh Zayid.

The two Iranian pilots had evidently forgotten that since the beginning of the revolution when the Emirate of Dubayy was host to Ayatollah Khalkhali and when their religious magistrate called Ayatollah Khomeyni "Imam Khalkhali," it has lost its head over the Islamic Republic, and to please the Ayatollah the oil sheikhs of this Emirate are even prepared to stoop to brokering arms to the Islamic republic.

The two Iranian pilots naively thought that Dubayy would not bite the hand that has fed it, although on the day after Khomeyni came to power, a letter of congratulations from the Sheikh of Dubayy--calling Khomeini the leader of Muslims--gave sufficient evidence of Dubayy's ingratitude.

In doing this, in addition to disregarding the most basic humanitarian principles, Dubayy has shown its submission to the Ayatollah, perhaps hoping to gain immunity from the sting of an Islamic revolution in the future. Yet the Ayatollah has demonstrated that such tribute will not cause him to abandon his far-reaching ideas. Such behavior can only undermine the credibility of this sheikhdom because of its unstable authority.

On the other hand, we must note that while the Islamic republic praised Dubayy's measure as one demonstrating respect for international law, it must not be imagined that the Dubayy government actually did this to observe international laws and regulations.

When has the Islamic republic respected these laws, that it now expects their observance from others?

At a time when all the area's illegal and destructive acts have their roots in Jamaran, talk of international law is heard only in the republic of ayatollahs and possibly the Emirate of Dubayy.

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CSO: 4640/104

IRAN

BRIEFS

RESIDENT IRAQIS CALLED TO FRONTS--Tehran--The Islamic Republic regime has asked all Iraqi residents in Iran to prepare to proceed to the battlefronts. In a notice published by the Islamic Republic, it was stressed that all Iraqi residents of Iran should report to the Islamic Republic authorities or to the Supreme Council of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq during 12-21 December. According to informed sources, those Iraqis who refuse to go to the battlefronts will be expelled from Iran. /Text/ /London KEYHAN in Persian 19 Dec 85 GF/ 12228

CSO: 4640/126

PAKISTAN

U.S. AID PROSPECTS, SECURITY CONCERNS VIEWED

Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 10 & 11 Dec 85

[Articles by Jamal Rasheed: "New American Aid Package -- 'Part I: Facing up to Congress'; and 'Part II: Conditions for U.S. Aid'"]

[10 Dec 85 p 4]

[Text] In October, Finance Minister Dr Mahbubul Haq formally announced, what in Islamabad's diplomatic circles was already well known for six months, that Pakistan would seek a further extension of the 1981, \$3.2 billion five year aid package from the US, that expires next year. Pakistan is now requesting \$6.5 billion spread over the next five years, out of which half is to be earmarked for military aid. This request is expected to face opposition in Congress as well as create numerous security problems for Pakistan because of the conditions Washington would like to impose on the present regime.

Congress is expected to be initially hostile to the request, because of the lack of trust in Pakistani assurance regarding it's nuclear programme. Reliable diplomatic sources in Islamabad and experts in Washington told this correspondent that the Pakistanis face four strong lobbies.

Pro-Israeli Lobby

The pro-Israeli lobby in Congress is expected to oppose the package, but eventually agree to a year by year aid grant which will be dependent on Islamabad's "good behaviour" regarding it's nuclear programme. In a possible trade-off with pro-Israeli Congressmen, the Reagan Administration will most likely agree to hold firm on the present suspension of any sales of sophisticated weaponry for Jordan. The pro-Israeli lobby will also fight hard for increased aid to Israel.

The pro-Indian lobby, which has grown substantially in recent months, will also be antagonistic, especially with the fear that Washington will be supplying sophisticated spy-in-the-sky aircraft to the Pakistani military. The US is, at present, holding up an Indian request for \$800 million worth of high technology, which includes three computer systems necessary for rocketry and nuclear programmes.

Reliable sources in Washington said that this lobby would tone down their opposition, if the US was to license them at least one of these computer systems.

A group of right wing Congressmen are expected to "raise hell on the corruption within the CIA, the Afghan Mujahideen and the Pakistani administration regarding the CIA's supply of \$250 million worth of arms and money to the Afghan resistance", a highly informed source told this correspondent from Washington. "They will be demanding a much closer involvement by the CIA on future aid to the Afghans. "At the beginning of the year when the Afghan aid package was under debate, prominent Congressmen said that upto 50% of aid so far given to the Afghans had disappeared. This lobby will also be demanding a more prominent role for the CIA in being allowed to directly distribute arms and money to the Mujahideen.

Finally, Pakistan will face the protests of powerful human rights groups during Congressional hearings. The New York based "International lawyers Committee for Human Rights", is updating it's earlier, highly critical report of human rights abuses in Pakistan for a presentation to Congress. Amnesty International, which has condemned the continuing violations of human rights in three separate reports during the past 18 months is also expected to protest further aid until the human rights situation improves. Also a group of concerned Pakistani scholars, journalists and professionals based in the US are expected to campaign vigorously in and out of Congress against increased US aid until the rule of law and full participatory democracy are restored.

Effective Way

Well placed sources in Washington and diplomats in Islamabad predict that Washington will actually offer around \$5 billion over five years but there will be no formal treaty, because of the US Congress opposition to multi-year aid commitments. Instead Washington will give a private undertaking to Islamabad that aid will be disbursed, but Pakistan will have to make its pitch for aid every year. Experts in Washington concur that this will also be the most effective way, for Congress to have some measure of control over Pakistan's foreign and domestic policy as well as ensure Pakistan's help in the US "strategic consensus" for the region. "If Pakistan has to come to Washington every year for it's package", said one academic in Washington, "then Congress will make sure that it's past year's record is in line with US policy for the region."

However, government officials in Islamabad point out that Pakistan needs, not only economic and military aid, but even more important are firmer guarantees from Washington that it will come to Pakistan's help if it's security is threatened. Officials say that Pakistan faces potentially hostile powers along most of it's borders. Relations with India, Afghanistan and the Soviet Union are at a low ebb, while the situation in Iran is still unstable. The US has consistently shied away from giving such commitments to Pakistan, even at such high crises points as the Bangladesh war in 1971.

In fact Washington is now in a much stronger position to squeeze Pakistan, than it was in 1981 when the \$3.2 billion package was hastily put together because of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Diplomats in Islamabad told this correspondent "that President Zia is no longer the leader who could dismiss President Carter's offer of \$300 million aid in 1980 as peanuts". A diplomatic source said that the reasons for Pakistan's weakness vis a vis the US are plentiful. "Both President Zia and US diplomats have stated that the Soviets do not pose a threat to Pakistan's sovereignty, so there is no fear as there was in 1981, of the Soviet wanting to dismember Pakistan. "It appears that the recent Geneva Summit has endorsed this view. Washington's need for a conduit that will give it access to the Afghan border regions to arm the Mujahideen, is no longer in any doubt as it was in 1981. A number of US newspapers and magazines have reported on fact that the CIA is now directly supplying the Mujahideen with the more sophisticated weaponry it needs like ground to air missiles. Finally continuing political and social instability in Pakistan and tense relations with it's neighbours, makes the regime dependent on Washington's good will. President Zia's experimentation with a controlled form of democracy, and the continuing crisis of legitimacy for the regime makes Pakistan especially vulnerable at present. Washington is therefore in a position to extract further conditions from Islamabad before it agrees to a new Aid Package. The intense but secret dialogue between the Reagan Administration and Islamabad regarding the terms and conditions for future aid have been going on for nearly a year.

[11 Dec 85 p 47]

[Text] The intense but secret dialogue between the Reagan Administration and Islamabad regarding Pakistan's request for a new aid package of \$6.5 billion has been continuing for nearly a year. Highly placed diplomatic, academic and official sources in Washington, London and Islamabad point out that any future aid commitment by Washington, especially if it is dependent on a yearly assessment of Pakistan's performance from Congress, will depend on the following factors.

Pakistan must desist from testing a nuclear weapon, although Washington is not averse to Pakistan continuing it's nuclear programme. Diplomatic sources say that US officials have strongly told Islamabad that there is no way they can pass an aid package through Congress if Pakistani businessmen continue being arrested for buying nuclear weapons technology in Europe.

Islamabad must continue to improve its relations with India, so that US support for Pakistan does not compromise Washington's new friendly relations with New Delhi. Washington will be much more cautious on what arms it sells to the Pakistani military. It is now highly unlikely that Washington will agree to sell Pakistan sophisticated spy-in-sky radar aircraft because of the adverse impact such a sale would have on Indo-US relations.

That Pakistan should play an even larger role in the US Central Command in the Gulf. (The Central Command, CENTCOM is the new command structure for the former Rapid Deployment Force, which is based in Oman and the island of Diego Garcia. Some 25 US naval ships are present in the Gulf.) The US is pushing hard for a commitment, as recently made by Saudi Arabia and the Gulf would come under the orders of CENTCOM. At present Pakistan is reported to have troops and advisers in 22 countries, largely in the Gulf and East Africa. Moreover it was reported during US Congressional hearings this summer that American P-3 anti-submarine aircraft had been regularly refueling at a Pakistan air force base near Karachi. The US would according to diplomats, clearly like to see more co-operation of this nature. In July Vice Chief of Army Staff, General K.M. Arif payed a week long visit to CENTCOM headquarters in Florida. Admiral Tariq Kamal Khan, Chief of the Naval Staff is at present on a 10 day US trip in which he will visit US naval installations.

Officials in Islamabad point out that it would be extremely difficult for Pakistan to make any official commitments to CENTCOM but they do not rule out the possibility of close co-operation with it.

Lastly the US supports and would like to see an enhancement of, President Zia's slow programme of gradual democratisation, as long as the country's foreign policy is not altered. The Reagan Administration is apprehensive about the demand by some component parties of the MRD for direct talks with Kabul for a settlement on Afghanistan. In the summer the US Ambassador created a storm of criticism, when he publicly said he was "baffled by the thought processes of those opposition MRD leaders who demand direct negotiations with the Karmal regime". However, Washington has scored some success with the Peoples Party. During Benazir Bhutto's visit to Washington earlier this year she assured Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of State, Howard Schaffear, that any future Peoples Party government would fulfill all foreign policy pledges to Washington made by President Zia.

Such terms and conditions which are presently being negotiated between Pakistan and the US, make the future aid package both extremely complicated and controversial. The present regime has already categorically stated that it will not allow US bases on Pakistani territory. However experts in Washington concur that Pakistan may have to concede far more than it did in 1981, because of the regime's present vulnerability at home and on the issue of it's nuclear programme. Moreover Washington's expanding ties with India means that it now holds an ever ready card to play if Pakistan acts tough.

Privately some officials in Islamabad express the fear that the new aid package, once secured, will considerably enhance Washington's military role in the region and thus allow it to depend more and more on militaristic solutions to problems in the Gulf and Afghanistan, rather than encourage diplomacy. They point out that part of the political cost of such a policy will have to be paid by Pakistan.

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CSO: 4600/155

PAKISTAN

COMMENTARY VIEWS SEMINAR ON SECURITY

Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 14 Dec 85 p 4

[Article by Abbas Rashid: "The View From Lahore: 'Debate on Pakistan's Security'"]

[Text] The Seminar on Pakistan's national security perspectives organised by "The Muslim" generated considerable discussion not so much on the merits of specific policy options as on the broad contours of foreign policy. Indeed, given the nature of the enterprise, it ought not to have been otherwise. For as policymakers as well as those who are concerned with the implications of policy voice their considered opinions on issues ranging from "proximity talks" to the "nuclear option" usually on the basis of a priori assumptions there is a need to keep the trees from obscuring the wood.

Dr Mubashar Hassan basing his presentation on "federal and sovereign" a document recently produced by his Independent Planning Commission duly emphasised the need for a careful and sober reassessment regarding provincial autonomy, status of woman and the primacy of representative institutions -- issues which are seldom seen in this country as being relevant to a serious discourse on security.

Identify of Views

There was an identity of views among the participants regarding the nature of Pakistan US relations. The US was described as an unreliable ally which had betrayed us in the past and whose long term strategic interests, in any case, did not lie in a close relationship with Pakistan. Even as the relationship was experiencing one of its periodic "highs" according to Dr Iqbal, Ahmad an independent US based Pakistani scholar, the United States had been busy cultivating a special relationship with India. The volume of their trade over the last five years he said had gone up from less than a billion dollars in 1979 to approximately five billion dollars in 1985. In the long term he emphasised the US wanted India as well as China to be part of the "triangle of containment" (against the USSR). It was not wise he suggested for Pakistan to make enemies of its powerful neighbours in the hope that the US would come to its assistance during a crisis. The US, he asserted, did not

contemplate doing any such thing. He challenged any US government official present in the audience to a debate on this point. There were no takers. To the surprise of many even Mian Tufail likened US Pakistan relationship over the years to one that usually exists between an owner and tenant. How the Maulana squared this conclusion with a reaffirmation of our role as a conduit for funneling CIA funds to the Afghan Mujahideen while aligning ourselves with the US position against direct negotiations with Kabul was not quite clear but it did appear to be a major departure from the Jamaat's closely held beliefs.

Asghar Khan, leader of the Tehrik-i Israqlal proposed a 20 years moratorium on debt repayment. It makes very little sense he said for us to get a billion dollars loan so that we can use more than half of it to pay back a previous loan. The only way to break this vicious circle he said was to gain time and develop a system whereby Pakistan could pay back its loans through surplus generated locally. The threat to the federation's unity, he said, came mainly from two sources. First, he said government and rulers in Pakistan have, as a rule, misused Islam employing it as an instrument of exploitation. Thus used it has led to divisiveness and disunity. Second, the lack of genuinely representation institutions he said has contributed to the growth of mutual suspicion among people living in different provinces. Centrifugal tendencies were bound to grow under an authoritarian regime, he argued.

Agha Shahi was critical of India's "adversary approach", particularly with regard to the nuclear issue. Rajiv Gandhi he said had not responded reasonably to any number of proposals put forward by Pakistan in this regard.

He warned against negotiating a concessional aid package with the US, currently on the anvil. It would be disastrous he said for Pakistan's autonomy and freedom to manoeuvre, for there was always a quid pro quo involved in such transactions. He strongly contested the assertion that there was a similar quid pro quo underlying the 3.2 billion US Dollar aid package negotiated during his tenure as foreign minister. At the time he said Pakistan had firmly resisted pressure for allowing US bases in Pakistan as well as a strategic alignment against the Soviet Union. He seemed to suggest that the regime may now be buckling under the US pressure on both these counts. It is difficult to believe that no concessions were involved on the part of Pakistan in return for the last aid package negotiated with the US but Mr Shahi certainly has a point inasmuch there seems to be little sense in making a dependency relationship worse than it already is. That there are those in the administration who find nothing wrong with such a relationship was reaffirmed by Dr Mahbubul Haq's gleeful announcement only days after the seminar to the effect that the new concessional aid package had been all but negotiated.

Muslim 'Elan'

Inaugurating the seminar Agha Murtaza Pooya spoke of the nation's "muslim elan" and the grave internal threat to our security arising from the large

and growing section of our population which was illiterate, poor and subject to various forms of deprivation. Dr Eqbal Ahmad among others, took up the theme of mobilised peoples not organised armies being the real agents of security. In the modern times, Dr Eqbal said the people not the armies have defended the integrity of a nation under attack. He gave the examples of Algeria, Vietnam, China and Iran. Equally, however, there was a need to insulate ourselves from being used as pawns by the Super-powers in wars that they initiate and sustain in pursuit of their own interests. This regime he said had lost an historic opportunity for putting Pakistan's security, at least in an external context, on an even keel in 1983 when the Russians were willing to withdraw from Afghanistan on certain conditions. At the time he maintained Pakistan could have struck a hard bargain with the Russians securing not only their withdrawal from Afghanistan but also a guarantee for its neutral status. Instead it had chosen to accept the US carrot and stick package--more aid in return for insecure borders.

He added that an historic opportunity of equal magnitude had been lost by the previous regime when it bypassed the chance to strengthen the institutions of civil society and put politics firmly in command at a time when the armed forces were not prone to be assertive, for a number of reasons.

Apart from the issue of Pakistan's internal cohesion and neutrality vis-a-vis super power machinations the question of Pakistan's nuclear option figured as a major concern in the seminar. A number of speakers stressed the need to develop nuclear energy and to keep the option of making an atom bomb open in view of India's lack of response to initiatives made by Pakistan for declaring South Asia a nuclear free zone, mutual renunciation of the use of nuclear weapons or other such arrangements that would preclude either country from going in for nuclear weapons. When placed in the context of India's attitude on the issue, going in for an atom bomb does not seem to be all that unreasonable. However, apart from being an entirely "reactive" choice, the premium being placed on it would suggest the following:

- (a) Only those countries which have nuclear weapons are really secure.
- (b) That, in the final analysis technology and not people make the difference.
- (c) That the major threat to our policy is not the deprivation of our people but the nuclear policies of neighbouring countries.

There is a need, perhaps, to debate at greater length the issue of Pakistan's nuclear option.

/12851
CSO: 4600/157

28 January 1986

PAKISTAN

STATE BANK ANNUAL REPORT REVIEWS ECONOMY

Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 8 Dec 85 pp 1, 8

[Article by Jawaid Bokhari: "GDP up: Decline in Savings, Exchange Reserves--SBP Report Sees 'Mixed Trends' in Economy"]

[Text] KARACHI, Dec 7--The State Bank of Pakistan has warned that "the country's foreign exchange reserves cannot afford any further reduction and in fact need to be replenished".

In an overall review of the economy for 1984-85 published in its Annual Report and released here today, the State Bank has also emphasized that "urgent need for increasing national savings and reducing our dependence on external borrowing". It noted with concern that debt servicing has become substantial, touching one billion US dollar per annum.

The gross national investment was financed last year by drawing down the country's foreign exchange reserves and greater reliance on external resources.

According to the SBP Report, the economy exhibited "mixed trends" in 1984-1985. There was a sharp rise in Gross Domestic Product, unprecedented increase in agricultural production following previous year's bad harvest, significant rise in real per capita income and improvement in the rate of gross investment.

On the other hand, the performance of the economy was marred by steep decline in national savings, heavy deficit in the budgetary position of the Government, severe pressure on balance of payments position and increased reliance on external borrowings.

The Report points out some "basic weaknesses" of the economy reflected in the large deficit in fiscal operations of the Government, widening gap in balance of payments and social imbalances between investment and savings. It notes that "despite the impressive growth of the economy during the outgoing fiscal year, there has been no improvements in these areas. These problems are inter-related and arise from our efforts to live beyond our means".

Dwelling upon each of the basic constraints on the growth of the national economy, the State Bank Report observed: "If adequate resources cannot be mobilised, Government expenditure, both development and non-development, will have to be curtailed".

The Report says that mobilisation of revenue resources fell short of our total expenditure requirements, including development and defence, with the result that about one third of the expenditure had to be met by external and domestic borrowings last year. Such heavy borrowings results in rapid increase in debt servicing and accentuates fiscal imbalance.

The State Bank called for structural changes in our fiscal policy. Historically, it feels, the basic constraint on fiscal policy has been the extremely low income-elasticity of taxation in Pakistan. The increase in tax revenue has mostly come from new tax measures.

The floatation of Special National Fund Bonds would help widen the tax base by unearthing the black money. So would other fiscal measures announced in the 1985-86 National Budget.

The SBP Report hoped that the National Taxation Reforms Commission will help the Government evolve "a more buoyant taxation system", and added, "evidently hard choices are involved".

The mounting pressure on balance of payments has also been highlighted significantly in the Report. These pressures, which developed in 1983-84, intensified during 1984-85. The current account deficit increased from 997 million US dollar to 1,609 million during the corresponding period owing to a decline in exports of 194 million US dollars and a fall of 375 million in unrequited transfers, largely home remittances.

Despite a larger net inflow of long-term capital, the gold and foreign exchange reserves of the country declined from 2.5 billion US dollars at the end of June 1984 to 1.2 billion at the end of June 1985. The reserves fell owing to heavy current deficit and other external transactions despite a drop of one percent in imports (FOB) over previous year's level. Imports, which accounted for 5.9 billion US dollars in 1984-85, did not go up partly due to increase in domestic production of oil.

Stating that since there was no prospect of an increase in home remittances, the Report suggests that the solution lies in stepping up exports of merchandise. Exports, as a ratio of GDP, declined from 8.9 percent to 7.9 percent despite larger domestic surplus in the domestic economy and better shape of the world economy. What is needed is an indepth analysis of the causes of stagnation of our exports so that a long-range programme for development of exports could be worked out. An all-out effort is also needed for exploration of oil as this is one of the most promising sectors which can substantially compensate for the decline in the workers' remittances from abroad.

Gross national savings fell for the second year in succession.

According to revised estimates, the overall budgetary deficit of the Federal and provincial governments (consolidated) stood at Rs. 38.3 billion, showing an increase of 40.6 percent over the original budget estimates for 1984-85. The deterioration was the combined result of a shortfall in revenue and substantial increase in expenditure, mostly of current nature. Owing to lower tax receipts, revenue declined by 3.7 percent and expenditure increased by 6.7 percent.

Government recourse to borrowing from the banking system amounted to Rs. 18.3 billion against the budget estimates of Rs. 5.8 billion and the actuals of Rs. 7.3 billion for 1983-84.

Increased government borrowing from the banking system caused the domestic credit to expand by Rs. 38.2 billion or 23.9 percent during 1984-85 against an increase of Rs. 20 billion or 14.4 percent in the preceding year. The domestic credit expansion would have been much larger but for a heavy draw down of about Rs. 18.9 billion in foreign exchange.

Thus the foreign exchange reserves bore the brunt of higher budgetary deficit financing and the rate of monetary expansion was maintained at the previous year's level of 11.8 percent. The rate of growth of bank credit to the private sector slowed down from 24.2 percent in the 1983-84 to 17.8 percent in 1984-85. Similarly the rate of increase in bank credit to the public sector enterprises was reduced from 15.1 percent in 1983-84 to 14.1 percent in 1984-85.

According to the State Bank Report, the inflationary pressures were contained during 1984-85. The rise in DGP deflator was lower at 5.7 percent during the year compared with 9.5 percent in 1983-84.

Other positive features of the performance of the national economy were as follows: Gross Domestic Production rose by 8.4 percent in 1984-85 compared to 3.5 percent in the previous year. The gross rate rose primarily due to large rise in agricultural production and steady growth in manufacturing. The overall growth rate of the commodity producing sectors was 8.8 percent, compared to 1.2 percent in the previous year.

The growth rate of real Gross National Product, reflecting the combined position of real GDP and real net factor income from abroad, at 7.3 percent was somewhat smaller than the growth rate of real GDP, due to a sharp decline of 11.5 percent in real net factor income from abroad. The growth in real GNP exceeded the rate of increase in population by a wide margin. As a result, real per capita income increased by 4.1 percent during 1984-85 in contrast to a nominal decline of 0.14 percent in 1983-84.

Value added in the agricultural sector registered a sizeable increase of 9.9 percent in 1984-85 as against a decline of 6.1 percent in 1983-84.

The growth rate of value added in manufacturing sector picked up from 8.1 percent of 8.6 percent. But for the widespread load shedding of electricity and shortages of gas in certain parts of the country, the growth of industrial production would have been significantly higher than actually realised.

Gross total investment at current prices is estimated to have risen by 15.2 percent in 1984-85 compared to an increase of 10.0 percent last year. The ratio of gross total investment to Gross National Product at current market improved from 15.7 percent in the preceding year to 16 percent during 1984-85.

/12851

CSO: 4600/155

PAKISTAN

CAUTION URGED ON 'TIGHTENING DEBT TRAP'

Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 14 Dec 85 p 4

[Article by Aslam Sheikh]

[Text] Islamabad -- The Annual Report of the State Bank of Pakistan is usually a more realistic appraisal of the economy than the somewhat complacent projection emanating from the corridors of powers here. It has rightly warned against the danger of declining national savings and rising dependence on external resources. More particularly it has noted with concern that annual servicing of external debt is now touching one billion US dollar per annum.

In a way the warning is timely and must somewhat temper our otherwise enthusiastic preparation to incur additional liability of more than 6 billion dollars the US alone for the post-1987 period. What we will be borrowing as usual from some other Western sources will be extra. Additional borrowing from US alone will be taking our present outstanding debt to over \$18 billion. If we take into account our total borrowing since the early fifties, the grand total comes to more than \$30 billion, including what we have already repaid and what was repayable in local currency.

To assert that we are still not as heavily indebted as some Latin American countries is no comfort and in fact seems a lot of economic nonsense. Measured against our national income, our foreign debt is staggering, perhaps close to 40 percent of GNP. Our debt service ratio to GNP is also more than that of India or Bangladesh. Similarly, the percentage of our export of goods and service annually going towards debt servicing is staggering, 30 percent again much higher than that of the two South Asian countries mentioned and where the comparison makes some sense.

For the whole of the First Plan (1955-60), we borrowed around one billion dollars. For 1960-65 and 1965-70 periods it was about three billion each. In the first five years of the seventies foreign debt rose to around \$3.9 billion. But over the past one decade alone more than \$14 billion were borrowed, close to \$12 billion between 1978 to 1985. During the last fiscal year alone total commitments were more than \$2.3 billion.

Over the past ten years, our interest payments on foreign debt were more than \$2 billion on the principal of around \$3 billion that we also repaid. Interest payments on short-term loans were extra. With mounting debt servicing, the net inflow is dwindling every year, fresh borrowing increasingly going towards repayments. We seem to have been caught in a vicious circle and increased borrowing is adding and not reducing our dependence on foreign resources. The net inflow in 1975-76 was \$923 million but in 1984-85 declined to \$594 million after repayment of old principal of \$513 million. If interest payment of \$275 million is added, the net will be smaller still.

This has been a precarious game but we have been able to play it without any serious mishap so far thanks to last decade's remittances boom. From all indications we may soon be compelled to live without that wind-fall. Global economy is undoubtedly entering a new turbulent phase. A new oil price war is beginning to threaten relations between the OPEC and its Western antagonists. While it is premature to assess its real implications and consequences in the years to come, it will certainly create more complications for our economy.

In the short run, if oil prices fall, we may partially benefit from lower oil import bill, though it is not clear what kind of long-term contracts on old prices we have entered into. But a big crash in oil prices could also mean a new drastic cut in development expenditures in the Gulf region, forcing the countries there to send many of our expatriates back home at a much brisker pace than they have been doing so far. We hardly seem well prepared to confront that kind of situation.

Our economic policy-making, as it has evolved over the past few years, is putting excessive reliance on foreign resources both as aid and foreign private capital. Apart from the fact that such total dependence weakens our sovereignty and also has its pitfalls, all the expectations about the uninterrupted flow of external assistance may not materialise in the rapidly evolving new international economic situation. Indeed, Americans have their own reservations about the availability of funds for external commitment as the domestic pressures on reducing public expenditure mount.

The uncertainties and complexities of the unfolding global economic scenario therefore should also compel us to tread cautiously in such a slippery environment. In any case a close monitoring of the emerging trends and prompt adjustments in our overall economic strategy is necessary. Above all the sane course, in the light of our unhappy experience in the late sixties, is to curtail foreign borrowing and reactivate a policy which can draw upon ample reserves of domestic reserves. This also means a new austerity and curbing wasteful consumption of elites to generate domestic funds for more balanced growth and development of neglected regions and classes.

/12851
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PAKISTAN

AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL'S CHARGES DISCUSSED

Lahore VIEWPOINT in English 28 Nov 85 pp 20-21

[Article by Zubeida Mustafa: "Amnesty 1985"]

[Text] If there is an organisation with an international membership that can never be popular with governments, it is the London-based Amnesty International. That is understandable, for its annual report, a blood-curdling but authentic and well-researched document, exposes the human rights records of countries in such a telling way that governments find it difficult to rebutt it. Hence it is invariably suppressed.

Amnesty treads on many toes because the issue it is most concerned with also happens to be the most sensitive for many governments: man's right to express his convictions -- political, religious and others. From this follow Amnesty's efforts to secure the release of political prisoners, ensure a fair trial for them and campaign against torture and the death penalty.

By focussing sharply on these issues, Amnesty manages to create an impact on public opinion though not necessarily a change in official policy or the human rights situation. At times its report is not even a revealing piece of literature for many of the facts are already known. Yet the report stirs the conscience because it gives in such concentrated form and in black and white information which is otherwise so scattered that it often fails to register.

Pakistan's Record

For instance, take the case of Amnesty's latest report released in October for the calendar year 1984. The five most serious charges of human rights abuse documented in the case of Pakistan are no revelation. What is more, most of them have been substantiated by Government pronouncements. But it would need a lot of optimism to believe that things are about to change; 1985 might even have been worse.

The report, fir of all, speaks of the large-scale detention of political opponents many of whom were held without charge or trial during 1984. It specifically mentions those arrested for participating in the MRD

demonstrations in 1983, for protesting against the referendum in 1984, for conspiracy to overthrow the government, for agitating against the ban on students' unions and for preaching and propagating the Ahmadiya faith. What should be disturbing is that many of these -- termed as prisoners of conscience by Amnesty -- were denied a fair trial by internationally accepted standards.

Second is the charge of torture of political prisoners by the police and other intelligence agencies. Amnesty spells out the gory details: "While held in police custody for several days, some of the students were reported to have been beaten with batons and pieces of leather, to have had hair pulled out..."

It further speaks of "death of criminal suspects in police custody, allegedly as a result of torture". Such instances are not unknown and were confirmed by the powers that be when some time ago two police officers were tried and convicted of torturing prisoners.

Thirdly, Amnesty charges that "some prisoners continued to be held in bar fetters and shackles " This should need no comment after a Federal Minister for State admitted before the National Assembly that a prisoner was kept in chains for violating prison rules.

Amnesty also takes strong objection to the floggings which "were inflicted in public as well as in jails" and at times resulted in "prisoners losing consciousness." Since floggings are routinely reported in the media -- with pictures in the Urdu Press -- this charge again cannot be challenged.

Finally, the report speaks of the execution of more than 70 prisoners during 1984, more than two-thirds of whom had been tried by military courts. One prisoner hanged in August was believed to have been under 18 years old at the time of his arrest. In one case "the Government intervened to procure the death-sentence on three men after a military court imposed prison sentences in a closed hearing." All executions have been duly announced, in some cases after they have been carried out. What is striking is the marked rise in the number of executions. In 1974, only two people were hanged.

Death Penalty

It is this matter of what Amnesty terms the "taking of human life by the State" that forms the focus of its report this year. Opposed in principle to capital punishment, the movement has campaigned vigorously against it and succeeded in some countries. By the end of 1984, 27 countries had abolished the death penalty for all offences and 19 for all but exceptional offences, such as war crimes. But over 100 countries still provide for the death penalty by law. Pakistan is one of them.

How does Pakistan's record of human rights compare with others? In 1984, at least 1,513 official executions were publicly recorded in 40 countries -- the highest figures being Iran 661, China 292, Iraq several hundreds,

South Africa, 114, Pakistan 70, Afghanistan 68, Saudi Arabia 23, US 21, Syria 18 and the USSR 16. The same year 2,068 people were sentenced to death by courts in 55 countries.

Death by Torture

But many people who died at the hands of the State were not sentenced to death by courts of law. Prisoners died in custody from torture, neglect or ill-treatment and civilians were killed in raids carried out by security forces. In some African countries such as the Cameroon, Sierra Leone and Zaire prisoners died of malnutrition.

Reports of death by torture came from Chile, Turkey and Uruguay. Indiscriminate killings often of unarmed civilians have also been noted. Chad, Brazil, El Salvador, Guatemala, Indonesia and Sri Lanka had the worst record in this context.

Another form of State violence was that of making people "disappear" -- a phenomenon typical of Latin America. In Chile alone 650 people "disappeared" and it was learnt that several army officers were responsible for their fate. A number of them had been shot while others had been thrown from aircraft into the sea after their stomachs had been cut open so the bodies would not surface. In Colombia 300 "disappearances" were reported. Bolivia had 207 such cases.

In terms of number, the largest group is that of prisoners of conscience -- men and women detained because of their views. Generally held without trial they cannot hope to secure their release by legal processes. Their numbers can only be guessed at and even when based on conservative estimates they are formidable.

Human Rights and Peace

What is important is that a worldwide awareness be created about the importance of human rights for the development of the human personality and the quality of life of people. Moreover, it also needs to be more tangibly recognised that the issue of human rights has a direct bearing on international peace and stability. Not surprisingly the international community's efforts in the last three decades have been directed towards making human rights legally enforceable. Now there are 23 covenants and conventions dealing with different rights and one of them -- the Optional Protocol -- even makes it possible for an individual to take his government to task before an international tribunal. There is a standing body -- the Commission on Human Rights -- to study reports on the human rights situation in different countries. Ad hoc bodies have been set up to investigate excesses by State authorities -- the one on Chile being the best known.

But these developments have not led to any significant improvement in the human rights situation in many countries. Many governments are still as intolerant of dissent as before.

Amnesty, which was set up in 1961 by a British lawyer when two Portuguese students were sentenced to seven years' imprisonment for making a toast to freedom, has certainly helped create an awareness of man's right to hold his own opinions. Today it has 500,000 members, 3,430 groups in 55 countries and 45 sections in as many countries. What is significant is that there is no Amnesty International Group or Section at work in Pakistan. India, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Nepal have Sections of Amnesty International. Are we that insensitive?

/12851

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PAKISTAN

SENATE RECOMMENDS EARLY REPATRIATION OF BIHARIS

Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 13 Dec 85 pp 1, 8

[Text] Islamabad, Dec 12--The Senate today unanimously adopted a resolution expressing complete sympathy with the Biharis in Bangladesh and urged the Pakistan Government for their early repatriation and permanent rehabilitation in Pakistan.

The resolution, moved by Senator Maulana Kausar Niazi, was adopted after a thorough discussion, in which a dozen Senators took part. Those who participated include Maulana Kausar Niazi, Abdur Rahim Mir-dadkhel, Mir Ali Nawaz Ahmed Talpur, Jehangir Khan Jogezeai, Sardar Khizar Hayat, Syed Fazal Agha, Syed Abbas Shah, Prof Khurshid Ahmed, Mohsiin Siddiqui, Javed Jabbar, Hassan A. Aheikh and Qazi Abdul Latif.

The resolution was: "This House expresses its complete sympathy with and concern for the Biharis living in make-shift refugee camps in Bangladesh and recommends to the Government to make effective arrangements for their early repatriation to and permanent rehabilitation in Pakistan.

Taking the floor Maulana Kausar Niazi said the Niharis were staunch Muslims and true Pakistanis and that at the time of Partition they had opted for Pakistan and not Bangladesh.

He alleged that despite the tall claims of being an Islamic state, nothing has been done for the rehabilitation of these brethren in Pakistan.

He expressed his pleasure that the President during his recent visit to Dhaka had met a delegation of the Biharis. He said it reflects his favourable sentiments about them and stressed that positive efforts should be made in this regard.

Mir Ali Nawaz Khan Talpur supporting the resolution said that the Muslim brothers living in Bangladesh should be shifted to Pakistan. He said those brothers should be settled in all the four provinces and added that people of Sind will welcome them open-heartedly.

Mohammad Jehangir Khan Jogezeai said that Islam being a universal religion has taught us a lesson of love and affection. The suffering and agony of Muslims are shared alike irrespective of distance or boundaries.

Sardar Khizar Hayat said that creation of Pakistan was the result of innumerable sacrifices rendered by the Muslim of the sub-Continent. He said the Bangalis were also in the forefront of this struggle.

Pir Abbas Shah said that the Biharis were made refugees due to their affiliation with us and were now languishing in camps. He said they should be shifted to Pakistan at the earliest. He suggested setting up of a Prime Minister's Fund for the repatriation of Biharis to solve the financial problems of their rehabilitation.

Prof Khurshid Ahmed speaking on the resolution said that he was pinched over the word Bihari used for our Muslim brothers. He suggested that it should be substituted for the word Pakistanis. He said they have been in miserable condition for the last 14 years. He said that he had seen them twice in the camps in inhuman condition.

Mr Mohsin Siddiqui while supporting the resolution said that if a fund was created for the repatriation of Biharis he would personally donate a sum of rupees five lakh towards this fund.

Javed Jabbar endorsed the views expressed by the mover of the resolution and called for adoption of the resolution keeping in view the human aspect of the issue. He said a plan should be chalked out to settle the Biharis in the four provinces. He said the Biharis, whom he called Pakistanis, would not be a burden on Pakistan's economy by any means.

Mr. Hassan A. Sheikh observed that the Biharis suffered because they supported the Pakistan army at the time of East Pakistan debacle.

Qazi Abdul Latif, speaking on the resolution, also favoured the resolution and demanded early repatriation of the Biharis.

Responding to various points raised by Senators in their speeches, the Federal Minister for Railways, Nawabzada Abdul Ghafoor Khan Hoti assured the House that the President, Gen. Mohammed Ziaul Haq and Prime Minister, Mohammed Khan Junejo shared their concern and the government was making every endeavour to repatriate the Biharis to Pakistan.

The Minister also denied a Senator's assertion about Saudi Government's offer of 350 million dollars for repatriation of Biharis and clarified that the funds were being collected by the Motamar Alam-i-Islami. About 35 million dollars had been collected by the Motamar so far, as against the total of 490 million required for the purpose. He also contradicted that the Pakistan Government was asking for cash payment of the fund. The Railways Minister also referred to President Ziaul Haq's meeting in Bangladesh with the Biharis.

The Minister of State for Religious Affairs, Maqbool Ahmed Khan, presented report of the Select Committee on the enforcement of Sharia Bill, 1985 before the House. Earlier the delay in the presentation of the report was condoned by the House.

Prof Khurshid Ahmed introduced the Freedom of Information Bill, 1985. The Bill, automatically stands referred to the Standing Committee, under the rules.

Maulana Kausar Niazi also moved another resolution, the consideration of which was deferred till the next working day, seeking reconstitution of the CDA Board, with inclusion of members of the Senate and National Assembly from Islamabad. Mr Shad Mohammed Khan, however, moved an amendment, seeking substitution of word "Islamabad" with word "Pakistan", in the resolution.

The House was then adjourned to meet again on December 14 at 5:15 p.m.

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PAKISTAN

SBPF CONVENTION REITERATES CONFEDERATION DEMAND

Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 10 Dec 85 p 8

[Article by Maleeha Lodhi: "SBP Front Reiterates Confederation Demand"]

[Text] London, 9 Dec--The first convention of the Sindhi-Baluch-Pashtun Front ended on Sunday afternoon with the unanimous adoption of a Declaration reiterating the demand for confederation. It also called for the convening of a constituent assembly with equal elected representation from each national territory to frame a confederal constitution for Pakistan.

In the closed session of the Front, a total of 75 delegates participated, including 25 from Pakistan 40 from Britain and 10 from Europe and the US. The text of the five-page Declaration was later released to the Press at the open session that followed attended by about 100 people, which was addressed by Muntaz Bhutto, Sardar Attaullah Mengal, Afzal Bangash and Abdul Hafiz Pirzada, all of whom spoke in Urdu.

The Front's Declaration said it regarded the establishment of a confederal structure as the last hope for keeping Pakistan together and warned that suppression of the rights of nationalities would result in disintegration of the country. It argued that the rights of the minority nationalities could be protected only within a political structure that recognises the equality of all nationalities and which is based on the principle of voluntary association of their territories in a union of states, whose sovereignty is abridged only by the voluntary surrender by its historic predecessor. The Declaration pledged to pursue a foreign policy for Pakistan based on the principles of independence, non-alignment and friendship towards all neighbouring states. Urging a peaceful political solution of the Afghanistan conflict, it vehemently condemned the present policy of turning Pakistan into a frontline state and a surrogate interventionist force in the superpower rivalry.

The Declaration also demanded the annulment of all convictions and sentences pronounced by military courts and called for the immediate, release of Rasool Baksh Palejo, Fazil Rahu, Makhdum Khaliquzzaman, Jam Saqi, Mahmudul Haq Usmani, Haroon Ahmed, Jamal Naqvi and other political prisoners, including those arrested in connection with the Thori Case.

Pledging full support to the journalists struggling for the freedom of the Press, it also demanded lifting of the ban on labour and student unions. Claiming that the Kalabagh Dam project was detrimental to the interests of the smaller nationalities, it demanded its immediate abandonment.

The main emphasis in the speeches made by all the Front leaders was on explaining why the Front was formed, who in Pakistan was opposing it and answering criticism directed against it. All made the point that confederation was not a step towards secession but a way, the only way, to save the country from disintegration. All also expressed the view that while they did not want to label the Punjabi masses as a party to the exploitation of the smaller nationalities, they are in a position to stop the ruling class from continuing this exploitation, and must do so to save Pakistan.

In a powerful speech, Muntaz Bhutto identified those opposing the Front as the regime, Punjabi politicians, socialists and collaborators who wanted a short-cut to power. Without naming him, Mr Bhutto launched a bitter attack on Ghulam Mustafa Khar saying that the so-called Sher-e-Punjab is on closer inspection, not even a jackal. Moreover, he continued, he also happens to be illiterate, getting others to draft and write his statements for him. Where are our Punjabi brothers today? he asked. "If they can't stop the ruling class, then they must accept responsibility for being a part of the exploitative structure". He also announced that he and other Front leaders would soon be returning to Pakistan to launch a peaceful campaign to present their case to the people and also to test the regime's claim that democracy was being restored.

In a highly charged speech, Sardar Mengal answered the argument that confederation would lead to secession by saying that "if we are given equality and are happy, why should we secede, why should we leave". To the charge that the Front had a Wadera and Sardari leadership, he said we want to give the people the political freedom to decide for themselves whether they want this socio-economic system. He warned the Punjabi opponents of the Front that if they did not accept confederation then there will be a confederation of three provinces and not four. He also said that it was for the Punjabi masses to furnish proof that they are not part of the exploiting structure by supporting the confederation demand. Much of Mengal's speech was in fact directed at Punjabi brothers". He also explained at length why the Front was demanding confederation. Calling the earlier acceptance of the 1973 Constitution as "our biggest mistake", he said that "we had accepted the Constitution only because of the extraordinary circumstances of 1971." He recalled that when the 1973 Constitution was being signed our governments were being dismissed", and when the Constitution was being celebrated we were in jail".

The interesting part of Mr Pirzada's speech was his claim that before Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was executed he had sent him a message through Benazir Bhutto, and later also told him himself that he regretted sending in the army to Baluchistan, calling it his biggest error" and, secondly, he had declared his support for the idea of confederation. Describing this as the late Prime Minister's last wish Mr Pirzada said he believed that Bhutto's PPP is finished because the party never fulfilled his last wish.

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